MilitaryReview

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
Peacekeeping Operations and Force Projection

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
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MilitaryReview

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From the Editor

Beginning with the May–June 1996 edition of *Military Review*, we will mail the journal under a new distribution scheme that will correct inaccuracies under the current system, better serve our intended audience and, in combination with *Military Review*'s electronic "on line" journal, cut our production costs by almost 50 percent.

The current distribution scheme is based on one per general officer and one per five field grade officers in the Active Army and one per headquarters (battalion and higher) in the Army National Guard and US Army Reserve. The data base for this distribution scheme is antiquated, with numerous inaccuracies that cannot be easily corrected—now or in the future—without direct notification from the organizations themselves, some of which no longer even exist.

The new distribution scheme is based on one per 10 officers for major commands, corps, divisions, major staff agencies, garrison commands, Army schools, Reserve commands and Cadet Command organizations. Medical commands, hospitals and units will receive *Military Review* on the basis of one per 25 officers. Brigades and battalions in both the Active and Reserve components will receive from one to five copies, based on the units' assigned field grade officer strength.

This new system will be continuously updated through a data base provided by a contractor to the Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff for Installation Management, which maintains a mailing list for all organizations in the Army. The new data base will enable us to deliver the journal to our readership more accurately and efficiently.

A separate letter concerning this change will be mailed to all future recipients of *Military Review*. This editorial constitutes the only notification current recipients will receive about the distribution changes. Current recipients, whether they are included in the new distribution scheme or not, will still have full access to the journal via the Internet. *Military Review* is now "on line" via the CGSC homepage <http://cgsc–army.mil/>. Scroll down to the *Military Review* icon on the homepage or enter the menu under "organizations" and call up *Military Review*. You can also access *Military Review* from the Fort Leavenworth Combined Arms Center homepage <http://leav–army.mil/> either directly or through the CGSC homepage entry there. *Military Review* "on line" is also hyperlinked to the Army's homepage at <http://www–army.mil>.

The combination of putting *Military Review* on line and cutting back on the number of paper copies produced will enable us to achieve significant efficiencies while continuing to provide our readers with a quality professional journal. Should you have questions or comments concerning this initiative, please feel free to write me at: Editor in Chief, *Military Review*, 290 Grant Avenue, Building 77, Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027–1231.

RMB

The Proof is Missing

Captain J.D. McKillip's article, "Iraqi Strategy During the Gulf War: An Alternative Viewpoint" (September–October 1995 *Military Review*), is a weak attempt to legitimize Saddam Hussein's aggression against his brother Arabs. The article's foundation holds together only if one believes the United States misinterpreted Iraq's valid national strategy and duped the rest of the world's nations to join in an unnecessary war.

McKillip's conclusions about Iraq's strategy, intentions and actions are pure speculation. I find it telling that there are no substantive Iraqi documents, reports or statements in the article's endnotes. The only references purporting to justify Iraqi actions are the quotations from Elaine Siolino's *The Outlaw State*. These quotations are only from the July 1990 Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries meeting and hardly prove McKillip's thesis.

The article is supposed to explain Iraqi strategy, yet no strategy statement has been forthcoming from Iraq. The author tells us that "documentation suggests that Iraq had a clear and sound national strategy supported by a consistent and logical operational strategy," yet McKillip does not offer the documentation, nor does he quote from it. He also does not explain how this purported strategy can be considered clear and sound. Additionally, he fails to show how, if Hussein's operational strategy was so consistent and logical, it collapsed so completely without much of a battle.

Further, McKillip says, "Iraq conducted operations that were both consistent with its foreign policy goals and the military realities of confronting the coalition opposing them." This is hard to verify since there are few authoritative sources on what Iraq's foreign policy was then. As for confronting the military realities of the coalition opposing them, it was hardly reasonable to tolerate an aerial bombardment for more than one month and then fold at the first sight

of ground troops. I cannot conceive of a foreign policy that accepts the useless sacrifice of thousands of troops, not to mention the destruction of the bulk of its military. If Iraq's foreign policy was to ensure the nation's military defeat, then Hussein's actions were indeed consistent with Iraq's foreign policy. Otherwise, his actions were consistent with a deluded character who lacks the capacity to see things realistically and act accordingly.

McKillip tips his hand early in the article when he says, "Fundamental to understanding Iraqi strategy is acknowledgment that Iraq had no intention of fighting a war to retain Kuwait." I believe McKillip is correct. However, to understand the Iraqi strategy as McKillip relates it, the reader must believe everything the author offers. One must also accept that the invasion of Kuwait was justified, that the United States misled Hussein about its intentions and that Iraq's intentions stopped at the Kuwait–Saudi border.

The author adroitly explains how the Republican Guards pulled back from the Saudi Arabian border leaving less–capable formations in their place. His belief that this proves Iraq had no intention to invade Saudi is just one possible explanation. He does not explore the possibility that they were refitting for future operations. This would not be the first time in history that crack divisions moved to the rear in favor of fresh units.

The conclusions offered in McKillip's article may be accurate. The problem is that either the information is not available or McKillip did not offer enough information to prove his point. This article might serve as further proof—for those who wish to prove it—that the United States blundered into a war, entered it as a military exercise or whatever is the reader's ulterior motive. Until actual documents come out of Iraq, put this article into the category of speculation. McKillip bemoans the lack of critical Gulf War analysis. He may

have a point, but in my opinion, his article does not fill the gap either.

MSGT **James H. Clifford,** *USA,*
Andrews Air Force Base, Maryland

Speculation is Our Business

I was pleased to read Master Sergeant James H. Clifford's comments about my article. The article's purpose was to provoke debate on an important issue whose treatment, I feel, has been less than balanced. It appears I have been successful.

As for the substance of Clifford's critique, I offer the following. My article is not an attempt to "legitimize" anything—please remember which side Canada was on. It is not a discussion of right or wrong. A nation's strategy does not need justifying to be coherent *from its point of view.*

The analysis of Iraq's strategy is not a definitive study based on hard evidence such as Iraqi government documents—which we can assume will remain secret unless Saddam Hussein's regime is overthrown—or statements from Iraqi officials. It is the product of deduction based on observed action and published documents and statements, most of which come from the international press. My original, unedited article contained 26 sources, including my own observations during the full year I served in Iraq.

Clifford raises specific issues I will address. I do not believe the United States "duped" anyone into fighting an "unnecessary war." I do believe the invasion of Kuwait and resulting Gulf War were preventable had the international community, including my country, had a clearer position on the Persian Gulf and its resources and nations. Once Kuwait was invaded, the world confronted the problem of what to do next.

Also at issue is the question of results. A common argument is that any strategy which fails must be bad. This is simply not true and is a profoundly dangerous attitude. There are many possible reasons for failure—bad strategy is just one. Discounting a na-

tion's strategy based on its overall failure leads to events such as the 1940 German invasion of France and the 1973 Middle East War.

Finally, Clifford suggests that perhaps the Iraqi army pulled its "crack" units back from Kuwait following its invasion as they were "refitting for future operations." This proposition is improbable. The Kuwait invasion was a short, sharp operation employing overwhelming force. If the Iraqis intended to invade Saudi Arabia, or any other state, they would have brushed the Kuwaiti forces aside and carried on. There was no need to "refit" anything.

My article was an attempt to see things from another perspective, to understand how and why Iraq did what it did. My reasons were simple and clear. Most situations confronting national and military planners come with a decided lack of "facts." Yet, nations and their military forces are compelled to make decisions that can and do have tremendous consequences. The "speculation" Clifford decries is the main way we do business and will continue to do so—and that *is* a fact.

CPT J.D. McKillip, *Canadian Army, St. Hubert, Canada*

Will the Real Guy Sajer Step Forward

Lieutenant Colonel Edwin L. Kennedy, in his book review of *Panzerheld: The Story of Hauptsturmführer Michael Wittman* (July–August 1995 *Military Review*) repeats an assertion seemingly gaining credence at the US Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, if not Armywide. Namely, it is that the book *The Forgotten Soldier* by Guy Sajer is fiction. For those not familiar with the book, it is an autobiography of a young Alsatian who served in Adolf Hitler's *Wehrmacht* during World War II. *The Forgotten Soldier* occupies an honored place on military bookshelves because of its authenticity and its unrelenting depiction of combat from the foot soldier's point of view.

The revisionists point of view propounded by Kennedy and others is that the book is a fake, although a well–written one, modeled after Stephen Crane's *The Red Badge of Courage*. In other articles, Kennedy has highlighted many inconsisten-

cies present throughout Sajer's book as evidence that he either made up key elements or misrepresented other events entirely. To those unfamiliar with the book's setting and the unit (the *Grossdeutschland* Division), Kennedy's arguments seem entirely logical and well arranged.

After some research at the Combined Arms Research Library, Fort Leavenworth, and other information depositories about the Soviet Front and the *Wehrmacht*, I think Kennedy is wrong. *The Forgotten Soldier* is authentic, at least until Sajer appears and admits he is a fraud. I am not asking for a campaign to "reverse the tide" but for quiet lobbying whenever possible for the book's authenticity.

Although *The Forgotten Soldier* has many flaws—all of which I believe are minor—it is still one of the finest, most realistic personal combat narratives of the Soviet Front and soldiering in general. Rather than devoting energy to prove it is fiction, we should treat *The Forgotten Soldier* as a historical military literature milestone and move on.

MAJ Douglas E. Nash, *USA, Tampa, Florida*

Military Professionals do not Use Fiction as Fact

Major Douglas E. Nash and I both very much like the novel *The Forgotten Soldier*, although I have never believed it to be modeled on *The Red Badge of Courage* as Nash claims. As a military historian, I am unable to find any substantive evidence that the book is anything other than a well–written fictional account of World War II Eastern Front experiences. The facts and evidence I have discovered support my conclusion that it is historical fiction.

Besides doing a lot of secondary source research, I was able to personally interview the *Grossdeutschland* Division historian, Helmuth Spaeter, and discuss the subject with numerous division veterans at their 1988 reunion. I am convinced beyond reasonable doubt that my hero "Guy Sajer" is a fictional creation intended either as a composite of actual individuals who experienced the war incidents in Russia or as a *nom de plume* to protect the author's true identity.

In a detailed *Army History* article, I wrote that *The Forgotten Soldier* was never purported to be an "auto-

biography" until its recent reprint by Brassey's—the latest in a line of publishers. Conversely, neither was it attributed to be a novel by any of its previous publishers, thus opening the gate for misinterpretation and disinformation. Brassey's has fallen into this trap. If this seems so unimaginable, then look at Brassey's book cover, which pictures a *Waffen SS* soldier. The *Grossdeutschland* was a German army unit. The misrepresentation is perpetuated and distorted simultaneously.

Like other well–written war novels, *The Forgotten Soldier* reads like a realistic account—but is not. For example, there are many well–written war novels portraying "authenticity and . . . unrelenting depiction of combat. . . . " Ernest Hemingway's *A Farewell to Arms*, Enrique Remarque's *All Quiet on the Western Front* and Norman Mailer's *The Naked and the Dead* are all written by veterans; are considered exemplary, realistic accounts written in first person; and are all novels. We know these authors experienced much of what they wrote about. However, their works do not qualify as fact, and they definitely do not meet the parameters qualifying them as autobiographies.

Nash tends to completely discount the primary source information with many convenient rationalizations and subjective, emotional arguments to wish Sajer into reality. But simply wanting him to be a real person cannot make it so. He says my arguments are "logical and well arranged." I believe this is for good reason—they are based on indisputable facts, not rationalizations and wishful thinking. To my way of thinking, Nash's arguments are illogical and ill–founded.

Nash's argument that *The Forgotten Soldier* could not be a "fraud" unless declared so by Sajer himself is very interesting, but it leads to the converse argument—that the book cannot be true unless declared so by Sajer. Nowhere does Sajer state the book is fact. This is not good literary form when writing novels in the first person. Neither is there an introduction by anyone of substance recommending it as a true account.

Numerous letters to author Sajer through the different publishers have failed to elicit any type of response. Other than rationalizing that Sajer *continued on page 104*

Commanders must meet operational contingencies across the full spectrum of conflict as America's Army enters the 21st century. In a world undergoing unprecedented and accelerating change, the Army must continue to fulfill its vital role in supporting national security objectives, developing military strategies and supporting diplomatic efforts to maintain peace in potential conflict areas. Commanders will continue to face highly ambiguous situations and uncertainty in peacekeeping (PK) operations. This section reviews lessons learned from recent PK operations and exercises and examines existing doctrine to further the Army's discussion of its PK roles and missions.

Peacekeeping
Operations

PEACEKEEPER 95:

27th Guards Train with "Big Red One"

Major General Randolph W. House, US Army,
Major Mark R. Pires, US Army, and
Lieutenant Colonel Lester W. Grau, US Army, Retired

The past several days had been remarkably warm and pleasant in Kansas for the end of October, but now the bitter, cold north wind howled as soldiers with the quick reaction force (QRF) huddled in the warmth of their sleeping bags. As the radio hummed to life with yet another mission, they scrambled into their gear, picked up their Kalashnikov assault rifles or M16A2s and stumbled into the predawn light. They could hear the steady thump, thump of approaching helicopters.

The helicopters landed and the blades stopped turning. The pilots joined the QRF soldiers clustered around a Russian lieutenant. It was his day to command. The lieutenant described the mission and his plan, pausing frequently so the interpreter could convey the full message. An ammunition dump was reportedly concealed in the buffer zone. The QRF had to find and capture it. After issuing the order and answering questions, the lieutenant inspected the force. Following an equipment check, the QRF boarded the helicopters for lift–off.

The helicopters rose into the air and over the rolling Kansas plain. The north wind rocked and buffeted the helicopters as they flew. The soldiers shouted out conversations as the adrenalin rush kicked in. A US Army specialist was trying to explain to a Russian junior sergeant that today was Halloween and what significance that held for Americans.

RUSSIAN BOOTS in America's heartland used to be the stuff of bad fiction—but it really happened. *PEACEKEEPER 95 (PK 95)*, a combined US and Russian peacekeeping (PK) exercise held at Fort Riley, Kansas, provided realistic combined training and forged stronger relations between the two countries. *PK 95* demonstrated that US and Russian units could work together in such operations—as they are now doing in Bosnia. *PK 95* was another successful step in the US–Russian military–to–military cooperation program which has been under way since

1991. Several Russian officers have studied at US war colleges, the National Defense University and the US Army Command and General Staff College. In 1994, elements from the US 3d Infantry Division (Mechanized) [3d ID(M)] and the Russian 27th Guards Motorized Rifle Division (27th GMRD) participated in *PEACEKEEPER 94 (PK 94)* in Totskoye, Russia. *PK 95* marked the first time Russian and US soldiers trained together in the Continental United States. The exercise enabled soldiers from both countries to practice interoperability in PK missions and to share and develop tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs) for PK tasks. More important, the exercise allowed US and Russian soldiers to develop personal relationships based on trust and mutual understanding. That both nations felt the exercise was important was demonstrated by visits from Russian Minister of Defense General Pavel Grachev, US Secretary of Defense William Perry, Secretary of the Army Togo West, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General John Shalikashvili and US Army Forces Command Commander General John H. Tilelli Jr.

Mission and Planning

In February 1995, the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff tasked the 1st Infantry Division (Mechanized) [1st ID(M)], Fort Riley, Kansas, with planning and executing a combined PK exercise with the 27th GMRD. Elements of the US 3d ID(M), Würzburg, Germany, would also participate. The mission: "Elements of US and Russian military forces conduct a combined PK exercise at Fort Riley, Kansas, 22 October to 4 November 1995, to develop a relationship based on mutual trust and better understanding of each other; to enhance interoperability between forces in a peacekeeping role; and to promote military–to–military cooperation between forces."[1]

A series of three planning conferences at Fort Riley and in Moscow enabled the 1st ID(M) and 27th

US and Russian soldiers listen to AAR comments at the combined movement checkpoint.

US Army

Throughout the planning conferences, communication was a challenge. On several occasions, planners concluded discussions thinking that both sides had agreed to a particular plan, only to discover later that the two units had left the discussion with different ideas about what had been said. Patience and flexibility were key in working through communication barriers.

GMRD to begin forging professional and personal relationships. Further, 1st ID(M) and Russian commanders developed three overarching exercise goals:

• Enhance military cooperation and trust between the United States and the Russian Federation, with long–term implications for world peace and stability.

• Conduct a four–day PK exercise to practice and refine the TTPs developed during *PK 94*.

• Implement combined small–unit actions to enhance tactical interoperability in combined PK operations.

US and Russian military leaders used negotiation and compromise to reach mutually acceptable agreements on the exercise. Throughout the planning con-

ferences, communication was a challenge. On several occasions, planners concluded discussions thinking that both sides had agreed to a particular plan, only to discover later that the two units had left the discussion with different ideas about what had been said. Patience and flexibility were key in working through communication barriers.

Exercise planning was further complicated by shifts in political affairs. The pre–election campaign for the new Russian Duma threatened to cancel the exercise, and the communist resurgence in the election caused further difficulties. *PK 94* had been met with howls of protest against the "US invasion of mother Russia." *PK 95* drew indignant howls from the US militia movement that claimed the exercise was a cover for "the UN occupation of the United States." Once the political flaps subsided, *PK 95* belatedly began.[2]

Command post exercise (CPX)/field training exercise (FTX) scenario and concept. The *PK 95* training scenario replicated actual PK operations. The scenario was set in "Kanza," a fictitious country attempting to establish a new government after undergoing a devastating civil war between two major factions—the Montoos (allied with the Clayton Indians) and the Chameoles (allied with the Rojos). Figure 1 depicts Kanza's population distribution before and after the war. The post–civil war map shows the agreed–upon buffer zone, where elements of the factions, splinter groups, refugees and the media were intermingled when the peacekeepers arrived. More than 200 soldiers from 1st ID(M) portrayed faction members, civilians, media personnel and Kanza army members.

The scenario replicated a PK operation in which formal consent among all parties on the presence and mission scope of the PK forces existed in accordance with Chapter VI of the UN Charter.[3] Thus, the peacekeepers deployed into a region where the belligerents had already separated, and the buffer zone was agreed–upon and in effect at the outset of the CPX/FTX. The PK forces' mission statement follows: "US and Russian contingents from the 1st ID(M)(–) and the 27th GMRD(–), as part of UN Combined Peacekeeping Forces–Kanza, conduct combined peacekeeping operations in the established buffer zone to supervise, monitor and verify observance of the truce between belligerents and help maintain a secure environment conducive to political stability and process."[4]

The PK mission's scope was limited to verifying and, where necessary, enforcing the peace agreement's terms within the buffer zone. The mission

Pre-Civil War Ethnic Distribution

Post-Civil War MOF* Locations
(and CPKF Buffer Zone)

Montoo
Chamcole
Clayton
Rojo

NEBRA
KANZA
Tuttle Sea
Clay Center
Riley
Milford Sea
Keats
Port Milford
Manhattan
Junction City

NEBRA
KANZA
Tuttle Sea
Clay Center
—XX—
CPKF**
Riley
Milford Sea
Keats
Port Milford
Manhattan
Junction City

* Major Opposing Factions
** Combined Peacekeeping Force

Figure 1. Kanza Exercise Scenario

statement also included a typical PK gray area: "Maintain a secure environment conducive to political stability and process." This part of the mission challenged peacekeepers and stressed the employment of rules of engagement (ROE).[5]

PK 95 used a master events list (MEL) and computer simulation to drive the CPX and FTX. Figure 2 depicts the force "lay–down" for the CPX/FTX. US and Russian forces each deployed one regiment– or brigade–level headquarters and one battalion headquarters for the CPX and one company for the FTX. The balance of the forces, including remaining companies from the battalions deployed for the CPX and an additional battalion from each of the regiment or brigade units were portrayed through simulation.

The MEL, an hourly schedule of interactions between peacekeepers and role players, consisted of more than 100 major events and countless "routine" events. Major events included large numbers of refugees seeking assistance, civil disturbances, encounters with faction members in the buffer zone and convoy escort missions. Routine events included civilian vehicles passing through the movement control point (MCP) and small groups of civilians seeking food or medical aid. Each event was designed to cause the peacekeepers to execute a specific training task under the conditions established by the training scenario. The training tasks, conditions and standards were taken from various TTP manuals, in particular

US Army Field Manual 100–23, *Peace Operations*, which offers a concise checklist of predeployment training that must be incorporated into a unit's training program.[6]

The MEL required peacekeepers to execute six major collective PK tasks found in the TTPs:
- Operate a checkpoint.
- Escort a convoy.
- React to civil disturbances.
- Employ a QRF.
- Patrol.
- Enforce the separation of belligerents.

Small–unit training was designed to facilitate interoperability. This was accomplished by creating a combined platoon–size MCP and a combined QRF. Each national force contributed 11 soldiers to the MCP and 17 soldiers to the QRF. These two combined

Simulated units with players interacting

XX
Combined Peacekeeping Force

Simulated units with headquarters players only

433 Motorized Rifle Regiment

Quick Reaction Force

937 Engineer

2 Motorized Rifle Regiment

3 Motorized Rifle Battalion

4-37 Armor

2-64 Armor

8th Motorized Rifle Company

D/2-64 Armor

Figure 2. Four-Day FTX/CPX Force Laydown.

US and Russian peace-keepers reacting to a civil disturbance.

Each event was designed to cause the peacekeepers to execute a specific training task under the conditions established by the training scenario. The training tasks, conditions and standards were taken from various TTP manuals, in particular US Army Field Manual 100–23, Peace Operations, *which offers a concise checklist of predeployment training that must be incorporated into a unit's training program.*

forces gave soldiers and small–unit leaders an opportunity to work closely together and exchange experiences and individual techniques for accomplishing various tasks. A highly detailed MEL was developed to achieve desired training objectives.

Lessons Learned

PK 95 produced a broad range of lessons learned, from national philosophies of combined PK command and control (C^2) to techniques at the individual soldier level.

C^2 **perspectives.** *PK 95* highlighted differing US and Russian perspectives regarding combined PK force C^2. The *PK 95* CPX/FTX C^2 structure was designed to form a combined US and Russian division–level staff to allow US and Russian staff officers to work together. In reality, two national staffs—one US and one Russian—formed in adjacent rooms. Each staff operated under the command of its national exercise commander. Command alternated daily between the 1st ID(M) and Russian division com-

manders. The two staffs passed orders and reports to their respective national forces. The difference between the intended C^2 structure—with one combined staff—and the actual outcome—two adjacent but distinct staffs—highlights the differing perspective the two nations brought to the exercise.

Figure 3 illustrates the difference between the US and Russian perspectives on combined C^2. Neither perspective is particularly right or wrong. The difference in perspectives is rooted in each nation's historical experiences in combined operations.

The left side of Figure 3 depicts the US combined staff model. In the US model, each force contributes to the staff based on the respective nation's capabilities and total force contribution. All staff sections are fully integrated into a single staff organized along the traditional "G–staff" lines of responsibility. US experiences in World War II, NATO operations and Korea have shaped and reinforced this particular combined staff perception—although each instance took years to shape and develop.

Combined Staff: Fully Integrated

US Experience

Commander

Deputy

C1 | C2 | C3 | C4

Combined Staff: Collocated, but distinct

Russian Experience*

Commander

Deputy — Combat Control Center

Chief of Staff | Chief of Staff

G1 | G2 | G3 | G4 | G1 | G2 | G3 | G4

Figure 3. Combined C^2: Lessons Learned

*Separate zones of responsibility coordinated by Combat Control Center

The right side of Figure 3 depicts the Russian combined staff model. In this model, there are two national staffs which are collocated but distinct. Each nation determines the organization and composition of its national staff. The Russian model also includes a combat control center responsible for coordinating critical operational issues between the two national staffs.

In both models, command of forces from contributing nations is given to a commander of one country with a deputy or chief of staff from another. Each model has strengths and weaknesses. The US model forms a more fully integrated staff, helping to ensure greater synchronization of effort. However, forming this type of staff requires a single, agreed–upon planning process with standard orders. Using this model is difficult if both nations do not speak the same language and employ the same staff procedures and map graphics. The Russian model allows each nation to use its own national planning process and operation orders. However, having two distinct staffs increases the chance that national efforts will not be synchronized toward one common goal. The key to using either is to capitalize on strengths and minimize weaknesses.

The AAR process. *PK 95* introduced the Russian participants to the US training model's essential components. Some components, such as the use of simulations, the multiple integrated laser engagement system (MILES) and the AAR process, are not part of the Russian model. Russian leaders, including Defense Minister Grachev, expressed interest in simulations and MILES and requested information on the capabilities and specifications of various sys-

Each staff operated under the command of its national exercise commander. Command alternated daily between the 1st ID(M) and Russian division commanders. The two staffs passed orders and reports to their respective national forces. The difference between the intended C^2 structure—with one combined staff—and the actual outcome—two adjacent but distinct staffs—highlights the differing perspective the two nations brought to the exercise.

tems. The Russian reaction to the AAR process was particularly interesting.

The training exercise was structured with US observer/controllers (O/Cs) located with each US unit down to squad level. US O/Cs conducted AARs after each event, and they also accompanied Russian units whenever they came into contact with role players. This arrangement ensured that events between Russian peacekeepers and US role players took place as planned. US O/Cs with Russian units were also able to act as training observers, if Russian units consented to receiving training feedback. The Russian forces brought "umpires" who observed them and numerically graded their actions. The give–and–take of the US AAR process is very different from the graded, one–way feedback of the Russian process.

Following each event at the combined MCP, the US O/C gathered US and Russian forces together for an AAR. Initially, the Russians did not participate in

the AAR. To create a more open atmosphere, the US O/C began conducting two AARs. One AAR was held with only the officers, while a second was held for the soldiers. This approach, while not the normal procedure for US units, opened up discussion.

The US O/C experiences at the MCP were also interesting. The Russian umpire did not conduct AARs but periodically gathered the Russian soldiers

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The Russian umpire did not conduct AARs but periodically gathered the Russian soldiers together to critique their performance. Following one such critique . . . the US O/C asked the Russian umpire for permission to address the soldiers. The umpire agreed and the US O/C facilitated a discussion of events and provided his observations. During the next critique, the Russian umpire asked the US controller for comments. The fact that the umpire sought feedback from the O/C increased the O/C's credibility and status with the soldiers. The Russian umpire also began asking the O/C for daily written comments on training observations.

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together to critique their performance. Following one such critique on the first day of the exercise, the US O/C asked the Russian umpire for permission to address the soldiers. The umpire agreed and the US O/C facilitated a discussion of events and provided his observations. During the next critique, the Russian umpire asked the US controller for comments. The fact that the umpire sought feedback from the O/C increased the O/C's credibility and status with the soldiers. The Russian umpire also began asking the O/C for daily written comments on training observations. After translating the comments, the umpire discussed the observations with the US O/C. These professional exchanges proved to be among the most beneficial aspects of the exercise.

Individual soldier–level and small–unit lessons. All of the participants learned valuable lessons at the individual–soldier and small–unit levels. Soldiers from both nations improved interpersonal skills in dealing with civilians and faction members. At the exercise's beginning, both US and Russian soldiers tended to treat civilians and faction members as enemies. As the exercise progressed, soldiers from both nations learned to adapt to their role as peacekeepers. They learned to be friendly while remaining vigilant and alert. Small–unit leaders learned to negotiate be-

fore using force. Early in the exercise, peacekeepers failed to use controlled escalation of force, which led to incidents of soldiers firing into crowds and other undesirable actions. Gradually, the peacekeepers learned to control events without resorting to force.

The QRF stayed together throughout the entire exercise. This arrangement facilitated team building, and the QRF functioned as a coherent force, regardless of which nation's lieutenant was in charge. The QRF demonstrated that the force could work together efficiently and effectively.

Operating together at the combined MCP was a great training experience for US and Russian soldiers as well. Leaders at the MCP initially divided duties and positions along national lines to maximize C^2 and minimize communication problems. During the exercise, the two forces established standard hand and arm signals and other operating procedures. Communication barriers were eventually overcome to the point where US and Russian soldiers freely intermingled.

The vehicle and personnel inspection point was manned by mixed groups of US and Russian soldiers. The basic procedures and duties at the inspection point were easy to grasp, enabling the forces to mesh immediately. Combining the soldiers at this level allowed them to exchange individual techniques. Russian soldiers, for example, were initially more thorough in conducting personnel inspections and US soldiers learned from them.

Task organizing US and Russian soldiers at the small–unit level created the opportunity to forge personal and professional relationships. Although this was a tremendous training experience, because of communications barriers and other factors, observers and leaders from both nations agree that it would be impractical to integrate forces to this degree during actual operations.

Future US and Russian PK Exercises

Key issues remain. Will future exercises rely more on inexpensive simulations or will the "muddy boots" element remain? Where will future exercises be held? What TTP refinements are needed for Bosnia and other areas? What modifications are needed for PK ROE? What changes should the US and Russian armies make?

PK 95 enhanced military cooperation and trust between the US and Russian ground forces. The CPX/FTX enabled soldiers to practice and refine TTPs. Combined small–unit actions enhanced tactical interoperability, and leaders exchanged ideas and perspectives on complex C^2 issues. *PK 95* was another step in the developing relations between the United

States and Russia. Future US and Russian PK exercises should continue to build on the foundations of *PK 94* and *PK 95* and incorporate greater logistic play and nongovernmental organizations.

Exercises such as *PK 95*, which build greater trust and cooperation between two of the world's most powerful nations, can only lead to greater world peace and stability.

The helicopters approached the landing zone. The first one touched down, and soldiers jumped off and moved out to secure the zone as the next helicopter touched down and the rest of the force deployed. After a quick check, the Russian lieutenant deployed the QRF into a rough wedge, and they moved toward the suspected ammunition dump. As the force neared the site, unknown individuals jumped up and wildly fired several magazines. The QRF held its fire since it was obvious the individuals were fleeing and firing only to discourage pursuit.

The QRF moved quickly toward the ammunition

> *Operating together at the combined MCP was a great training experience for US and Russian soldiers. . . . During the exercise, the two forces established standard hand and arm signals and other operating procedures. Communication barriers were eventually overcome to the point where US and Russian soldiers freely intermingled.*

dump. Suddenly, a Russian private raised his hand and shouted. Everyone froze. A US squad leader approached him. The soldier pointed to a thin, almost invisible, trip wire skillfully woven into the prairie grass. The QRF followed the wire to a concealed claymore mine and found several other buried mines. The US squad leader showed his Russian counterpart how to check for antilift devices on US mines. Soon, the area was cleared and secured. Mission accomplished. **MR**

NOTES

1. "1st Infantry Division (Mechanized) [1st ID(M)] Exercise Directive for *PEACE-KEEPER 95*" (Fort Riley, KS: Headquarters, 1st ID[M], 23 June 1995), unclassified.

2. *PK 95*'s four phases stretched over two weeks. During Phase 1, 105 soldiers from the 3d ID(M) and 153 27th GMRD troops deployed to Fort Riley, Kansas. The Russian contingent deployed in two IL–76 aircraft, which remained in the United States to allow the Russian aircrews to train with US aircrews. Phase 2 included the opening ceremony and lane training. Lane training gave participants a final opportunity to practice peace-keeping (PK) tasks. The training, led by 1st ID(M) noncommissioned officers (NCOs), demonstrated US Army training methods and showcased NCOs as primary trainers. The Russian army does not have a comparable NCO corps and found it surprising that the US Army entrusts so much responsibility to NCOs. Lane training also introduced the Russians to the AAR. Phase 3 was the four–day exercise, which combined computer simulation with a CPX and a realistic PK FTX. Phase 4 consisted of cultural and military activities, the closing ceremony and redeployment. Cultural activities involved mixed groups of US and Russian soldiers traveling to Topeka and Abilene, Kansas, for sightseeing. Military activities included US and Russian soldiers cross–training with the M16A2 and

AK–74 rifles, and Russian officers driving and firing the M2 Bradley Infantry Fighting Vehicle. The closing ceremony followed a combined picnic and sporting events. On 4 November, 27th GMRD and 3d ID(M) participants redeployed home.

3. US Army Field Manual (FM) 100–23, *Peace Operations* (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, December 1994), Annex C, 75.

4. "Campaign Plan Operation *PEACEKEEPER 95* for the Combined Peacekeeping Force–Kanza" (Fort Riley, KS: Headquarters, 1st ID[M], 18 September 1995), unclassified.

5. The scenario and events portrayed during the four–day CPX/FTX were developed using various sources, including publications from the Center for Army Lessons Learned; the *Russian–United States Guide for Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures of Peacekeeping Forces During the Conduct of Exercises*; and past experiences from both Russian and US operations. The scenario and events were developed from a PK operations cross–section and were not based on events in Bosnia or any other contingency operation.

6. FM 100–23, 86–89.

Major General Randolph W. House is the commander, 1st Infantry Division (Mechanized), Fort Riley, Kansas. He received a B.S. from Texas A&M University and an M.A. from Clemson University. He has held a variety of command and staff positions in the Continental United States (CONUS) and Europe, including deputy commandant, US Army Command and General Staff College (USACGSC), Fort Leavenworth, Kansas; assistant division commander for operations and training, and J3, Joint Task Force Andrew in support of Hurricane Andrew relief operations, 4th Infantry Division (Mechanized), Fort Carson, Colorado; commander, 2d Brigade, 1st Cavalry Division, Fort Hood, Texas, during Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm; and executive assistant to the vice director and director, Joint Staff, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Washington, D.C. His article "Command and Control in a Heavy Brigade Movement to Contact" appeared in the November 1991 issue of Military Review.

Major Mark R. Pires is the chief of plans, G3, 1st Infantry Division (Mechanized), Fort Riley, Kansas. He received a B.S. from the US Military Academy and an M.A. from Fresno State University and is a graduate of the USACGSC and the School of Advanced Military Studies. He has held a variety of command and staff positions in CONUS and Europe, including assistant professor of military science, Fresno State University, Fresno, California; commander, Headquarters and Headquarters Company, and commander, Company C, 5th Battalion, 77th Armor Regiment, 8th Infantry Division (Mechanized), Mannheim, Germany; and S3, Air, 5th Battalion, 77th Armor Regiment, Mannheim.

Lieutenant Colonel Lester W. Grau, US Army, Retired, is a research coordinator at the Foreign Military Studies Office, Combined Arms Center, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. He received a B.A. from the University of Texas at El Paso and an M.A. from Kent State University. He is a graduate of the USACGSC, the US Army Russian Institute, the Defense Language Institute and the US Air Force War College. He held a variety of command and staff positions in CONUS and Europe, including deputy director, Center for Army Tactics, and chief, Soviet Tactics Instruction Branch, USACGSC; political and economic adviser, Headquarters, Allied Forces, Central Europe, Brunssum, the Netherlands; and diplomatic courier, Moscow. He supported PEACEKEEPER 95 as an interpreter and facilitator. His article "The Soviet Experience in Afghanistan" appeared in the September–October 1995 issue of Military Review.

Insights into Canadian Peacekeeping Doctrine

Sean M. Maloney
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THE CHANGE in the world's power alignment necessitates a corresponding change in applying military force. The debate over such application has been fierce, nowhere more so than in the US Army. How does a force steeped in a series of reactive adaptations over the past 50 years of the Cold War adjust to this new environment? Currently, US Army doctrine specialists are struggling to produce a codified basis for peacekeeping (PK) operations involving US forces. Hopefully, they are aware of and are drawing on the experiences of their closest ally, Canada.

Since 1948, the Canadian army has been involved in more than 30 PK operations of varying types and duration. Up to now, Canadian army PK doctrine has been relatively ad hoc and has reactively adapted to the wide variety of PK situations.[1] Now, after sustained operations in the Former Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) since 1991, and after operations in Somalia, the Canadian army has produced a comprehensive doctrinal manual, *Operations Land and Tactical Air: Peacekeeping Operations*. This article's aim is to highlight this document and to use the Canadian army's experiences to show its applicability.

Historical Problems in Mounting and Conducting PK Operations

Before discussing Canadian PK operations, we must examine the historical milieu which current doctrine addresses. Since 1948, PK operations, particularly those involving the UN, have been plagued with continual and systemic problems which still affect UN PK missions. Canadian doctrine has continually adapted to changing PK situations. In fact, our doctrine has been designed to minimize the structural problems inherent in UN PK missions. There is no such thing as a "typical" PK operation—all situations are unique, and it is difficult to compare, for example, UN operations in the Congo in the 1960s and UN operations in Cyprus in the 1970s. However, there is such a thing as a typical PK *environment*, particularly in UN operations. In addition to the more familiar operational concerns—instability within theater; the numbers, objectives and equipment possessed by belligerent forces; and geographic peculiarities—four problem areas stand out historically.

Mission and force generation. The actual mission statement generated by UN Headquarters, New York (UNNY) may be ambiguous and result in mission creep and a totally chaotic situation with regard to force generation. UN PK organizations are multinational forces, with the largest contribution usually consisting of a battalion–size combat unit and/or company–size support units.

The UN Truce Supervisory Organization (UNTSO), created in 1948, consisted of 63 (later 300) UN military observers whose role was totally ambiguous: Monitor a virtually nonexistent cease–fire between Israel and its Arab neighbors. UNTSO, however, was unable to continually observe Israel's borders. A second task was later added to its mandate: Prevent arms from entering the country. Again, UNTSO was neither manned nor equipped to carry out this task. In the words of its commander, UNTSO was "an international policeman without a truncheon."[2]

The UN Emergency Force (UNEF) was created in 1956 to disengage British, French and Israeli forces from Egypt. The force commander recommended that UNEF be formed as a division, with an armored brigade and fighter–bomber support, and be capable of conducting the full range of military operations. His recommendations were made based on the mandate he was given by UNNY. UNNY refused to follow these recommendations, however, claiming that the proposed UNEF structure was too offensively oriented. As a result, the UNEF had six under-strength infantry battalions made up of troops from India, Sweden, Colombia, Indonesia, Brazil, Denmark, Norway and Finland—all without motor transport. UNEF also included a Yugoslavian recon-

naissance squadron, a Norwegian medical company and Canadian signal, transport and maintenance units.[3] The commander stated that he "was in some apprehension that UNEF's inability to use force would become known [by the belligerents] and lead to its being ignored as completely ineffective. . . ."[4]

Operation *Des Nations Unies Au Congo* (ONUC) received its forces in–theater before a commander was selected or a clear mission was established. In 1960, three brigades—one each from Ghana, Morocco and Ethiopia—a Tunisian battalion, a United Arab Republic (UAR) battalion, an Irish battalion and a Canadian signal unit quickly arrived in Leopoldville. These units were lightly equipped and had no land or air transport. Although there was no military headquarters initially, the ONUC commander was charged with establishing law and order, acquiring freedom of movement for UN relief efforts, disarming and retraining local military forces and preventing unilateral superpower intervention. When the force commander requested the deployment of six brigades, a tank squadron, field and antiaircraft artillery regiments, fighter–bombers and transport aircraft, the UN secretary general said, "Are you mad? Do you think I want to start an armaments race?"[5]

Command and control (C^2). The PK command situation will be chaotic and cumbersome with an inordinate number of UN civilians working as an integral part of the headquarters. Command authority may be ambiguous and subject to massive amounts of interference from UNNY and diplomats working in-theater. ONUC, UNTSO and UNEF suffered from split headquarters. ONUC military personnel ran the operations and intelligence functions, while civilians ran the logistics, procurement and finance sections. The force commander did not have in–theater communications for several weeks. The logistic base was virtually nonexistent, with some of ONUC's units lacking food for several days or lacking the ability to move around in–theater to counter threats. No clerical staff was available to handle air movements—the first time ONUC heard that new forces were assigned to them was when the forces were arriving at Leopoldville Airport. Air transport committed to ONUC was not allowed to distribute supplies in–theater because UNNY's policy was to rely on local regional distribution to prop up the Congolese economy. This local system proved unreliable.[6]

The ONUC commander was subordinate to the UN special representative to the Congo, who reported directly to the UN secretary general. The representative micromanaged everything, leaving the commander with little authority over any ONUC op-

erations except the tactical deployment of troops. In fact, the commander was not allowed to communicate directly with UNNY. At one point, the special representative ordered the commander to arm and

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Factions will use a "fight–talk, talk–fight" technique to maneuver for geographic space and time, harass each other or garner media attention for their causes. In a less blatant and violent fashion, they will attempt to achieve their aims despite PK forces' presence in–theater.

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equip a belligerent faction because he was convinced this particular faction had to defend itself from a threat which, in fact, did not exist. The force commander resisted and was bypassed in the chain of command. The special representative gave the orders to the units in the field. The result: The newly armed faction unleashed an appalling genocide campaign against a disarmed faction.[7]

The Polish contribution to UNEF II in 1974 was, according to UNNY, supposed to include a field hospital. The Poles only contributed a small number of doctors. To make up the shortfall, Canada contributed the bulk of the equipment, doctors and ambulances; however, the unit was still considered by UNNY to be a Polish field hospital. Because the Poles were in charge, they forced Canadian doctors to get approval for all procedures. In some cases, the Poles contacted UNNY for medical advice. When eight Panamanian peacekeepers were seriously wounded by a mine, Canadian soldiers arrived at the hospital to give blood. The Poles did not make timely decisions about taking and stockpiling the blood. Unfortunately, over the course of several hours, lives were lost.

Belligerent factors will use PK forces for their own purposes. Factions will use a "fight–talk, talk–fight" technique to maneuver for geographic space and time, harass each other or garner media attention for their causes. In a less blatant and violent fashion, they will attempt to achieve their aims despite PK forces' presence in–theater.

As noted earlier, UNTSO was incapable of monitoring, let alone preventing, small–unit infiltration of Israel by the Arab states or vice versa. In one case, Israeli intelligence personnel, impersonating UNTSO observers, gathered intelligence on the Jordanians. Israeli, Egyptian and Syrian intelligence services exten-

> *During UNPROFOR operations in Sarajevo, the Bosnian presidency consistently tried to manipulate senior UN commanders into siding with the Bosnian faction. When this failed, Bosnian–Herzegovinan media sources and government officials baited UN commanders to get them to make statements that could be used as propaganda to gain local and international support.*

sively infiltrated UNTSO headquarters to acquire unit location information. Using intelligence techniques ranging from blackmail to bribery and even assassination, the factions damaged UNTSO's credibility and reduced its effectiveness. Unreliable UN civilian personnel were returned to New York and, in many cases, promoted to positions where they could provide even more important diplomatic information. The force commander sought to construct a secure communication facility so he could communicate with UNNY. UNNY bureaucrats, however, would not allocate the necessary funds for it.[8]

The UN PK force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) was established to protect the island's Turkish minority. The Cypriot population on both sides of the line were integrated Turkish–Greek. After the demarcation line's establishment in 1974, Turkish Cypriots in the south were expelled to the north and Greek Cypriots sent south—a direct result of both Turkish and Greek policies. UNFICYP did not prevent this activity, which probably has directly contributed to the continued division of the island for 30 years.[9]

During UN Protection Force (UNPROFOR) operations in Sarajevo, the Bosnian presidency consistently tried to manipulate senior UN commanders into siding with the Bosnian faction. When this failed, Bosnian–Herzegovinan media sources and government officials baited UN commanders to get them to make statements that could be used as propaganda to gain local and international support. Major General Lewis MacKenzie, the UNPROFOR chief of staff, was frequently put on the spot: "We were having problems delivering aid . . . [Minister] Doko was defensive, protesting that our vehicles were full

of ammunition made in Yugoslavia and destined for the Serbs. 'Balls,' I replied. 'Our vehicles carry our own ammunition and that's all . . . if that's what you think, then let's you and I go there right now and check the vehicles.' . . . Doko's representatives returned. They reported that the vehicles had been checked and the only non–Canadian weapons were American–made M–72 antitank rockets. I stared at Doko; after a few seconds, he apologized for a 'misunderstanding.' 'Mr. Doko,' I said, 'your media were present for the whole operation. I presume the airwaves will be full of anti–UNPROFOR propaganda within the hour.'"[10]

National agendas may impinge on PK forces' effectiveness. This applies to outside countries not participating in the PK mission as well as mission participants. Though UNNY makes cosmetic attempts to screen out countries with ulterior motives, this cannot be totally successful because, for political reasons, the UN is multilateral and must consider all countries volunteering to participate.

During the 1960s, the United States and Great Britain were concerned about the sovereign base areas' security in Cyprus because these bases figured prominently in planning for operations against the Soviet Union in the event of global war. Because Greek Cypriots were thought to be a potential threat, it is conceivable that the nod was given to the Turks to invade the northern part of the island for the secondary purpose of providing a balance of forces on Cyprus.[11] Additionally, through the Mutual Defense Assistance Plan, the United States provided Turkey, a NATO ally, with US weapons, including the tube–launched, optically tracked, wire–guided missile (TOW) system and the M60 series main battle tank. These weapons, on Cyprus in Turkish service, increased the lethality of the belligerent forces and posed a direct threat to the comparatively lightly armed UNFICYP forces.

ONUC encountered problems with the Egyptian component of the UAR battalion. During a coup panic in 1961, some ONUC units, against ONUC orders, moved into the Congolese capital from their assigned field positions to protect East European–bloc embassy staffs as they prepared to evacuate. At the same time, an Egyptian parachute company commander told the ONUC commander that if he were called on by ONUC to use force against one particular Soviet–supported faction, he would not comply because he had orders from President Abdel Nasser not to do so.[12]

Polish national agendas plagued UNEF operations along the border between the Gaza Strip and Israel.

Picking its way through a battered Sarajevo intersection, a 1st Battalion, Royal 22d Regiment mounted patrol moves past apartment blocks frequently used by snipers.

All photographs by Sean M. Maloney, Department of National Defence, Canada

Peace enforcement... involves a deterrent force deploying to a threatened area with the consent of only one of the disputing parties. The goal is to prevent crisis escalation— by coercive force if necessary. Such a force is ready and equipped for full or limited combat operations, including offensive military action.

The UN places limits on contributions due to financial costs or depending on how skittish UNNY staffs are about weapon systems and capabilities that they deem "too aggressive." The UN plans but does not conduct the force deployment to the theater.

UNEF forces, deployed in observation posts (OPs) along the buffer zone, were expected to report infiltrations by either belligerent faction directly to UNNY. OPs were manned by trios of Canadians, Indians and Poles. The Poles were instructed by their government to disagree with the Canadians no matter what the issue. Consensus was required before a report on an infiltration could be passed to UNNY. Consequently, very few incident reports were relayed. Similar problems reduced the effectiveness of the non–UN International Commission of Control and Supervision (ICCS) in Indochina.[13]

Canadian PK Doctrine: Highlights

Canadian doctrine in general, and *Peacekeeping Operations* in particular, is "authoritative but not directive"—commanders have great latitude in apply-

ing doctrine. Consequently, not all aspects of Canadian PK doctrine are contained in *Peacekeeping Operations*, even though the manual is the basis for action. As with any doctrine, it has formal and informal components. Therefore, in addition to examining the formal doctrine, this article also discusses informal doctrine as it developed in the FRY.

Canadian PK doctrine derives from problems experienced in past PK operations and from long–standing Canadian policy that has consistently emphasized domestic national unity, domestic political liberty, the rule of law in international affairs and the acceptance of international responsibilities in keeping with Canada's role in international affairs since 1948.[14] In effect, Canadian involvement in overseas security interests must not jeopardize national unity, and overseas involvement must have a legitimate

legal basis.[15] Canadian policy's overall goal since 1948 has been to promote stability within the international system. This was accomplished through participation in NATO's deterrent structure and in UN intervention operations in conflicts with global war ramifications.

Canada rarely acts on its own and prefers multilateral involvement for two reasons:

● Canada does not possess the capability to act alone for sustained periods.

● Canadian policy requires a legal framework for operations.

As a result, overseas operations will usually be conducted under the authority of either Article V or VI of the *North Atlantic Treaty*, collective security within the NATO area; Article 51 of the *Charter of the United Nations*, the right of national self–defense; or other articles in Chapters VI and VII of the *Charter*

Principles for PK Operations in Multilateral Operations

The mission must confront a real threat to international peace and security or an emerging humanitarian tragedy and must be part of a larger strategy that includes developing long–term solutions in the affected region. There must be:

- A clear and enforceable mission mandate.

- An appropriate force structure consistent with the mission.

- An effective means of consultation between national contingents.

- An identifiable and commonly accepted reporting authority.

- A division of military and civilian resources in–theater, with a recognized authority and mutually agreed–to operating procedures.

- A defined concept of operations, an effective C^2 system and clear understanding on using force.

of the United Nations, which assign the peace enforcement roles of the UN Security Council.[16] *Peacekeeping Operations* identifies several principles of multilateral operations, all drawn from historical PK experience, as depicted in the figure.

Historical examples show that to date, all UN PK operations have violated at least one and, in several cases, most of the principles. Failure to match these principles with stated intent and solutions has never prevented Canadian participation. However, this may change. If goals are not clearly spelled out from the outset, PK operations are increasingly subject to mission creep far beyond the original intent.

In Canadian doctrine, "peacekeeping operations" is a generic term for the four operation types described as follows.[17]

● *Peace enforcement.* This form of conventional military operation involves a deterrent force deploying to a threatened area with the consent of only one of the disputing parties. The goal is to prevent crisis escalation—by coercive force if necessary. Such a force is ready and equipped for full or limited combat operations, including offensive military action. These are essentially conventional military formations operating under a UN mandate. For example, operations in Korea from 1950 to 1953 and the Persian Gulf from 1990 to 1991 were peace enforcement operations.

● *PK forces.* These international military formations are designed to be interposed into a conflict to permit political negotiations to take place. Such forces generally include military units acting within a UN or multinational formation. PK forces may be employed in PK buffer zones or protected areas and in observer roles. These composite units are armed for self–defense. Certain aspects of UN operations in the FRY fit into this category, including UNPROFOR. UN forces in Cyprus are PK forces.

● *Observer missions.* Also referred to as "good offices" or "truce supervision missions," the UN or other multinational organizations frequently deploy teams of military observers such as UN military observers (UNMOs) to monitor compliance of parties with a truce, accord or other international agreement. UNMOs are unarmed and travel in small groups as liaisons to the belligerent forces. In many cases, they function as UNNY's "eyes and ears." Canadian soldiers are essentially seconded as individuals to the UN or multinational force. Examples include UNTSO, the Multinational Force and Observers (MFO) in the Sinai and the European Community Monitoring Mission (ECMM), Yugoslavia.

Soldiers from the 2d Battalion, Royal Canadian Regiment evacuating an injured Muslim civilian from the Srebrenica enclave.

The UN or other international agencies may provide military assistance for humanitarian or disaster relief operations. Force structure for such operations could include medical, engineer, communication or logistic units and limited protective forces. Examples of Canadian participation in HA operations include Rwanda, Pakistan/Afghanistan mine awareness training and the Ethiopia Food Relief Program.

• *Humanitarian assistance (HA).* The UN or other international agencies may provide military assistance for humanitarian or disaster relief operations. Force structure for such operations could include medical, engineer, communication or logistic units and limited protective forces. Examples of Canadian participation in HA operations include Rwanda, Pakistan/Afghanistan mine awareness training and the Ethiopia Food Relief Program.

Responding to a Need

Canadian doctrine recognizes the historical limitations inherent to the UN system and, although the system is, hopefully, changing in a positive sense, many planners remain pessimistic. The UN planning cycle is not a formal organism, because the UN believes each operation is unique. In very basic terms, the UN analyzes the situation and debates the merits of involvement. The Security Council passes a resolution calling for a cease–fire, appoints a special representative, informally negotiates with belligerent nations and then produces a mandate. Formal preparations begin once the senior military commander is appointed, while the secretary general asks UN members to contribute forces and equipment.

Participants then negotiate what they are willing to provide, which may vary drastically from what the secretary general desires. The UN places limits on contributions due to financial costs or depending on how skittish UNNY staffs are about weapon systems and capabilities that they deem "too aggressive." The UN plans but does not conduct the force deployment to the theater.

The formal Canadian planning process is fairly straightforward—warning, preparation, deployment, employment and redeployment. This theoretically occurs after the government has accepted the mission and directed the Department of National Defence to carry it out. Informally, Canadian military planners will have heard about the operation through colleagues at the UN and elsewhere and will have initiated anticipatory planning at all levels. For example, anticipatory planning for the Canadian deployment to the FRY in 1992, Operation *Harmony*, started five months before the force actually deployed to its area of responsibility (AOR). Similarly, anticipatory planning for a possible deployment of the 4th Canadian Mechanized Brigade to the Persian Gulf in 1990 began two months before a government decision was made not to send land forces.[18]

Croatian police and a Canadian soldier patrol in Sector West. Confidence–building measures include combined patrols of peacekeepers and local belligerents.

A force that cannot move within its AOR cannot accomplish its tasks. It is critical that incremental belligerent encroachments on this freedom not be allowed to systematically restrict movement. This applies to UNMOs as much as to military units. If the commander is denied information, he cannot plan. If a UN battalion cannot patrol, it cannot exert presence. If a medical unit cannot reach an isolated town, it cannot assist the population.

Multilateral PK mission C^2 is riddled with problems. Historical patterns for UN C^2 elements include a head of mission (who may or may not be the force commander; if not, it could be the secretary general's special representative), a military staff (operational functions) and a chief administrative officer (usually a civilian in charge of logistic and administrative functions). The force commander exercises opera-

tional control over member contingents in–theater.

Canadian doctrine limits the damage an inefficient UN command structure can do to its forces assigned to the mission, particularly in areas critical for morale. Canada set up a national Canadian Contingent (CanCon) Headquarters, that is essentially a stripped brigade headquarters with the usual range of staff functions. The CanCon commands all Canadian units in–theater and delegates control to the multinational command headquarters. The National Support Element, subordinate to the CanCon, handles Canadian–specific items such as pay, welfare, mail, supplies and a national rear communications link, which is secure, unlike UN theater communications.[19]

Once in–theater, Canadian forces operating under UN control undertake specific tasks depending on the PK mission type and in accordance with the mission mandate. *Peace enforcement* tasks include traditional conventional military activities, including offensive and defensive operations using the whole spectrum of force. *Peacekeeping* involves five stages: interposition, observation, reporting, assessment and action. The PK force physically interposes itself between the belligerent forces to prevent them from fighting. Peacekeepers also designate a cease–fire line, forcing the belligerents to withdraw, and impose a buffer zone between the two factions. To ensure the buffer zone remains an effective separator between factions, the PK force establishes a presence in the zone by constructing OPs and checkpoints, establishing control measures and zone inspections and aggressively patrolling day and night.

The force must have absolute freedom of movement to operate effectively and must continuously report cease–fire violations and establish liaison/communications with both factions so that disputes and incidents can be resolved at the lowest level possible to prevent escalation. Supervision tasks include monitoring cease–fire agreements, protecting ethnic enclaves, ensuring disengagement compliance, exchanging prisoners or bodies, conducting nonmilitary activity within the buffer zone or establishing refugee camps. Liaison or intermediary tasks involve maintaining personal contact with local belligerent commanders and military forces, local civil organizations and flanking PK units. Canadian units may be called upon to provide "specialist" units, such as signal, aviation, engineer or antitank missile units, to higher UN headquarters or other UN national contingents.

Military observers monitor and verify compliance with agreements such as demobilization, disarmament or cease–fire. Unarmed, they serve in groups or may be attached to other PK forces. UNMOs are

usually tasked with mobile observation for specific situations where immediate information is required by higher multinational or national headquarters. Observers supervise exchanges and agreements, investigate belligerent complaints and negotiate and mediate between belligerents and the PK force or between belligerents themselves.

There are two general HA mission types: economic and humanitarian assistance. Economic assistance's aim is to restore and maintain essential services so that normal economic activity can be resumed following a conflict, and includes restoring water, electrical power and sewer systems; providing meteorological data; restoring roads, ports and airports; or providing agricultural aid, educational assistance and transportation. HA could include assisting multinational agencies in collecting economic data to determine relief requirements; protecting and distributing relief supplies; providing medical aid; resettling displaced persons; resupplying isolated communities; monitoring elections; taking a census; or protecting any of these activities from interference. It is important to note that PK tasks are never performed independently of one another—there is tremendous overlap requiring maximum flexibility.

Canadian PK experience has produced five fundamentals:[20]

● *Freedom of action and movement.* A force that cannot move within its AOR cannot accomplish its tasks. It is critical that incremental belligerent encroachments on this freedom not be allowed to systematically restrict movement. This applies to UNMOs as much as to military units. If the commander is denied information, he cannot plan. If a UN battalion cannot patrol, it cannot exert presence. If a medical unit cannot reach an isolated town, it cannot assist the population.

● *Negotiation.* The primary method of developing effective solutions to a conflict is negotiation. If a solution is imposed without the factions' mutual consent, hostility may increase. Objective and effective negotiations created, controlled and fostered by the force will create a climate of mutual respect and cooperation. There must be mutually acceptable solutions. Negotiations take time, patience and effort.

● *Use of force as a last resort.* Long–term solutions to conflicts in PK cannot be imposed by force. Generally, force should only be used in self–defense, but some situations warrant limited offensive action if a local action may ignite a larger problem.

● *Impartiality.* This must be demonstrated by PK forces at all times and in all situations—operational, administrative and social. No belligerent point of view

Soldiers of the 4th Combat Engineer Regiment searching for mines in Croatia.

Unarmed [military observers] may serve in groups or may be attached to other PK forces. UNMOs are usually tasked with mobile observation for specific situations where immediate information is required by higher multinational or national headquarters. Observers supervise exchanges and agreements, investigate belligerent complaints and negotiate and mediate between belligerents and the PK force or between belligerents themselves.

can be favored. To do so puts the mission in jeopardy. Peacekeepers must be patient and fair at all times.

● *Mutual respect.* This is critical for the success of any multinational PK operation. Belligerents will exploit a lack of mutual respect within the force for their own purposes. Force members must respect the belligerents' language, religion and culture. This will facilitate negotiation and movement if the factions are able to accept the PK soldiers on a personal level.

Informal Canadian PK Doctrine

As with the formal doctrine codified in *Peace-keeping Operations*, informal doctrine is the result

of many years' experience in dealing with UN PK and non–UN operations. Informal Canadian doctrine emphasizes the concept of *credibility*. For a lightly armed and equipped or outnumbered PK force, credibility is a form of protection. It is not

> *The Canadians, in conjunction with the Norwegians, ran cold–weather courses for all UNPROFOR contingents needing such training. UNNY would not authorize funds for cold–weather clothing for these contingents, nor would they increase the fuel requirements. As a result, the Canadians and the British donated enough cold–weather equipment to outfit a division.*

enough to paint vehicles white, wear blue helmets, sit in OPs and fly the UN flag. The belligerents must, above all, believe that the PK force is sincere in its aims and capable of carrying out its mandate. Thus, informal Canadian doctrine revolves around the generation, maintenance and, if necessary, the restoration of credibility. Operations in the FRY provide a plethora of examples supporting this.

The Canadian army's role in the FRY expanded exponentially over time. Initially, Canada deployed a number of observers to the ECMM—Operation *Bolster*. Though its efforts were heroic, this non–UN observer force was not large enough to broker comprehensive cease–fires between the Croats and the Serbs, nor was it capable of preventing ethnic cleansing. In 1992, Canada deployed an engineer regiment and a battalion group from its NATO forces in Germany—Operation *Harmony*—as part of UNPROFOR in Croatia.

These units performed practically every type of PK task discussed earlier. When Bosnia erupted into open warfare, UNPROFOR's line of communication from its airhead in Sarajevo to the UN–protected areas in Croatia were cut off and the airport was occupied by belligerent forces. The Canadian battalion group, which was demilitarizing Sector West in Krajinas, was directed to force its way to Sarajevo, relieve the small French force there and reopen the airport so that supplies and relief aid could be flown in.

After the unit returned to performing its PK tasks in Croatia, Canada pledged a second battalion group in the fall of 1992 to the expanded UNPROFOR Bosnia–Herzegovina Command—Operation *Cavalier*. This unit provided escort to UN and nongovernment organization humanitarian relief convoys and

protected Muslim enclaves from ethnic cleansing. Both units, CANBAT 1 and CANBAT 2, were joined by a Canadian logistics battalion (CANLOGBAT) and were operational until NATO took over the Bosnia mission. Despite media focus on certain isolated incidents, Canadian PK troops were, according to almost all belligerents and allied UN forces, the most effective forces in–theater in carrying out their PK tasks.[21]

In addition to Canadian soldier professionalism in general, the most important aspect of Canadian credibility lies in the fact that from the outset, Canadian planners ignored UNNY force generation parameters to a great extent. UN planners in New York wanted Canada to provide four light infantry companies with wheeled vehicles, one mechanized infantry company with 15 armored personnel carriers (APCs) and 250 combat engineers. No heavy weapons such as .50–caliber machineguns or mortars were to be taken along. Canadian planners generated a number of light force options but rapidly rejected all of them because of a high armor and artillery threat. The final organization was created based on the assumption that the contingent had to be prepared to defend itself against a ground assault which included tanks.

At one point, some skittish planners wanted to delete TOW Under Armour antitank vehicles, but operational planners resisted. UN planners in New York feared that Canada was going to send not only TOW Under Armour but heavy self–propelled mortars as well. They objected strenuously, insisting that only illumination rounds be carried and no high–explosive rounds, claymore directional mines or TOW missiles be brought into the theater. These weapon systems were deemed too "offensive" for a UN PK environment.[22]

In all, Canada deployed a 900–man, four–company battalion group equipped with 83 M113 APCs, including eight (later 16) TOW Under Armour vehicles, four M113 mortar carriers and a 250–man armored engineer unit with combat engineer vehicles. TOW missiles, claymore mines and high–explosive mortar rounds were brought along with the contingent, as were the full complement of heavy machineguns. The TOWs possessed thermal imaging sights and were instrumental in providing the appropriate intimidation effects when the battalion group ran into belligerent roadblocks on the road to Sarajevo. They were also the only units capable of providing night observation around Sarajevo's airport.

A similar situation existed when Canada deployed the 1,200–man CANBAT 2 battle group to Bosnia in the fall of 1992. Initially, the UN requested a mecha-

A Cougar from the 12th Regiment Blinde du Canada, mounting a 76mm gun, ensures free access on Route PACMAN. UN reaction was somewhat negative regarding the introduction of nearly 100 Canadian armored vehicles, but Canada's decision to deploy "heavy" repeatedly paid off.

The Medak Pocket operation was conducted by two Canadian mechanized companies, with two French mechanized companies under command. The combined Canadian–French force virtually attacked through the Serb lines, rolled up to the Croat lines and physically pushed both sides back to establish a buffer zone. The force arrived too late to stop the killing in the villages, but the operation demonstrated that mechanized forces were the only ones that could have conducted such an operation.

nized infantry battalion to assist in HA convoy protection and to guard Muslim enclaves. Canadian planners insisted on deploying a squadron of Cougar armored cars equipped with 76mm guns, in addition to three APC–equipped infantry companies. UN reaction was somewhat negative regarding the introduction of 21 armored cars, 60 APCs and 16 TOW Under Armour vehicles. Once again, Canadian planners overruled the UN and the decision to deploy "heavy" paid off. Many local belligerent commanders, who were used to shooting up "soft" UN humanitarian relief convoys, thought twice about interfering with convoys escorted by the Canadian battle group in Bosnia.[23]

By comparison, the other national contingents deploying with UNPROFOR were very light on the ground, with practically no wheeled transport or APCs. When the second Canadian Operation *Harmony* rotation arrived in Croatia (Sector West) in 1993, the officers were appalled at the state of the other three UN battalions in the sector. Of the battalions from Nepal, Jordan and Argentina, only the Argentineans had a mechanized company and wheeled transport for their three other companies. The Jorda-

nians had a company of M113s. The other battalions had 30 rounds of ammunition per man, no machineguns and no antiarmor weapons. In contrast, the belligerents had M–84 main battle tanks, BMP Soviet armored personnel carriers, multiple rocket launchers, mortars and 20mm and 40mm antiaircraft guns.

Some UNPROFOR contingents drawn from equatorial countries were ill–equipped to deal with the cold FRY climate, reducing their effectiveness and credibility. One Nigerian soldier froze to death at his post. Canadian engineers built base camps and taught their colleagues how to build warm OPs. The Canadians, in conjunction with the Norwegians, ran cold–weather courses for all UNPROFOR contingents needing such training. UNNY would not authorize funds for cold–weather clothing for these contingents, nor would they increase the fuel requirements. As a result, the Canadians and the British donated enough cold–weather equipment to outfit a division.

To establish credibility in Sector West, pressure was applied from some quarters for the UNPROFOR to acquire APCs for the Nepalese, while the Canadians provided maintenance for the Jordanians'

M113s. The Jordanians and the Nepalese also received a variety of Canadian logistic support. In addition to propping up its UN allies, CANBAT 1 conducted aggressive night patrolling and developed contingency plans to resist any armored or mechanized incursion into the protected area. These contingency plans were practiced frequently in full view of belligerent forces to achieve the desired deterrent effect. Sector West was relatively quiet until the Canadian battle group left for Sector South.

Once again, the decision to go heavy paid off. French and Kenyan troops protecting the Serb enclave in Sector South fled when the Croats initiated a successful mechanized attack. Because UNPROFOR's credibility in the sector was nonexistent, the UNPROFOR commander selected his most credible formation, CANBAT 1, to establish and monitor a buffer zone in the sector. Again, as in Sector West, the message was clear and the Canadian AOR in Sector South quieted down. The Kenyan battalion needed "propping up" so that vital ground to the south of the Canadian AOR would be secure.

Meanwhile, the Croats conducted another mechanized attack north of the Canadian AOR and proceeded to ethnically cleanse three Krajinan Serb villages. This area fell just outside the UN protected area, but the commander, realizing that UNPROFOR's credibility was on the line again, called upon CANBAT 1. The Medak Pocket operation was conducted by two Canadian mechanized companies, with two French mechanized companies under command. The combined Canadian–French force virtually attacked through the Serb lines, rolled up to the Croat lines and physically pushed both sides back to establish a buffer zone. The force arrived too late to stop the killing in the villages, but the operation dem-

onstrated that mechanized forces were the only ones that could have conducted such an operation. UNPROFOR's credibility was restored to some extent.

Credibility in PK operations does not rest completely on aggressive action and intimidation. It is actually a balancing act between those aspects and restraint. Experience in the FRY indicates that selectively demonstrating the *capability* and *will* to carry out aggressive action in support of PK aims can produce results at the sector level and lower. Officers commanding CANBAT 2 in Bosnia during 1993 and 1994 quickly determined that Canadian presence during convoy route negotiations sometimes speeded the talks because the belligerents knew that CANBAT 2 would roll out Cougar armored cars and mechanized infantry to get the convoys through if necessary. The belligerent parties did not lose "face" with their own people because they could claim they were forced to accept the new status quo because of the implicit threat of force.

In another case, the preventive UN deployment to Macedonia and the establishment of UNPROFOR's Macedonia Command was initially conducted by a CANBAT 2 mechanized company group. The Macedonians, seeking to prevent spillover from the Bosnian conflict, requested the deployment to deter any potential threat to Macedonia's sovereignty. Joined by the Nordic Battalion and a 300–man US force, credible UN forces demonstrated resolve through restraint. No adjacent neighbor has invaded Macedonia.

Another prerequisite for credibility is the requirement for absolute *impartiality*. This, linked to the need to resist other UN contingents' national aims and ulterior motives, was the source of countless problems in the FRY mission. Almost every contributing UNPROFOR member had ulterior motives for participating in the PK operations. Partiality erodes mission credibility on both sides of any demarcation line. On one hand, the faction receiving support from national UN contingents exploits the UN's geographic AOR to infiltrate the opposing side's area and conduct raids and sabotage. The faction not receiving support possesses intelligence sources and knows that its opponents are receiving aid or support from a UN contingent, which in turn loses credibility and thus effectiveness if attacked or interfered with in any way.

Canadian PK forces in the FRY have been completely impartial, despite the exhortations of domestic propaganda mills in Croatia, Bosnia and Serbia. CANBAT 2 consistently rebuffed attempts by all belligerents to co–opt it and has retained its credibility.[24] Unlike other UNPROFOR contingents in Bos-

nia, the Canadians had relative freedom of movement and were more successful at low– and mid–level negotiations.

Another informal Canadian PK doctrine aspect is C^2. As discussed earlier, Canada maintains a national contingent that retains operational command over Canadian forces. The Canadian army has historically resisted attempts to divide Canadian forces in–theater, because this reduces Canadian influence in the multinational planning process. Canada also fears misuse of Canadian soldiers by non–Canadian commanders.[25] By virtue of the fact that it is a predominantly European and Caucasian nation, Canada cannot be allowed by the UN to occupy the highest military command positions in large–scale UN operations.[26]

As a result, the Canadian contingent commander generally attempts to dominate and influence the higher–planning processes that directly affect Canadian forces in–theater. For example, Canada will generally aim for the G3—usually operations officer—and force chief of staff positions. In some cases, Canada acquires positions at sector level (analogous to brigade) in sectors where Canadian units are operating. Again, possession of higher command slots allows Canada to influence planning to some degree, which, in turn, preserves Canadian capability and assists with maintaining the mission's credibility as a whole when dealing with belligerents.

Thus, informal Canadian peacekeeping doctrine as applied in the FRY consisted of the following components, all designed to create, maintain and restore credibility in the mission:

● Liberally interpret and modify UNNY force generation parameters so that the forces possess the capability to conduct the mission.

● Prop up "Third World" contingents to increase their effectiveness.

● Balance aggressiveness and intimidation with restraint.

● Maintain absolute impartiality.

● Resist national aims if they do not coincide with the PK mission's objectives.

● Dominate or influence the in–theater planning process.

I hope this article has provided the reader with the historical milieu in which Canadian PK doctrine was formed—and gives some insight into current formal and informal Canadian PK doctrine as applied to the existing mission in the FRY. This discussion will, hopefully, provide the basis for further discussion of PK roles and missions as the US Army further develops its doctrine. *MR*

NOTES

1. Maurice Tugwell, "Adapt or Perish: The Forms of Evolution in Warfare," in *Armies in Low–Intensity Conflict: A Comparative Analysis*, edited by David Charters and Maurice Tugwell (London: Brassey's Defence Publishers, 1989). For a summary of Canadian peacekeeping operations, see Fred Gaffen, *In The Eye of the Storm: A History of Canadian Peacekeeping* (Ottawa, Canada: Deneau & Wayne, 1987); and John Gardam, *The Canadian Peacekeeper* (Burnstwon, Canada: General Store Publishing House, 1992).
2. E.L.M. Burns, *Between Arab and Israeli* (Toronto: Clarke & Unwin, 1962), chapter 2.
3. Ibid., 210–11.
4. Ibid., 273.
5. MG Carl von Horn, *Soldiering For Peace* (New York: David McKay Co., 1966), 150–53 and 191.
6. Ibid., 154, 160 and 162.
7. Ibid., 154 and 198–200.
8. Ibid., 96–119.
9. Michael A. Attalides, *Cyprus: Nationalism and International Politics* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1979), chapter 5.
10. MGen Lewis MacKenzie, *Peacekeeper: The Road To Sarajevo* (Toronto: Douglas & McIntyre, 1993), 306.
11. See Attalides, chapter 1. The primary purpose was to "protect" the Turkish minority in the north from Greek Cypriot violence.
12. Von Horn, 213 and 237.
13. The exact reasons for the Polish behavior in the UN Emergency Force is unknown but was probably related to the Cold War NATO–Warsaw Pact confrontation. For more on the International Commission of Control and Supervision (ICCS) mission, see Victor Levant, *Quiet Complicity: Canadian Involvement in the Vietnam War* (Toronto: Between the Lines, 1986), chapters 14 and 15.
14. Lester B. Pearson, *Mike: The Memoirs of the Rt. Hon. Lester B. Pearson, 1948–1957*, vol. 2 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1973), 26.
15. During World Wars I and II, Canada was wracked with internal dissent over deploying forces overseas. The French minority in Quebec opposed deployment in both wars on the grounds that they were "imperial" wars to protect British interests.
16. On occasion, Canada has operated within non–UN, non–NATO peacekeeping operations, notably the International Commissions for Supervision and Control under the authority of the Geneva Accords in 1954 and with the Multilateral Force and Observers

(MFO) in the Sinai under the Camp David Accords. The legal authority for participation in Vietnam was murky and caused serious problems in the operation. The MFO, though not under UN auspices, was coordinated with UN observers and had some basis in the "umbrella" sections of Chapters VI and VII of the UN Charter.
17. Canadian Armed Forces Manual B–GL–301–003/FP–001, *Operations Land and Tactical Air Volume 3, Peacekeeping Operations* (1995), 1–6–1 and 1–6–2.
18. Sean M. Maloney, *War Without Battles: Canada's NATO Brigade in Germany, 1951–1993* (Ottawa: Esprit De Corps, 1995), chapter 7.
19. Canadian Contingent, UN Protection Force (UNPROFOR), operations briefing (Zagreb, Croatia: 1 March 1995).
20. B–GL–301–003/FP–001, 1–4–1 to 1–4–2.
21. During my time in the former Republic of Yugoslavia, I discussed this with British, Malaysian, Norwegian and New Zealand UN troops and with Bosnian Muslims, Bosnian Serbs and Krajinan Serbs.
22. Maloney, chapter 7. LCol Jamie Arbuckle, former senior staff officer, operations, UNPROFOR, interview by author (Ottawa, Canada: 7 January 1995).
23. LCol Thomas Geburt, commanding officer, 2d RCR Battle Group, in Croatia and Bosnia, interview by author (Gagetown, Canada: 15 November 1994). Note that the UN backed off when Denmark deployed a squadron of Leopard 1 main battle tanks (MBTs). It is quite a sight to see MBTs painted white bearing black "UN" markings. See Richard Calver, "Mocni tenkovi Leopard u lovu za mirom," *UNPROFOR News* (10 January 1995). These vehicles have engaged in antibunker and antitank operations near Tuzla, former Republic of Yugoslavia.
24. Impartiality was such an obstacle to Bosnian Muslim aims in Sarajevo that they tried on a number of occasions to assassinate the Canadian chief of staff to the UNPROFOR, MGen Lewis MacKenzie. See MacKenzie, 294–95.
25. MAJ R.H. Caldwell, "The Echelon Above Corps: Some Historical Perspectives on the Canadian Army Overseas" (Operational Research and Analysis, Department of National Defence, 1989), unpublished document.
26. As Swedish MG Carl von Horn noted in 1966, "Who, in the hot house atmosphere in New York was going to be brave enough to admit the truth—that our success in saving thousands of lives had rested exclusively on Western military discipline, training, techniques and know–how or on these same qualities the new national units had inherited from the old colonial armies?" See von Horn, 238.

Sean Maloney is a Canadian military historian working on his Ph.D. at Temple University. He received a B.A. and an M.A. from the University of New Brunswick, Canada. He has held a variety of positions in Canada and Europe, including historian, 4th Canadian Mechanized Brigade, Lahr, Germany; and troop leader, 8th Canadian Hussars (Prince Louise's), Canada. His books include War Without Battles: Canada's NATO Brigade in Germany, 1951 to 1993; Securing Command of the Sea: NATO Naval Planning, 1948–1954; *and the forthcoming* Chances for Peace: Canadian Soldiers in the Balkans, 1992–1995, *with John Llambias.*

Combat Decision Making in "Operations Other Than War"

Lieutenant Colonel Dane L. Rota, US Army

Tis not hard, I think,
For men so old as we to
keep the peace.
—William Shakespeare[1]

RECENT ARMY DEPLOYMENTS have reaffirmed that the likelihood of US forces becoming involved in operations other than war (OOTW) will remain high in the near future. Likewise, contemporary US military strategy has embraced peace operations, along with warfighting and deterrence, as a prime means for advancing US national interests and pursuing national security objectives.[2] Thus, brigade and battalion commanders find their units not only training for high–intensity combat operations, but also preparing to conduct peacekeeping (PK), humanitarian assistance (HA) or other complicated and potentially sensitive noncombat missions.

The presence and role of the UN, other US government and international agencies, allied forces and nongovernmental organizations in OOTW add more complexity to the challenge of command and control. The varied interests of these entities are often incongruent, and the mission focus may shift in such a highly charged political environment. A recent example occurred in Somalia when US forces conducted concurrent HA, PK and peace enforcement operations under UN auspices.[3]

Therefore, command of US military forces in OOTW can be an intricate process. Decision making requires a pragmatic, flexible methodology due to OOTW's unique conditions. OOTW's multifaceted civil–military environment may give rise to open–ended mission statements or vague mission end states.[4] In addition, the potential for periods of intense violence may exist, requiring precipitous force escalation followed by an equally rapid return to restraint. Finally, OOTW's nonlinear spatial nature often requires the commander to rely on decentralized execution of decisions and orders.

> *Because of the real–time capability of the electronic media to portray images of events to worldwide audiences, an isolated incident at a remote checkpoint may quickly become the focal point of domestic US public debate of an entire operation. This underscores the value of disciplined, well–informed soldiers who are at the cutting edge of any proactive information management effort during mission execution.*

Applying the Combat Decision–Making Model to OOTW

The concept, planning and/or preparation, execution and assessment (CPEA) methodology discussed in US Army Field Manual (FM) 101–5, *Command and Control for Commanders and Staffs*, is one of three doctrinal methods of decision making in combat operations. However, CPEA's proactive focus on continuous planning for future events based on the outcome of current operations also makes it an ideal tool for decision making in OOTW, where several events may occur simultaneously or in quick succession.[5] The CPEA methodology is particularly useful for brigade and battalion commanders when time constraints and staff limitations inhibit deliberate decision making. The OOTW process discussed in this article is much like the CPEA model designed for combat decision making. However, the OOTW process incorporates political, as well as military, environmental conditions that the commander must consider as he makes his running estimates. Accordingly, the methodology depicted in Figure 1 incorporates terminology and processes that are germane to both combat and noncombat operations. For example, what might otherwise be called "enemy forces" in PK operations are frequently termed "former belligerents;" "intelligence collection"

becomes "information gathering;" and so on.[6]

At brigade level, the commander's initial concept focuses on at least one suitable method for employing allocated resources to accomplish missions within the intent and plans of the commander two levels higher. The commander must now consider essential specified and implied military tasks, as well as political tasks, in formulating a concept for the operation. In practice, political interests typically outweigh military necessity in OOTW's conduct, thus placing additional constraint on military forces. For example, PK operations are conducted in accordance with Chapter VI of the UN Charter, which requires the consent of the conflicting parties. This mutual consent compels UN forces to execute their mandate with absolute impartiality. Peacekeepers have no enforcement rights in the strictest sense and may legally employ force only as a last resort in self–defense.[7] Constraints, such as restrictive rules of engagement, sometimes pose dilemmas for commanders because of the concurrent necessity for force protection. Beyond the consequences to troop welfare and morale, friendly casualties suffered during noncombat operations can be politically disastrous. A brigade commander whose unit recently returned from performing HA operations in Rwanda noted that balancing the OOTW principles of security and restraint was one of his most difficult challenges.[8]

The commander's broad visualization of how he will incorporate OOTW imperatives such as restraint, legitimacy and force protection into mission accomplishment is embodied in his intent. Purpose, method and end state are the key ingredients for determining how an operation will proceed. Perhaps the most difficult, yet essential, mental process in formulating and articulating intent is visualizing critical events leading from current condition to end state. The commander's understanding of his current

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state, coupled with his visualization of critical events that lie on the path to the desired future state, should drive the plans and orders on which his concepts for the operation are further refined. Visualizing that road map toward the future state, in effect, is the primary means by which the commander determines how his forces will be concentrated and how they will synchronize their activities at decisive points to accomplish pivotal tasks.

As in combat operations, OOTW tasks may be event driven, time suspensed or sequential. Many PK tasks, such as clearing the zone of separation, demand that the commander's staff build flexibility into suspenses for task completion required of subordinate units. Maintaining legitimacy with the various parties in a UN operation requires continual reassessment of a plan's time lines. Perseverance is a key ingredient for PK success. The maxim "a good peacekeeping day does not necessarily equal a good military day" rings true in this regard.

Information Requirements for OOTW Decisions

An accurate assessment of the current situation is also a requisite for formulating clear intent. The commander's critical information requirements (CCIR) tell subordinate commanders and staff which key information pieces are missing from his visualization of the operation. Whether these missing pieces are related to how the commander sees his own forces or how he sees other actors, CCIR will link key decisions with major events. Therefore,

Figure 1. CPEA Model For OOTW.

Formulate the Concept

Unity of effort
Security
Perseverance
Restraint objective
Legitimacy

Visualizing political and military tasks

Concepts for future operations

Commander's Situation Assessment and Anticipation of Future Operations

Feedback from operations

Detailed Mission Planning and Preparation

Execute Operations

Plan and orders synchronization

A US lieutenant presses a local Croatian commander to identify minefields and have his men stop firing at Serbian troops waiting to begin similar operations. The unanticipated shooting and negotiations delayed the operation's start time by three hours, December 1995.

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information acquisition, assimilation and evaluation are as essential to planning for critical events in OOTW as the intelligence preparation of the battlefield is to offensive combat operations.

There are often differences between the information products developed for OOTW and battlefield operations. For example, terrain and weather factors will have obvious effects on planning ground emergency aid convoys incidental to an HA operation. Besides the standard terrain overlay, the OOTW information process will also consider key facilities, population status, lines of communication and logistic sustainment.[9] Similarly, the commander must evaluate threats posed by potentially hostile parties based on their capabilities and likely courses of action (COA). Political considerations, particularly locally, are equally germane to anticipating hostile intent as they are in determining the feasibility of friendly COA. Face–to–face contact with key local faction leaders may give the commander his greatest insight into the psychological factors that affect their behavior.

Intuitive and Rational Reasoning

Intuitive skill may also give commanders an important advantage in sensing opportunities and risks in seemingly ambiguous political situations. Intuition allows the commander to rapidly focus on feasible solutions to a problem when time for systematic analysis is unavailable. Intuition comes largely from experience.[10] However, intuition may complement rational decision making when time and certainty permit a more scientific approach. Thus, intuition may also help staff officers during wargaming as they portray the various parties involved in OOTW and identify likely reactions to friendly COA.

Given the psychological dimension's importance in OOTW, brigade and battalion task force–level threat evaluation will probably rely heavily on the human dimension for information. Moreover, information access and control give the commander the political leverage often necessary to influence other OOTW players. Therefore, information acquisition, analysis and distribution demand that military organizations adopt an interagency approach.[11] Nongovernmental and private voluntary organizations, such as the International Red Cross, Save the Children Foundation and World Council of Churches, may be very helpful in providing data needed by military commanders. In any case, information gathering must be tempered to ensure perceptions of trust

Event/ System	Illegal Checkpoint or Roadblock	Civilian Riot or Demonstration	Artillery or Mortar Attack	Mine Obstacles
Intelligence	NAI 3, 7, 11, 14A ID Bypass Counterintelligence Videotape Incident	MP Patrols on Routes Blue, Gold Human Intelligence Debrief	NAI 9, 11, 25, 27 Crater Analysis	NAI 22, 26, 27 Debrief EOD Disseminate Mine Threat Information
Maneuver	QRF Show of Force	Evacuate UN Personnel Protect Key Facilities CA/MP DC Collection	PSYOP Leaflets Aviation Show of Force	CA/MP Control DC/Refugees PSYOP Loudspeaker
Fire Support	TAI 5, 12, 14, 33 Illumination/Smoke	QRF Be Prepared to Employ Riot Control Agent	Q36 Radar EA Fox No Fire TAI 2, 3, 4, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 13, 15-32	
Mobility, Countermobility, Survivability	Clear Mines Reduce Wire Obstacle	Reinforce Cordon With Wire	Road Repair O/O Deploy Bridge	Threat Education Breach/Mark Damage Control
Combat Service Support	Refuel O/O Aerial Resupply	Evacuate QRF Casualties CA/MP Area Damage Reschedule Convoys	Recovery to LOG Base Windy	Casualty Evacuation CA Assess HN Medical Facilities
Air Defense	Avenger Platoon Augment Surveillance			
Battle Command	OIC Negotiate Authorization to Bypass	HN/UN Civilian Police MP Divert UN Traffic Request JTF Authorization for Riot Control Agents PAO/LNO Press Teams	Determine Hostile Intent	MP Traffic Control Points Routes Blue, Gold

CA = Civil Affairs	HN = Host Nation	PAO/LNO = Public Affairs Officer/Liaison Officer
DC = Dislocated Civilian	NAI = Named Area of Interest	PSYOP = Psychological Operations
EA = Engagement Area	OIC = Officer in Charge	QRF = Quick Reaction Force
EOD = Explosive Ordnance Disposal	O/O = On Order	TAI = Targeted Area of Interest

Figure 2. Synchronization Matrix: UN Humanitarian Aid Convoy.

and impartiality are maintained despite the fact that the information will be used to accomplish mission objectives.

During the development and refinement of the concept of operations, the commander's staff must synchronize a multitude of activities in the operational area. To achieve mass in OOTW, the staff must focus the effects of friendly forces and actions at a decisive time and place. As in high–tempo battle, the synchronization matrix at Figure 2 is a useful tool for the execution of critical events and other supporting tasks. For the staff, detailed coordination of activities involves analysis and identification of how different activities best support one another temporally and spatially. For subordinate commanders, the synchronization matrix makes tracking crucial tasks easier, because OOTW execution tends to be highly decentralized and may involve multiple supporting units.

Decentralized execution also complicates the feedback process, both during and after operations. As implied in the discussion on information requirements, the articulation of CCIR is the foundation of high–value feedback. Focused information requirements, linked to accurate reporting by subordinate elements, will provide the commander with the feedback he needs to maintain a running estimate of the situation. In certain OOTW activities, such as checkpoint operations, detailed and structured reporting orders are often necessary for deployed forces.

The different parties engaged in OOTW will inevitably attempt to put favorable slants on their versions of critical events. Coordination among US military forces, multinational partners, civilian agencies and, often, former belligerent parties themselves is vital for disseminating key information. Unity of effort is achieved by establishing a well–defined liaison effort. Commanders must designate their liaison officers as the primary channels for communication with external agencies.[12] "Hotlines" to the former belligerent parties often allow the commander to reconcile conflicting reports of incidents and, thus, receive feedback necessary to analyze complex political–military situations.

Media reporting also assumes a major role in the operations feedback portion of the OOTW decision–making process. In PK operations, there are often fewer restrictions on television and radio coverage of military activities. Because of the real–time capability of the electronic media to portray images of events to worldwide audiences, an isolated incident at a remote checkpoint may quickly become the

> *Intuition allows the commander to rapidly focus on feasible solutions to a problem when time for systematic analysis is unavailable. Intuition comes largely from experience.*

> *Information access and control give the commander the political leverage often necessary to influence other OOTW players. Therefore, information acquisition, analysis and distribution demand that military organizations adopt an interagency approach.*

focal point of domestic US public debate of an entire operation. This underscores the value of disciplined, well–informed soldiers who are at the cutting edge of any proactive information management effort during mission execution.

The commander's ability to assimilate information flowing from these often conflicting sources is vitally important. His personal observations gained during movement throughout the area of operation are equally essential because they contribute to his intuitive sense. Just as a feel for the ongoing fight in the heat of battle allows the commander to react more quickly than the enemy, so does "reading the political tea leaves" allow him to anticipate his next move. The political impact of activity occurring in the area of operation is just as vital to PK's success as are the military implications of that activity.

In the final segment of the CPEA model, the commander's situation assessment, coupled with directives from higher headquarters, determines if new concepts for future operations are necessary. For example, a shift toward a semipermissive environment may dictate a re–examination of force protection concepts during PK operations. The commander may also weigh the feasibility of peace enforcement options to regain the initiative in a deteriorating situation. These types of political–military dynamics will drive mission reanalysis and continuation of the decision–making cycle.

US forces will continue to conduct a variety of missions and roles as part of our nation's post–Cold War security strategy. Thus, the notion of a versatile force able to respond to contingencies across the entire conflict spectrum has been incorporated into current doctrine. However, the commander's primary tasks of leading soldiers and deciding how to accomplish the unit's mission remain essentially unchanged. While OOTW conditions may differ from high–tempo combat, the processes involved in operational command are still much the same. Decision making requires a systematic method for stabilizing fluid situations, as well as a degree of intuition that can make military sense of complex political problems. The combat decision–making model is one important tool for simultaneous planning and execution of PK, HA or disaster relief operations. Its main advantage is to provide a focus for soldiers by linking multiple and sometimes seemingly unrelated political and military activities in a unifying mission concept. Recent after–action reviews confirm that the transition from noncombat to and from combat operations during OOTW tends to occur at unexpected times and places. Recently, one senior leader aptly observed, "All commanders must believe they are always only a heartbeat away from a gunfight."[13] Thus, brigade and battalion commanders will discover that the combat decision–making model has wide applicability across the entire spectrum of conflict. *MR*

NOTES

1. British Army Field Manual (FM) *Wider Peacekeeping*, 4th draft, revised (United Kingdom: August, 1994), 1–1.
2. US Army FM 100–23, *Peace Operations* (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office [GPO], December 1994), iv.
3. For a critique of US military organizational response to the challenges of the Somalia crisis, see Jonathan T. Dworken, "Rules of Engagement: Lessons from *Restore Hope*," *Military Review* (September 1994), 26–41.
4. FM 100–23, 43.
5. FM 101–5, *Command and Control for Commanders and Staff* (Washington, DC: GPO, August 1993), 4–82.
6. FM 100–5, *Operations* (Washington, DC: GPO, June 1993), 13–0 to 13–8.
7. *The Blue Helmets* (New York: UN Department of Public Information, 1990), 6.
8. COL James P. McDonough, briefing (Hohenfels, Germany: Combat Maneuver Training Center, 10 March 1995).
9. FM 34–7, *Intelligence and Electronic Warfare Support to Low–Intensity Conflict Operations* (Washington, DC: GPO, 18 May 1993), 3–1 to 3–17.
10. J.W. Lussier and Terrill F. Saxon, *Critical Factors in the Art of Battle Command*, draft (Alexandria, VA: Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences, July 1994) 32–36.
11. FM 100–23, 44.
12. Ibid., 29.
13. MG Carl F. Ernst, After–Action Review, Joint Task Force *Somalia*, slide presentation, undated.

Lieutenant Colonel Dane L. Rota is the deputy senior brigade observer/controller, Combat Maneuver Training Center, Hohenfels, Germany. He received a B.S. from the University of Connecticut and an M.A. from Yale University and is a graduate of the US Army Command and General Staff College. He has served in a variety of command and staff positions in the Continental United States and Europe, including S3, 793d Military Police Battalion, Fürth, Germany; assistant professor of social sciences, US Military Academy, West Point, New York; and commander, 501st Military Police Company, 1st Armored Division, Ansbach, Germany. His article "Deep Battle in the Pacific: The Submarine and US Seapower in World War II" appeared in the October 1992 edition of Military Review.

Operational Law: Plan and Execute

Colonel Patrick Finnegan, US Army

OVER the past decade, the US Army has increasingly integrated operational law and lawyers into military planning and operations. Operational law is an umbrella term used to describe the legal rules that affect military operations in peace and war. Since the mid–1980s, that umbrella has expanded to include overseas military operations and riot control and disaster relief within the United States. As the Army's contingency force, the XVIII Airborne Corps has been at the forefront of many military actions, during which operational law theories and ideas were practiced and refined. This article will describe the role and functions of the corps Staff Judge Advocate (SJA) office during Operations *Hawkeye*, *Just Cause* and *Desert Shield/Desert Storm*. It is not an in-depth analysis of legal issues, but a description of personal experiences and recollections.

From July 1988 to May 1991, the XVIII Airborne Corps played a vital role in several significant military operations. The corps was fortunate to have Colonel John Bozeman, a former field artillery and special forces officer with Vietnam combat experience, assigned as the SJA. He realized the growing importance of operational law and took several steps early in his tour that later paid great dividends.

The SJA created a full–time operational law officer position and staffed it initially with the senior lieutenant colonel in the office. Even more important, he convinced the corps G3 to include that lawyer in the corps planning cell and assault command post (CP), the very first corps headquarters group to deploy in a crisis. This met with some resistance because slots in the planning cell and on the assault CP were limited—for every lawyer included, an operations officer, intelligence analyst or logistics planner must be deleted. Bozeman, however, convinced corps leaders that involving lawyers in a mission's early planning and operational stages could prevent problems later. As a result, we learned about pending or possible actions early and were involved in reviewing plans, rules of engagement (ROE) and other

> *Two lawyers, including the SJA, deployed with the corps staff to Panama on the operation's first day. . . . In the operation's aftermath, we learned it was a good idea for lawyers to be involved in [war crimes and friendly fire] investigations to ensure records were made of inquiries into all sensitive incidents. SJA involvement made it easier to respond to congressional and media questions about specific incidents.*

potential legal issues. After several deployments and operations, the SJA devised several "hip–pocket" observations for operations lawyers. The first explains why a lawyer should be involved with the planners: *If you are not routinely involved in rules of engagement, you will learn about your unit's deployment on CNN. All other legal issues will be afterthoughts.* Once the SJA has a foot in the door, he can help planners write and review ROE and ensure other legal issues are not overlooked.

Sometimes, events happen so fast that there is no deliberate planning cycle, which is exactly what happened with Operation *Hawkeye* in September 1989. Fortunately, the corps staff was accustomed to including lawyers in crisis planning operations. The military, including XVIII Airborne Corps, received favorable publicity for their efforts in Florida after Hurricane Andrew, but that was not the first time XVIII Airborne Corps had been involved in large-scale hurricane relief operations.

After Hurricane Hugo devastated parts of the US Virgin Islands, there was widespread looting and chaos on St. Croix. The situation was beyond local police control—the Virgin Islands National Guard was, at best, a nonentity and, at worst, a participant in the breakdown of law and order. Although the governor of the islands initially resisted using federal troops, President George Bush ordered the XVIII

Airborne Corps and other units to St. Croix to quell civil disturbances. The situation was uncertain because of the lack of communication with St. Croix. The hurricane had virtually destroyed the federal prison, allowing 500 convicted felons to roam free and

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add to the chaos on the island. The assistant US attorneys who had prosecuted them feared for their lives.

By 1700 on 20 September 1989, the corps was told to begin deployment. The first C–141 touched down at the devastated airport in St. Croix before 0700 the next morning with the corps chief of staff as the task force (TF) commander and the deputy SJA as the task force legal adviser. Although we had virtually no planning time, we were involved in legal issues from the very beginning.

The first question addressed was ROE and what soldiers should do when confronting looters. Because of poor communications, some reports indicated we might be met by armed dissidents when we landed at the airport. Fortunately, that was not the case. Using civil disturbance *OPLAN GARDEN PLOT* as a guide, we drafted ROE and ensured that all soldiers were briefed before departing Fort Bragg, North Carolina. The ROE were continuously updated as the situation changed. Separate ROE were drafted for soldiers guarding the prison's perimeter. The FBI sent 50 agents to locate the missing prisoners, who were returned to the devastated prison. Because the fences and most guard towers were destroyed, US soldiers and the few remaining guards formed a security perimeter until engineer units could rebuild the fences.

In–country conditions were extremely primitive in the hurricane's aftermath. For the first several days and nights, the corps staff lived and worked in a partially destroyed outbuilding at the airport with no offices, desks, telephones or electricity and no potable water other than what was brought. As the logistic

flow began from the United States, cots, field desks and other supplies were flown in.

The mission focus changed quickly from civil disturbance to disaster relief operations (DRO). By the time the corps TF arrived, the looting had ended. Our main focus became protecting the few businesses that were still operational, guarding the condominiums and resort hotels and helping the government organize and control DRO and distribute food and water. The local government, reeling from the hurricane's effects, had no plans for dealing with such a crisis and could not communicate with the populace because all radio stations and telephone lines were destroyed by the storm.

As SJA, my principal role was to assist with interagency coordination. Within an hour of our arrival, the TF commander met with local government and police officials whose initial reaction was hostile. They were offended that federal troops had been sent into a situation they believed they could control themselves. The TF commander explained our role and that the president had ordered the mission and offered our help. The St. Croix police, who realized the situation was beyond their capabilities, were delighted to have the military police (MP) assist them. We worked out joint police and MP patrols and areas of responsibility and began restoring order. The TF also worked closely with the FBI and, as the mission changed to disaster relief, with Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) officials and the local government to begin distributing food and water, clearing rubble and informing the populace of what assistance was available and where. Twice daily, the TF G5 and SJA met with the lieutenant governor, FEMA representatives and local government functionaries to determine progress and which other relief actions were needed.

For the two months the TF spent in St. Croix, the SJA staff dealt with a wide variety of issues involving contract and fiscal law, interagency coordination and ROE. The SJA staff even dealt with intelligence law issues. Because the initial situation was so unclear, two Army counterintelligence agents arrived the second day of the operation. It quickly became evident there was no threat that would directly involve them. They asked if they could help the FBI gather information about and round up escaped prisoners. After coordinating with the US Army Intelligence Command, however, we determined those actions would constitute improper "intelligence activity" under Executive Order 12333, and they were allowed to perform only administrative functions for the FBI.

Operation *Hawkeye* marked the first time in more than 20 years that US troops were ordered to perform

civil disturbance operations. *Hawkeye* also was the corps' first major DRO experience. Like other corps units supporting the operation, the SJA's office learned valuable lessons that were put to good use shortly afterward.

The last troops from Operation *Hawkeye* returned to Fort Bragg just before Thanksgiving 1989. Less than a month later, the XVIII Airborne Corps was in Panama for Operation *Just Cause*. After the abortive coup attempt in October, the corps, in conjunction with US Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM), began an extensive planning process. Lawyers were an integral part of that process. The SJA office drafted the ROE for the plan, advised the targeting board and coordinated potential legal issues with lawyers in USSOUTHCOM and other units, including special operations forces, who were part of the operation.

Because ROE were drafted before anyone deployed, the 82d Airborne Division devised a method to inform all soldiers about the rules. They put the ROE in simple language on a wallet-size card. All soldiers were briefed and then issued the cards.

Two lawyers, including the SJA, deployed with the corps staff to Panama on the operation's first day. They immediately became involved in legal issues that continued throughout their stay, including providing advice on investigations into potential war crimes and friendly fire incidents. In the operation's aftermath, we learned it was a good idea for lawyers to be involved in those investigations to ensure records were made of inquiries into all sensitive incidents. SJA involvement made it easier to respond to congressional and media questions about specific incidents.

While the actual fighting was over quickly, the cleanup operations continued, including the search for Panamanian President Manuel Noriega and his sympathizers. During this phase, legal questions continued unabated. Another "hip–pocket" observation: *When the shooting stops, you will worship at the feet of an expert in contract and fiscal law.*

The National Command Authority announced that the United States would pay rewards to Panamanian citizens who turned in weapons. This resulted in a bonanza of weaponry—and difficult questions about where to get the money for the rewards. Other fiscal law issues arose concerning the Commandancia and other buildings that had been defaced with pro–Noriega graffiti. To help support the newly installed government, the commanders decided to whitewash the walls. Several US businessmen donated the necessary supplies to XVIII Corps Rear at Fort Bragg. The question arose, "Could we accept these gifts, and if we did, could we use govern-

A military policeman stands guard at the airport in the aftermath of Hurricane Hugo, September 1989.

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ment aircraft to transport them to Panama?"

The issue of war trophies surfaced during Operation *Just Cause*. The Panama planners did not consider the issue before the operation started, and guidance was issued only about a week after the initial fighting. The guidance was based on the 1975 US Army Regulation 608–4, *Control and Registration of War Trophies and War Trophy Firearms*, which does not address some issues and is confusing in others. One particularly troublesome area was "unit trophies." Commanders wanted to take back captured automatic weapons or vehicles to display at their units for morale and esprit, but there was no system in place to allow this. We worked with logistics

experts to figure out how these weapons could be sent back to the United States, processed and demilitarized at a depot and eventually forwarded to the units that captured them.

Another "hip–pocket" observation summarizes fairly well an issue that we grappled with after the fighting was over in Panama: *The airborne, light infantry and Rangers walk great distances all the time*

The successful integration of lawyers into planning and operations was summed up by a commander's comments: "When I saw the force list, I wondered why we were even taking the SJA. After these past three weeks, I know that if I ever go to war again, the first person I'm taking is my lawyer." Military attorneys were able to help commanders resolve legal questions that arose during **Just Cause** *because they were well integrated into the planning and during all parts of the operation.*

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in training, but in combat they hate to travel on foot. If they are involved in your operation, you can expect lots of claims for requisitioned vehicles. Shortly after the 82d Airborne and Ranger assault into Panama, no rental vehicles and very few private automobiles were available anywhere near the airport because troops had taken them without consent or rental agreements. Two more attorneys were deployed to Panama to work full time setting up a system to evaluate and pay claims for borrowed or confiscated vehicles.

In today's media world, many issues have immediate political impact because operational decisions are replayed or "misplayed" the same day on CNN. That occurred in Panama regarding the issue of searches and diplomatic immunity, which resulted in yet another "hip–pocket" rule: *If your area of operations includes the capital city, you will have about 15 incidents with diplomats each day.* In Panama, immunity was aggravated by the fact that some diplomats were from countries openly or covertly hostile to US efforts and who were harboring fugitives whose continued influence threatened to undermine mission accomplishment.

For example, when US forces prepared to search a particular house for a weapons cache reported by a reliable informant, the occupant of the house claimed to have diplomatic immunity because he was the Nicaraguan ambassador. He later changed his claim, however, to being an aide to the ambassador. The search was postponed while the Joint TF (JTF) at-

tempted to determine if the house was really the ambassador's residence.

Based on the known facts, including information from the US State Department that the Nicaraguan ambassador's residence was listed in official Panamanian records as being in a high–rise building in another part of the city, the JTF authorized the search, which resulted in the seizure of a considerable number of automatic and semiautomatic weapons. The search was approved without the knowledge that the house had an embassy sign wedged between bars on a front window. A legally correct decision was made based on the known facts, but that did not prevent adverse publicity and other repercussions, including expulsion of several US diplomatic personnel from Nicaragua. This incident proves the validity of another "hip–pocket" rule: *Diplomats from unfriendly countries can defeat any of your rules for handling diplomats.*

The successful integration of lawyers into planning and operations was summed up by a commander's comments: "When I saw the force list, I wondered why we were even taking the SJA. After these past three weeks, I know that if I ever go to war again, the first person I'm taking is my lawyer." Military attorneys were able to help commanders resolve legal questions that arose during *Just Cause* because they were well integrated into the planning and during all parts of the operation. One additional factor that greatly helped provide timely, accurate legal advice was the communication network. Because *Just Cause* took place in a country where US military, including lawyers from USSOUTHCOM's staff and US Army South, were stationed, the TF could take advantage of the existing infrastructure and research capabilities. Additionally, telephonic communications between Panama and Fort Bragg were excellent. The SJA talked several times daily with the corps SJA office in the rear, which helped resolve legal issues quickly.

Desert Shield/Desert Storm

Lessons learned in earlier deployments and operations were invaluable in providing legal advice and assistance to commanders and soldiers during Operation *Desert Shield* as well. Although this operation and *Desert Storm* were considerably larger in scope and more complex than either *Hawkeye* or *Just Cause*, US forces faced many similar situations. Frequent prior deployments made all commands aware of the need for attention to preparation for overseas movement (POM) processing. Many troops who had deployed recently to St. Croix and Panama needed little or no updating of legal documents. Howev-

er, the large number of soldiers, including Army Reservists, who deployed to Southwest Asia from Fort Bragg resulted in the preparation of more than 17,000 wills. In addition to Active Duty attorneys, a small Reserve unit, the 204th Judge Advocate General Detachment, helped prepare wills and other documents for deploying soldiers and their families.

Although there was not an extended planning period before the first deployment, the phasing of unit deployments allowed planning to continue throughout *Desert Shield*. Before the first C–141 left Pope Air Force Base, North Carolina, the SJA office drafted ROE and briefed all soldiers. Repeating what the 82d Airborne Division did in Panama, the SJA refined the idea of wallet–size ROE cards by printing two separate, different–colored cards: a white card for peacetime (*Desert Shield*) ROE and a blue ROE card for when hostilities began (*Desert Storm*). Cultural tips were printed on the back of the peacetime card. The SJA eventually printed more than 100,000 of each type of card to distribute to all corps units. The corps chief of staff as the advance element commander and two lawyers (an operations law officer and a senior contract law attorney) deployed on the first C–141. Drawing on Panama experiences and mindful that there would likely be several issues involving the leasing and purchasing of equipment and supplies, the SJA ensured our best fiscal and contract law experts went to Saudi Arabia early to help initiate support arrangements.

The pace of corps unit deployments and the command decision to deploy large numbers of combat forces first, followed by combat support and combat service support (CSS) forces, made it somewhat easier for the SJA office to support both the deployed units and the continuing activity at Fort Bragg, including preparing other units to deploy. The relatively slow arrival of corps units into theater from August to November 1990 facilitated the gradual evolution of the SJA into the operation. The Fort Bragg office was selectively drawing down and the deployed SJA office was systematically built up to coincide with the arrival of corps units in Saudi Arabia. The SJA deployed in late August with the corps commander, leaving the deputy SJA to coordinate further deployments and serve as the Fort Bragg SJA.

This gradual deployment of units and military attorneys allowed us to meet the challenges of having a fragmented office separated by half a world. At Fort Bragg, we continued to assist with typical installation issues, including environmental concerns, contracts for services and criminal law cases, in addition to being fully involved in the continuing deployments. The SJA office briefed family support groups

Blindfolded and restrained, Panamanian Defense Force prisoners receive assistance from a US military policeman, December 1989.

US Navy

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as well as deploying units and provided "round–the–clock" legal assistance to family members. As the Fort Bragg population began to shrink, there was some concern about post security. The SJA office helped draft a plan that included curfews and other security measures.

One issue that initially surfaced in Panama—the acceptance of gifts to individuals and Army organizations—grew to major proportions during *Desert Shield/Desert Storm*, due to the widespread support and outpouring of contributions from the American public. The Fayetteville, North Carolina, community has a long history of supporting Fort Bragg soldiers, and the amount and range of gifts and support they provided was astounding. The issue was not

Bedouin camels roam through an 82d Airborne Division staging area during *Desert Shield*, August 1990.

DESERT SHIELD ROE

THESE ARE PEACETIME RULES OF ENGAGEMENT. NOTHING IN THESE RULES LIMITS THE RIGHTS OF IN-DIVIDUAL SOLDIERS TO DEFEND THEMSELVES OR THE RIGHTS AND RESPONSIBILITIES OF LEADERS TO DE-FEND THEIR UNITS.

A. You may not conduct offensive military operations (raids, ambushes, etc.).

B. You may use force in self–defense in response to at-tacks or threats of imminent attack against US or host nation forces, citizens, property or commercial assets.

C. You are not permitted to enter the land, sea or airspace of other countries—besides the host nation.

D. If you inadvertently enter territorial land, sea or air-space of another country, you may use force in self–defense to withdraw.

E. You may not seize property of others to accomplish your mission in peacetime.

F. Proper contracting processes must be followed to obtain supplies and other items necessary to accomplish the mission.

G. Treat all persons and property with respect and dignity. Remember, we are at peace.

REMEMBER

1. WE ARE NOT AT WAR.

2. THESE RULES ARE IN EFFECT UNLESS HOSTILI-TIES BEGIN.

3. KNOW THE WARTIME ROE AND FOLLOW THEM IF HOSTILITIES BEGIN.

Repeating what the 82d Airborne Division did in Panama, the SJA refined the idea of wallet–size ROE cards by printing two separate, different–colored cards: a white card for peacetime (Desert Shield) ROE and a blue ROE card for when hostilities began (Desert Storm). Cultural tips were printed on the back of the peacetime card. The SJA eventually printed more than 100,000 of each type of card to distribute to all corps units.

confined to Fort Bragg, and eventually the Depart-ment of Defense (DOD) and the Army had to rede-fine the rules and develop new guidelines to deal with the issue.

Throughout the operation, we received outstand-ing support from Reservists. In addition to helping with wills and other POM issues, Reserve volunteers filled in for lawyers deploying overseas. Due to a history of excellent support from Reserve units and individual mobilization augmentees, there was no shortage of volunteers, and several Reserve attorneys deployed as corps SJA volunteers to Saudi Arabia.

Once the majority of the 82d Airborne Division had deployed to Saudi Arabia, all military justice ac-tions were consolidated, including those for rear de-tachment 82d troopers, with the deputy corps com-mander as sole convening authority. As the corps continued to deploy, he was redesignated as the Fort Bragg commander. An early requirement—also re-lated principally to criminal law—was to designate provisional rear commands for elements of units re-maining at Fort Bragg. Some provisional forward commands were also required in Saudi Arabia for

units whose commanders deployed later than most of their troops.

The gradual deployment of units also permitted careful organization of the forward SJA office. SJAs deployed with XVIII Airborne Corps headquarters elements, not with the individual brigades they sup-ported, although their deployments were generally timed to coincide with the arrival of brigades in–theater. As the deployment progressed, lawyers were detailed to brigades and groups and were eventually attached on orders for administration and logistics. Most detailed lawyers handled two or three special court–martial convening authorities. As a condition of the detail, brigades agreed to provide office space, a sleeping area and access to telephone or radio com-munication and transportation. Many provided a pri-vate office (tent area) because legal assistance clients were seen at the unit. Transportation was the biggest concern, because SJAs have no organic vehicles. Without access to transportation, prosecutors cannot do the kinds of investigations, witness interviews and coordination necessary to ensure prompt disposition of offenses. These transportation concerns were

eventually alleviated through the use of rental cars and vehicles contributed by other countries. SJA support to brigade level was essential, particularly because most brigade–level units were isolated by distance or lack of communications.

Several methods were used to offset the lack of experience of many brigade legal advisers. As SJAs initially deployed during *Desert Shield*, they stayed with the corps main CP outside Dhahran and were detailed to units only after an initial orientation to the legal challenges and requirements in–theater. While this system sometimes delayed the introduction of brigade–level legal advisers to their full–time units, the legal capability of individual SJAs improved. After the senior legal staff members arrived in Saudi Arabia, the SJA directed them to visit the brigade lawyers as frequently as possible. This became even more important after the corps headquarters moved forward to Rafhah. At that point, there were three separate XVIII Airborne Corps SJA operations in Saudi Arabia—the principal one in Rafhah, an administrative element with the corps main CP at King Khalid Military City and a corps rear element at Dhahran. Individual legal advisers welcomed the opportunity to discuss issues and cases with the SJA staff, and the visits also gave us the opportunity to discuss the performance and needs of legal advisers with commanders and staffs.

In addition to orientations and frequent visits, a series of information papers on recurring or significant issues were distributed. These were particularly helpful due to the relative isolation of some units and the frequent difficulties in communication. The information papers also served as good introductions to theater legal issues once the US VII Corps deployed to Saudi Arabia. Additionally, two separate conferences, one during *Desert Shield* and one before the ground war, were held for all XVIII Corps unit attorneys. After VII Corps was in–theater, the two corps SJAs arranged another conference for all SJAs to share ideas and information.

Another key element to success was the ability to communicate with the rear office at Fort Bragg. The corps signal office provided a satellite telephone to the SJA in Dhahran, primarily for providing quality legal assistance. The phone was exactly like any other telephone extension back home—long–distance calls to businesses or attorneys in the United States were routed through and billed to the Fort Bragg office. This was particularly beneficial in the early stages of deployment, because more pressing and frequent legal problems arose for troops who had to deploy on very short notice. Because this was a much longer deployment than previous operations,

and because more deployed attorneys meant greater demand for materials, additional references and regulations were needed. Those remaining at Fort Bragg researched legal issues, coordinated them with other agencies and served as a resource for those who deployed.

The satellite telephone was also instrumental in assisting the "stay–behind" Fort Bragg SJA. As the war drew closer and the Fort Bragg population dwindled, a replacement for the deputy SJA had to be found. The problem was finding a qualified officer to assume duties as the installation SJA. A patriotic, dedicated Reserve officer volunteered to leave his civilian law practice for six months. However, he was very concerned about his lack of experience in dealing with installation issues. The fact that he could be in immediate contact with the forward office helped persuade him to take the position, and he talked with JAG officers in Saudi Arabia daily throughout *Desert Storm* to coordinate legal issues at Fort Bragg and redeployment scheduling.

Legal assistance issues. Both routine and unusual legal assistance issues required great effort by attorneys at corps headquarters and brigade legal advisers. Some issues included: US soldiers legally marrying each other in Saudi Arabia; host nation customs requirements; veterans' re–employment rights for activated Reservists in corps units; and Soldiers' and Sailors' Civil Relief Act rights and obligations. In addition, a good deal of effort was spent preparing to help soldiers file tax returns, including coordinating with different states about requirements. Fortunately, the initiation of hostilities in January 1991 led to legislative tax relief, ending the need for a large–scale program and preventing what might have been a logistic and administrative nightmare.

Foreign claims. The US Air Force, designated as central claims authority for the theater, was initially reluctant to appoint Army SJAs to foreign claims commissions. It soon became evident that foreign claims, particularly those involving vehicle accidents, would outstrip the Air Force's ability to handle the cases theaterwide. Army SJAs appointed to handle foreign claims found it to be a full–time job, due partly to the casual way Saudis investigate accident claims and to the political sensitivity of claims by Saudi citizens against the United States.

Administrative law. The most intriguing administrative law issues involved females, flags and civilians accompanying the force. US Central Command (CENTCOM) modified normal Department of the Army (DA) policy by directing that all pregnant soldiers be returned to home station. When this began to have an impact on some units—as female soldiers

An AH–1F Cobra gunship crew from the 2d Armored Cavalry Regiment accepts the surrender of Iraqi soldiers near the western border of Kuwait, 28 February 1991.

SJAs were involved in the daily targeting board conducted by the XVIII Airborne Corps during the air and ground wars, assisted with issues concerning permissible use of and supplies to Kuwaiti volunteers and helped answer a variety of questions concerning EPWs. These included whether EPWs could have their photographs taken by the media and whether surrendering Iraqi troops had to be taken prisoner or could be disarmed and released because the large numbers of prisoners were hampering the forward progress of coalition units.

departed the theater amid rumors that they had found a convenient way out of the desert—some commanders wanted to issue "no sex" orders or punish soldiers who became pregnant. Due to the difficulty of enforcing such orders and the possibility of unfavorable publicity, the SJA suggested a policy that established single–sex sleeping areas in units and prohibited visits by soldiers of the opposite sex. Other issues peculiar to the first deployment involving large numbers of female soldiers included how they could be used, whether they would be permitted to drive military vehicles (women are prohibited from driving in Saudi Arabia) and what uniforms they could wear in the desert heat without offending Saudi sensibilities.

News stories and rumors abounded concerning displaying the US flag on uniforms and the use of the "flag stamp" on mail. Supposedly, the Saudi Arabian government objected to both. The American flag was not flown at areas assigned to US use, partly for security reasons and partly because flying the flag of one sovereign in the state of another can only be done with permission, which DOD did not intend to request. However, the Saudis never raised any objection to either flag stamps or flag patches on uniforms.

Many civilians, both DA employees and contractors, accompanied the force, creating a host of issues that included whether they could: carry Army–issued weapons, be issued gas masks, carry Geneva Convention cards and be permitted to wear military uniforms.

Operational law. Operational law dealing with the legal rules concerning military operations also concerns issues related to the law of war and international law. SJAs were involved in the daily targeting board conducted by the XVIII Airborne Corps during the air and ground wars, assisted with issues concerning permissible use of and supplies to Kuwaiti volunteers and helped answer a variety of questions concerning enemy prisoners of war (EPWs). These included whether EPWs could have their photographs taken by the media and whether surrendering Iraqi troops had to be taken prisoner or could be disarmed and released because the large numbers of prisoners were hampering the forward progress of coalition units. Before the start of the ground war, two national media reports quoted XVIII Corps soldiers as saying they intended to leave "death cards" on the bodies of enemy soldiers. Although such an act would not strictly violate international law, we drafted a corps policy prohibiting it because it could create the impression that US soldiers had little regard for the law of armed conflict.

The problems the JTF in Panama experienced trying to resolve war trophy issues were alleviated somewhat in *Desert Storm* because CENTCOM issued clear, definitive, well–publicized guidance from the deployment's beginning. Although it was a valiant attempt to avoid the problems of *Just Cause*, it only worked to a certain extent. After eight months of a "bright line" rule concerning what constituted permissible war trophies, several commanders pre-

vailed on CENTCOM Commander General Norman Schwarzkopf to change the rules to allow enemy bayonets to be taken as war trophies. Schwarzkopf thus amended the original guidance. However, problems persisted concerning "unit trophies" because, for example, the 24th Infantry Division (Mechanized) wanted to take several captured Iraqi tanks home to display at Fort Stewart, Georgia. War trophies continued to be a difficult and emotional issue for soldiers and commanders. The news reports concerning trials involving smuggled AK–47s make it clear this problem is likely to continue whenever we go to war.

After the ground war ended, the XVIII Airborne Corps began to redeploy to Fort Bragg and other stateside installations. Corps SJA operations in Saudi Arabia were gradually closed down. Generally, brigade legal advisers redeployed with or at the same time as the units they supported, although dates were adjusted to ensure that those who served in the desert the longest went home first. The deputy SJA supervised the redeployment and move back to the SJA office at Dhahran, which served as the redeployment base for corps units. The main concern during redeployment was maintaining sufficient legal support for the CSS units that stayed longest and closing down ports and logistic bases. The deputy SJA also coordinated with the Trial Defense Service to ensure that defense counsel would continue to be available for soldiers accused of misconduct. During the redeployment phase, the corps legal office was again assisted by Reserve support. Several Reserve officers who had arrived in Saudi Arabia in March or April 1991 constituted the last element of XVIII Corps SJA forward and assisted the last remaining units in–theater.

Much of what military attorneys in XVIII Airborne Corps did in Saudi Arabia and Iraq, and the support they provided to commanders and soldiers, was based on lessons learned in earlier operations. From the initial alert order, the SJA office was involved in legal issues ranging from ROE to funding and contracting for goods and services. The keys to success for the SJA included full integration of SJAs into operational planning, dedication of SJA support

> *Throughout [Desert Shield/Storm],*
> *we received outstanding support from*
> *Reservists. In addition to helping with wills*
> *and other POM issues, Reserve volunteers*
> *filled in for lawyers deploying overseas. Due*
> *to a history of excellent support from Reserve*
> *units and individual mobilization augmen-*
> *tees, there was no shortage of volunteers, and*
> *several Reserve attorneys deployed as corps*
> *SJA volunteers to Saudi Arabia.*

to brigade level whenever possible, predeployment emphasis on legal preparedness and quality Reservists who volunteered at great sacrifice.

Because the XVIII Airborne, as America's contingency corps, has been tasked frequently in the past few years to respond to several crises, the role and importance of operational lawyers has become ingrained in the thinking of commanders and staff officers. Probably the best indication of this came with Hurricane Andrew relief efforts in Florida. The SJA had previously fought and won an extended battle to have one lawyer included in the Corps Assault CP— the deputy corps commander, however, ordered four lawyers to accompany the assault CP and first troops into Florida. The lessons learned during past operations were invaluable in providing timely legal advice as XVIII Corps units performed missions in Somalia, Guantanamo Bay and Haiti.

The increasingly important role of operational law in XVIII Airborne Corps military operations over the past several years has created a challenging, occasionally difficult area where SJAs can assist commanders and soldiers. SJAs, as well as other soldiers, must operate within the "fog of war." Sometimes, this is difficult for attorneys who are trained to deal with precise rules and specific evidence. Probably the best way to summarize the feelings of an operational lawyer on the ground with troops comes in these final "hip–pocket" observations: *Legal issues in war are relatively simple to resolve if you have all the facts,* and of course, the corollary, *you will never have all the facts.* **MR**

Colonel Patrick Finnegan, US Army, is the staff judge advocate (SJA), US Special Operations Command, MacDill Air Force Base, Florida. He received a B.S. from the US Military Academy, an M.P.A. from Harvard University and a J.D. from the University of Virginia Law School and is a graduate of the US Army War College. He has held a variety of staff positions in the Continental United States and Europe, including legal adviser, Joint Special Operations Command, Fort Bragg, North Carolina; chief of administrative and civil law, deputy SJA and temporary SJA, XVIII Airborne Corps, Fort Bragg, before deploying to Operation Desert Storm; deputy director, Academic Department, and criminal law instructor, Judge Advocate General's School, Charlottesville, Virginia; and chief of military justice, 8th Infantry Division (Mechanized), Bad Kreuznach, Germany.

Guerrillas
in the
Brazilian Amazon

Colonel Alvaro de Souza Pinheiro, Brazilian Army

The Amazon basin is a strategic priority for Brazil because of the political, economic and psycho–social interests it has in the region. The author focuses on Brazil's use of military power to protect its interests in the Brazilian Amazon and demystifies Brazil's guerrilla warfare experience there by identifying the link between Brazil's past military actions in the Amazon and future military concepts for protecting Brazilian sovereignty.

SINCE THE BEGINNING of Brazil's colonization, the conquest of the Amazon has been an episode written in blood, courage and determination. The city of Belém, the Pará state capital, was the starting point for the Portuguese–Brazilian conquest of the region. Founded on 12 January 1616 by Francisco Caldeira Castelo Branco after expulsion of the French from São Luís do Maranhão, the city, protected by Fort Presépio, became a magnet for settlers.[1] It was the jumping–off place for expansion and domination and a center for a new race established as a natural byproduct from the merging of white Europeans and Indians.

Conquest of the Amazon was marked by violent disputes as Portuguese–Brazilian forces tried to expel the English, French, Dutch and Irish, who had all come to the region to explore and build commerce and tried to dominate the land by building permanent forts along the region's riverbanks.

Captain Pedro Teixeira, known in Brazilian history as the "Conqueror of the Amazon," epitomizes the formidable Portuguese–Brazilian conquest. On 28 October 1637, he left Cametá along the Tocantins River on a two–year adventure with 87 soldiers and 300 hired porters and Paranese Indians. In 45 canoes, Teixeira and his men went up the Amazon River to Quito, Ecuador. During the long journey he fought, defeated and expelled foreigners who wanted to settle at strategic points along the "Sea River." Teixeira discovered, reconnoitered and manned the Amazon River's principal tributaries. After defeating the Encabellado Indians, he founded a small Portuguese–Brazilian village—Franciscana—at the confluence of the Napo and Aguarico rivers, today's border between Peru and Ecuador. This established a boundary for the Spanish and Portuguese domains, whose thrones united under the King of Spain in 1580.

Shortly after the expedition's return to Belém, Portugal won its independence from Spain and became the rightful owner of the Brazilian colony, thanks to Teixeira's expedition and to other Portuguese explorers such as Raposo Tavares. Tavares reached Belém 11 years later by descending the Madeira and Amazon rivers from the São Paulo Province.[2] Teixeira's expedition served, much later, as the first argument in the doctrine of *Uti Possidetis* upon which the 1750 Treaty of Madrid would confirm the Portuguese–Brazilian conquest.[3]

Teixeira fought to subdue the Tupinambás Indians, who threatened the Portuguese conquest of Belém and other coastal locations such as Cumã and Caités, located between Belém and São Luís. In these battles, his reputation as an astute, courageous military commander was solidified when he demonstrated an efficient combat form—guerrilla warfare.

Teixeira was named *Capitão–Mor do Grão Pará,* a position which is equivalent today to military commander of the Amazon. A victim of a rapid and insidious disease, he died in Belém in 1641. He is interred at the Metropolitan Cathedral of Belém, built in the 17th century in the same area where Fort Castelo stands.

Teixeira used guerrilla warfare to move the Tordesillas Meridian from the mouth of the Amazon to the Andes.[4] His direction of riverine operations and decentralized use of troops in surprise actions against superior enemy forces are hailed as the beginning of ambush tactics. These tactics were emulated by Antonio Dias Cardoso, André Vidal de Negreiros, Henrique Dias and Felipe Camarão in the memorable Pernambucan Insurrection, a native movement that expelled the Dutch from Brazil's northeastern region.[5] This became one of the most notable and important events in forming Brazilian nationality.

Another highly significant episode in the history of guerrilla warfare in the Brazilian Amazon was the formation of the independent state of Acre. The exploration and prosperity of rubber commerce brought a great number of Brazilians, principally northeasterners, to the Acre region, a strip of land ceded to Bolivia in 1867 by the Treaty of Ayacucho. Refusing to accept Bolivian authority over the region, Brazilians living in Acre created an independent territory and demanded its annexation by Brazil. In response, the Bolivians founded Port Alonso (today Port Acre) in January 1889. In May 1889, with the support of rubber workers and the Amazon state governor, Luís Galvez Rodrigues proclaimed the area the Republic of Acre. The Brazilian government, however, had to deny the proclamation to maintain existing treaty obligations. In 1901, Bolivia signed the Aramayo Treaty, leasing the region to the Bolivian Syndicate of New York, which received authorization to collect taxes, explore for rubber and conduct mining operations.[6]

In August 1902, a Brazilian guerrilla force under the leadership of José Plácido de Castro started a victorious insurrection in Acre. Castro, a 26–year–old southerner, adapted to Amazon jungle conditions with the same agility and mobility the guerrillas practiced on horseback in the backwoods of the Rio Grande during the Federalist Revolution.[7]

In January 1903, after many battles, the Bolivian forces were decisively defeated and withdrew. Castro was proclaimed governor of the independent state of Acre. On 17 January 1903, in a diplomatic victory

by the Baron of Rio Branco, the Treaty of Petrópolis was signed.[8] Brazil bought the Acre region from Bolivia for 2 million pounds, a commitment to build the Madeira–Mamoré railroad and an agreement to cover a 110,000–pound payment owed to the Bolivian Syndicate.[9] On 25 February 1904, Acre was dissolved and incorporated into the Brazilian Federation as the Federal Territory of Acre.

Castro was victorious because he combined rare skill with understanding of the strategic aspects of the geographic, political, economic and social factors that brought Acre's citizens to the armed fight. In his military operations, Castro applied Napoleonic strategy using the classic art of war principles. With inferior numbers, he adapted his forces and tactics to the enemy, weather and terrain, establishing a highly mobile guerrilla campaign.

These two Amazon military campaign historical examples had great political and strategic military significance. They demonstrated enormous patriotic enthusiasm and showed the fundamental importance of guerrilla warfare techniques in the Amazon. And as I will discuss, recent events involving Brazilian regular forces in guerrilla warfare in the Amazon Region are based on the lessons learned in the campaigns conducted by Teixeira and Castro so long ago. These lessons will be used again if it should ever become necessary to defend Brazil's vital interests in the Amazon.

The 1970s Counterguerrilla Experience

In November 1970, a Brazilian air force (FAB) SA–16 Albatross aircraft dropped airborne forces near the city of Marabá on the Tocantins River. From 7,000 feet, 12 men from the Brazilian Army Airborne Brigade Special Forces (SF) Company jumped in a military free–fall operation. After a 30–second delay, they opened their parachutes and the team leader unraveled a Brazilian flag. They drifted onto a small drop zone—a white sandbar in the middle of the river.

The team rapidly organized itself and quickly brought the flag to a waiting Brazilian navy patrol boat, where a marine lieutenant received it from them. The patrol boat then moved from the island to the port of Marabá.[10] There, the marine solemnly disembarked and passed the flag to a lieutenant from a jungle infantry battalion of the Military Command of the Amazon. The infantry officer then drove to the city center square and passed the flag to a public school student. To the sound of the national anthem, the student raised the flag at the national pavilion.

This civic ceremony, witnessed by thousands of Marabá residents, signaled the completion of the first joint military exercise conducted by the Brazilian armed forces in the Amazon—Operation *CARAJÁS 70.*

Using members of the three armed forces, and with the participation of various units not headquartered in the Amazon, *CARAJÁS 70* was a counterinsurgency exercise in a jungle environment. An excellent example of joint training, this operation's principal objectives were presence and dissuasion because of the presence of a rural guerrilla center in the region known as *Bico do Papagaio.*[11]

In April 1972, intelligence sources confirmed the guerillas' existence in the region around the cities of Marabá and Xambioá. The then–illegal Communist Party of Brazil (*PC do B*), which had a Maoist orientation, had established a training area there, in hopes of developing a liberated zone.

The Araguaia Guerrilla Force (*FOGUERA*), as the revolutionary movement had named itself, was established with funding from the international communist movement, whose members were primarily Albanian. The Communist Party of Albania's relationship with the *FOGUERA* was such that every day at 2100, a one–hour Portuguese language program was broadcast via short wave from *Radio of Tirana* in Albania. The program was specifically directed to the *FOGUERA* movement. The radio programs transmitted to the region always gave a heroic connotation to guerrilla actions. A long–range radio network reached the guerrilla force via an intermediate station and the Tirana station. Dismantling this radio link was one of the first successful actions of Brazilian communications and security forces.

The operation area chosen by the *PC do B* was extremely susceptible to subversive actions. The region had only a small state and local government presence. Sanitation and medical care were highly deficient. Malaria and leishmaniasis had reached epidemic proportions in the region, and a large part of the population was anemic and disease infested. There was no treated water and very little drainage. The region's economy was based on spring nut harvesting and firewood. Agriculture was subsistence farming of corn, manioc and rice. The population's quality of life was very low.

Being located near important roadways was extremely favorable to the *PC do B* because the region received a considerable number of new colonists, which facilitated infiltration of guerrilla reinforcements. Militarily, the guerrillas' choice of this area was intelligent because the region fell on the boundary between two Brazilian Army Military Area commands—the Amazon (CMA) and Planalto (CMP). This initially caused coordination and control problems for the army commands and gave a substantial advantage to the guerrillas.

In May 1972, when Brazilian military operations effectively started, *FOGUERA* had about 80 guerrilla fighters, including 15 women. The movement was organized into a political bureau, a military commission and three guerrilla detachments, each with three groups of eight to 10 members.

The political bureau was the head organization of the *PC do B*, which had split away from the Soviet–inspired Brazilian Communist Party (PCB) to follow the Chinese Maoist line. Adopting the principles of Mao Tse Tung, the *PC do B* envisioned escalating the guerrilla movement in rural areas until it was supported by the rural population and then extending the movement to urban areas. The *PC do B* political bureau members were rarely in the area, but they instructed others and kept abreast of all events. All military commission decisions were subordinate to political bureau approval.

The military commission constituted the command of *FOGUERA*. Its mission was to plan, coordinate and conduct guerrilla force actions. The leader-

"Bico do Papagaio" Region
Locations of Guerilla Base Camps and Federal Troops

ship, as well as other elements in command of the detachments and groups, was almost totally made up of members who had completed guerrilla warfare courses abroad, notably in Peking, Tirana and Havana.

Subordinate to the military commission were the three detachments which constituted the terrorist organization's maneuver elements. For security reasons, each detachment operated without knowing the planned or current operations of the others. Command and control (C^2) of the detachments was based on contacts at selected locations at predetermined dates and hours, established by strict compartmentalized methods and the use of passwords. This system made guerrillas captured alive an important and necessary source of information for counterguerrilla operations. Subordinate to each detachment were nine fire groups which were the guerilla force's basic elements. A fire group's autonomy was extremely restricted, and it operated under the

The combatants' psychological maturity and leadership development at all levels are key factors for success in jungle operations. The excellent training provided at the Jungle Warfare Training Center sets the standard for the Brazilian army's jungle experts.

A *major intelligence operation was planned to survey in detail . . . the terrain and the local population. Operation Sucuri, cautiously launched, planned for the smallest details to be included . . . [and] made clear to the superior command that the problem could not have a military solution alone. Military actions had to be integrated with diverse national and state civilian governmental organizations to ensure a complete elimination of the subversive center.*

detachment commander's strict control.

For the most part, members of *FOGUERA* were recruited by the *PC do B* from university students in Fortaleza, Salvador, Rio de Janeiro and São Paulo. A good number of these students were already living clandestine lives compromised by their actions in urban terrorism.

Guerrilla training had practical and theoretical objectives. The practical part was preparation of the soldier and elementary units for jungle combat. This included map reading, conducting ambushes, handling explosives and destruction with improvised materiel. The theoretical goal was to strengthen the ideological knowledge of *FOGUERA* members. Besides military training, the groups also participated in "productive work," principally in newly cleared areas, to sustain the guerrilla forces. The guerrillas also developed a psychological action program called the "work of the masses" aimed at obtaining the people's support. This was effective in some areas where the *FOGUERA* could organize a support force, but at no time did the organization try to recruit locals into the guerrilla forces, although the local people probably would have fought with them.

In truth, *FOGUERA* was a guerrilla force in an initial and incipient stage. Its armament consisted of handguns, hunting weapons and some rifles obtained from isolated actions against the outposts of the Pará State Police. One of the most serious mistakes federal forces made was to initiate operations normally used against guerrilla forces in their final stages of organization and development.

Guerrilla Operations Begin

Brazilian counterguerrilla actions against local forces can be divided into three phases: Phase 1 from April to October 1972; Phase 2 from April to August 1973; and Phase 3 from September 1973 to March 1975. Phase 1 involved massive use of Brazilian troops. In August 1972, these troops numbered about 1,500 men. Two battalion–size combat bases were established, one in Marabá and the other in Xambioá. Six company–size combat bases were set up in the interior of the operational area. During Phase 1, a series of mistakes were made:

● Mistaken concepts for operations and tactics. The planning and conduct of initial operations in the Bico do Papagaio region assumed that the counterguerrilla actions would be the type that are normally unleashed against forces already in the stage of a national liberation army. One of the first operations was a "clean–sweep" action in the Andorinhas Mountains, which do not have natural cover. After being bombarded with napalm by the air force, the mountains were vigorously searched and encircled by a large force. The results were dismal, because the guerrillas were never there. In the jungle, federal patrols moved on trails in large platoon formations of 35 to 40 men, while the guerrillas moved through the jungle in groups of five to 10.

● Lack of tactical unity of effort. Unity of effort was lost in planning and operations because the combat base in Marabá was under the control of the CMA, while the one in Xambioá was under the CMP's command. A simple call for aeromedical evacuation produced complex coordination problems.

● Incomplete intelligence. There were no maps or aerial photographs of the operational area. Lack of terrain knowledge was enormous, and FOGUERA's disposition and composition were unknown. Combat intelligence was extremely scarce about recent and current enemy activities, peculiarities and deficiencies.

● Great diversity in units employed and deficiencies in training. Units from different parts of Brazil were used in this phase. Some had little skill and no training in jungle counterguerrilla operations. Many units consisted of new recruits who had not even completed six months of instruction and were psychologically immature. Accidental discharge of weapons and shots fired mistakenly when patrols inadvertently met in the jungle caused some casualties.

● Lack of continuity in operations. Unlike the guerrilla force, which had been in the area for some time and remained there, the Brazilian troops were used for predetermined periods. They never remained more than 20 days and returned to their base

Although it was only recently activated, army aviation participation has been instrumental in the success of operations in the Amazon region.

Intelligence–gathering efforts in local communities provide a significant source of intelligence for operations against "opposing forces."

The entire force—including air force personnel—operated undercover in civilian clothing. Using a "cover story," the soldiers posed as elements of the federal police to avoid recognition that the Brazilian armed forces were being used to handle an internal defense problem. . . . About three years after the counterinsurgency campaign's start, the most dangerous center of rural guerrillas in Brazil was eliminated.

camps without being replaced. This discontinuity hurt operations and created a negative view of the military among the population.

Despite these problems, there were two positive aspects of Phase 1: 15 casualties were inflicted on the guerrilla force, and all levels of command gained a thorough understanding of the seriousness of the area insurgent situation.

In October 1972, in a decision made in Brasília by the ground force's highest level of command, operations were interrupted. Planning for Phase 2 considered all the lessons learned during Phase 1. A major intelligence operation was planned to survey in detail the *FOGUERA*, the terrain and the local population. Operation *Sucuri*, cautiously launched, planned for the smallest details to be included. The information obtained during *Sucuri* made clear to the superior command that the problem could not have a military solution alone. Military actions had to be integrated with diverse national and state civilian governmental organizations to ensure a complete elimination of the subversive center.

Phase 3, Operation *Marajoara*, was launched immediately after the conclusion of the surveys developed during Operation *Sucuri*. The CMA was appointed command headquarters with C^2 of all units, including several civilian federal and state government agencies. Additionally, professional troops were selected from the best–trained jungle infantry and airborne units. A rigorous training program emphasizing the exercise of leadership at all levels was conducted in garrison areas and in the combat area.

Three combat bases were established: the principal command post (CP) in Marabá; Xambioá; and Bacaba on the outskirts of the Transamazon Highway. An efficient and secure system of communications greatly enhanced the C^2 system. Likewise, an efficient logistic support system was created to handle all the highly specialized characteristics of the mission and operational environment.

The entire force—including air force personnel— operated undercover in civilian clothing. Using a "cover story," the soldiers posed as elements of the federal police to avoid recognition that the Brazilian

armed forces were being used to handle an internal defense problem.

Patrols began operating with only five to 10 men, comparable to the enemy guerrillas. Also, Brazilian patrols began using the considerable skills of local inhabitants who acted as guides or trackers. These elements proved decisive in the operation's success. Instead of moving on trails, the patrols used aerial photos provided by the air force to navigate through the jungle. Once again, the lesson that "guerrillas can best fight other guerrillas" was reinforced. In this context, the important role executed by the SF elements stands out.

These unconventional warfare experts were continuously involved in actions against the *FO-GUERA*, beginning with intelligence operations in *CARAJÁS 70*. During Operation *Marajoara*, SF elements acted as force multipliers by training engaged units and preparing self–defense forces in the local communities; launching intelligence and psychological operations with the local population; and using selected direct–action missions against the internal enemy.

Another important achievement of the counterguerrilla campaign was the success of the air force units, particularly the helicopter squadrons. Performing infiltration, exfiltration, resupply and aeromedical evacuation missions, these units were instrumental in the operation's overall success.

About three years after the counterinsurgency campaign's start, the most dangerous center of rural guerrillas in Brazil was eliminated. Furthermore, the Brazilian armed forces had established a sound basis for doctrine and operations in jungle and mountain environments.

Defending the Brazilian Amazon Today

On 26 February 1991, about 40 men who called themselves guerrillas of the Colombian Communist Revolutionary Armed Forces (*FARC*) conducted a raid into Brazilian territory. They attacked a Brazilian army detachment at a semipermanent camp on the bank of the Traíra River on the Brazil–Colombia border. The attack was conducted in three echelons.

Efficient, secure and highly flexible communication systems are essential for effective command and control during operations in the Amazon environment.

The lawless situation there was caused by a large number of illegal Brazilian and Colombian miners who arrived in Traíra after the deactivation of the Paranapanema Mining Company. . . . It was later proved that the Colombian FARC guerrillas were allied with cocaine dealers and illegal Colombian miners. The Colombian guerrilla action seemed to be a reprisal for previous counterguerrilla actions conducted by the Traíra Detachment.

The fire–support element remained on the Colombian bank while the other two elements—assault and security—unleashed intense automatic weapons fire against the camp. The surprised camp members tried unsuccessfully to react. During the action, the Brazilian 17–man unit suffered 12 casualties: three dead and nine wounded. Two Colombian miners detained at the camp also died.

By the raid's end, the Colombian guerrillas, suffering no losses themselves, had stolen the station radio, ammunition, uniforms and all of the post's armaments. They carried 5.56mm automatic weapons and various hunting rifles and wore light green uniforms and rubber boots. Two women who were identified among the attacking commandos had already been detained at the post before.

The minister of the army, Brazilian Ground Force commander, authorized the Amazon Ground Force commander to establish the Traíra Detachment to confront the riotous situation in the Traíra Mountains. The lawless situation there was caused by a large number of illegal Brazilian and Colombian miners who arrived in Traíra after the deactivation of the Paranapanema Mining Company.

It was later proved that the Colombian *FARC* guerrillas were allied with cocaine dealers and illegal Colombian miners. The Colombian guerrilla action seemed to be a reprisal for previous counterguerrilla actions conducted by the Traíra Detachment. It should be noted that the Traíra Detachment was limited to maintaining law and order. Their operations were restricted to deporting Colombian miners to their territory and stopping Brazilian miners from entering the area. The Brazilian federal government planned to normalize the local situation, then return Brazilian miners to the area.

The *FARC* attack against the detachment was unforeseen. Since the first Brazilian border platoons were established in the Amazon, attacks like this had never occurred. The *FARC* attack led to the planning and execution of a combined operation staffed by the armed forces of Brazil and Colombia—Operation *Traíra*. This operation was the principal result of an extraordinary regional bilateral meeting held on 9 March 1991 between Brazil and Colombia.

This meeting produced various combined accords and recommendations and defined the forces' commitment to operate in their respective territories to maintain order and pacify the border region. The meeting also established the coordinated actions to be conducted by Brazilians and Colombians at all levels of planning. An agreement was reached for the immediate and continuous exchange of intelligence related to subversion, terrorism and narcotrafficking in order to neutralize possible threats. It was also recommended that Brazil's and Colombia's armies should foster combined problem management to increase government presence in the area and support community development activities.

In the Brazilian territory, the CMA CP remained in Vila Bittencourt, a border platoon headquarters along the Colombian frontier. In the Colombian territory, the CP was at La Pedrera. The results of Operation *Traíra* were significant. On the Colombian side, patrols by the *Batallón Bejarano Muñoz*—a highly trained counterguerrilla unit—established effective control in their area of operation.

On the Brazilian side, the 1st Special Border Battalion's (1st BEF's) exceptional performance stands out.[12] Overcoming the initial trauma of the Traíra attack, the 1st BEF (today the 8th Jungle Infantry Battalion, Tabatinga) killed seven guerrillas who had attacked the detachment, imprisoned several members of the guerilla support network and recaptured most of the stolen military equipment.

Major participating units included elements of the traditional Amazonas Battalion, 1st Jungle Infantry Battalion (1st BIS). The Brazilian army's Strategic Reserve elements, the SF and army aviation units quickly responded to support and reinforcement requests. The presence of unconventional warfare experts from the 1st Special Forces Battalion (1st BFEsp), Rio de Janeiro, was extremely useful. The 1st BFEsp deployed an immediate action detachment that was integrated with SF and commando troops. Performing intelligence operations and selected direct–action missions, they were indispensable to the operation commander.

The LM-1 assault craft, totally designed and manufactured in Brazil, increased the Jungle Infantry battalions' capability for conducting river operations.

The Brazilian Air Force's armed AT-27 *Tucanos*, jointly operating with SIVAM (Amazon Surveillance System) radars, are a decisive combat power multiplier against "adversary forces."

Military free-fall is an efficient infiltration technique for Special Forces in the Amazon.

Existing problems in the arc of the Amazonian border from French Guiana to Bolivia, involve Indian management, clandestine mining and the smuggling of precious minerals, contraband and arms. The problems' root can be linked to strong connections between foreign guerrillas and drug traffickers, creating the phenomenon of narcoguerrillas. . . . This situation could escalate crises that might threaten Brazil's vital interests in the Amazon.

Operation *Traíra* marks a historically significant point for army aviation. This was the first time the recently created Army Aviation Brigade was deployed in an Amazon combat operation. The Ajuricaba Patrol employed four multipurpose Pantera helicopters and two scout Esquilo helicopters. Additionally, aviation logistic personnel and maintenance troops supported the infiltration and resupply of Colombian patrols. After the operation, two Panteras and two Esquilos were left to support the 1st BEF in Traíra for six more months.

FAB participation provided intratheater airlift of soldiers and logistic support with C–130 Hercules and C–115 Buffalos. The FAB was represented on the CP staff by an air support liaison officer from the VII Air Force Command. He assumed the planning duty and directed the employment of air assets allocated to the operation by the Air General Command (COMGAR), Brasília, Federal District. The assets, all based in Vila Bittencourt, included two C–95 Bandeirante aircraft for aerial reconnaissance, six UH–1H helicopters and six AT–27 Tucano fighters. The operation demonstrated that in the Amazon, without adequate FAB support, ground forces will be extremely limited in their combat, combat support and sustainment operations.

The Brazilian navy also had a role in Operation *Traíra*. A navy river patrol ship from the Amazon Fleet deployed to Vila Bittencourt to assist with logistic support and to increase regional security levels.

Existing problems in the arc of the Amazonian border from French Guiana to Bolivia involve Indian management, clandestine mining and the smuggling of precious minerals, contraband and arms. The problems' root can be linked to strong connections between foreign guerrillas and drug traffickers, creating the phenomenon of narcoguerrillas, particularly in Peru and Colombia. This situation could escalate crises that might threaten Brazil's vital interests in the Amazon. This especially concerns the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the national patrimony.

In November 1991, Operation *Perro Loco* was launched at the Colombian border by CMA to con-

front latent *FARC* threats. This operation was conducted in the Iauaretê and Querarí regions, both in the state of Amazonas.[13] The 5th Jungle Infantry Battalion (5th BIS), 1st BFEsp and 14 helicopters from the Army Aviation Brigade participated. Like Operation *Traíra*, this operation further demonstrated the capabilities of the units involved. They successfully dissuaded the Colombian narcoguerrillas in the region from conducting incursions into Brazilian territory.

Operational Design for Frontier Defense

In directives sent by the Army General Staff, Brasília, relating to external defense, the Ground Operations Command (COTer) was directed to use ground forces to defend vital Brazilian interests. All lessons learned from Operations *Traíra* and *Perro Loco* were considered in developing long–term plans for Amazon operations.

Defining the type of operation as low–intensity conflict was an important strategy. The threat, generally designated as "adversary forces," presented itself in various forms: narcotraffickers, guerrillas with or without political motivation, Indians without Brazilian citizenship, clandestine gold miners, international adventurers, foreign–infiltrated agents (to include state or privately sponsored) or a combination of these elements—all threatening Brazilian national security and undermining its sovereignty.

The military operations' overall political objectives will be reached when Brazilian sovereignty and integrity are established throughout the region. The operations will not be suspended until adversary forces have been expelled from Brazilian territory. Military objectives can be summarized as defending the population and national patrimony by destroying adversary forces operating within the national territory.

Fundamentally, ground force action will increase in intensity, starting with prevention tactics and moving to suppression. Operational actions following escalation will be as follows:

● Military support to federal, state or city governments.

● Intelligence–gathering operations and operations against adversary forces.

● Major operations if adversary forces evolve more developed strategies and organizations.

The strategic concept for using ground forces in these situations is that, despite the conduct of operations to destroy adversary forces, the Brazilian military war structure will not be activated and forces will continue to conduct unconventional military operations.

To better deal with these situations, the CMA can activate a conflict area (AC) through the authority of the minister of the army. The establishment of the AC in terms of a defined territorial limit must be restricted to a border area where there may be imminent or already–occurring threats. In terms of command structure, the AC must be divided into an operations zone (Z Op) and support zone (Z Ap). The AC commander must establish the C^2 structure and responsibilities within the AC.

The Z Op must be restricted to a region where operations to destroy adversary forces will occur. This region must include the ground and air space necessary for all operations' conduct. In principle, the Z Op commander commands the echelons directly responsible for adversary force destruction.

The Z Ap is a region for facilitating sustainment support of the operation, much like a communications zone in US Army doctrine. In principle, the Z Ap CP must be collocated with the principal logistic base. Basically, supplies arrive at the Z Ap, normally an area where an adequate airfield exists, by air or river. From there, supplies are transported to the Z Op by helicopter.

The AC size is established by CMA based on the seriousness or complexity of the problem. In an area where the adversary force's combat power is considerable—with significant irregular forces, guerrillas and foreign narcotraffickers—the activated AC should be brigade size. The commander should be from one of the four jungle infantry brigades stationed in the strategic Amazon area. In this case, the brigade commander could designate one of his battalion commanders as Z Op commander and his S4 as Z Ap commander.

Based on available combat information, the COTer establishes priority areas for planning and training. If the problem is small or restricted, the CMA could decide to have its subordinate brigades establish an AC appropriate for a battalion.

For planning in an activated AC, available resources include the combat, combat support and logistic elements of CMA and the Brazilian Army Strategic Reserve. This includes employing elements of the Army Aviation Command, Airborne Infantry Brigade and SF Battalion. Besides these, the combat, combat support and logistic elements of the FAB and navy are available and can be allocated to the COTer by the COMGAR and the Naval Operations Command.

These resources can be increased depending on the complexity of the mission and the requirements of private and civilian government organizations, which fall under the AC command. All this gives the Brazilian army an adequate structure for preparing, planning and conducting operations in defense of the strategic Amazon area.

Future Strategy for the Amazon Theater

The threat to Brazilian interests in the Amazon is, primarily, a function of the ability of Brazil's friendly neighbors to control or defeat their serious internal conflicts. The presence and fervor of narcoguerrillas in Colombia, Peru and Bolivia is such that "social bliss" now or in the near term is unlikely, despite the extraordinary attempts taken by the respective governments. Also, fighting foreign narcoguerrillas in an external defense situation in areas along the Amazon border remains a possibility and suggests a need for multinational, combined operations in both the short and medium terms.

Brazilian vision must focus on possible threats to constitutional authority and the maintenance of law and order. One threat is related to interest in the Amazon by groups called "landless movements." Such a threat—which may or may not have ideological connotations—may require using federal force. Eventually, a fight against adversary forces in an internal defense scenario could result. The *Bico do Papagaio* continues to be a potentially explosive region for this type of conflict. To prevent its escalation, much more than military presence is required. There

Significance of Brazilian Strategic Thinking

Colonel William W. Mendel, US Army, Retired

Colonel Alvaro de Souza Pinheiro's article about the Brazilian experience in the Amazon captures the North American reader's attention because of its rough parallel to "winning the wild West" in US history. While the United States had mostly tamed its West by 1900, Brazil is still in the process of bringing order and progress to the outer reaches of its Amazon region. Alvaro's essay can be appreciated on several levels by US security professionals dealing with Ibero–American issues.

Alvaro's frank discussion of Brazil's counterguerrilla experience in the Amazon Basin highlights how national boundaries were drawn and how Brazilian nationality was formed. This includes the fight "to subdue" indigenous peoples who threatened the Portuguese–Brazilian conquest of Brazil. Alvaro's story of jungle fighting, which he brings forward to today, may inspire some readers to seek more information about Brazil.[1]

In Brazil's modern history, the *FOGUERA* (Araguaia Guerrilla Force of the Communist Party of Brazil) was the biggest rural threat to Brazil's national security. The stories of Operation *CARAJÁS 70* and subsequent operations to counter *FOGUERA*'s guerrilla actions, describe the maturation of Brazil's modern armed forces in actions that influenced doctrine and joint interoperability. By 1974, the military had largely finished off the rural guerrilla Communist Party of Brazil's military arm. The Brazilians did not employ foreign advisers or foreign troops to defeat the communist guerrilla movement. This makes them unusual in Latin American military experience and explains the feeling of pride members of their armed forces have in defending the national patrimony.

The Traíra incident (February 1991) was significant for Brazil for two reasons. It was the first time Brazilian soldiers were killed in combat with rural guerrillas since battling the *FOGUERA* in 1974.[2] The event served notice to the Brazilian government that the frontier's defense was serious business that needed support. Indeed, Minister of Foreign Affairs Francisco Rezek reportedly advised the Colombian government that the Brazilian army could not accept this kind of action, and something would be done to counter the guerrilla groups.[3] The consequence was the planning and execution of a combined Brazil–Colombia operation. According to the Brazilian minister of the army, seven Colombian guerrillas were killed; four were captured and later returned to the Colombian army.

The incident also confirmed the need for frontier troops. Since 1920, the Brazilian army has had a border watch program. Today, five jungle infantry battalions patrol the Brazilian Amazon border areas, which compose 60 percent of the national territory. The battalions' mission is made difficult by the "facts of the Brazilian Amazon," described by the minister of the army in his 1991 testimony to the Brazilian National Congress:

- Great size of the region.
- Weak transportation network, mainly riverine.
- Small and diversified population.
- Difficulty in making government presence felt.
- Indian tribes largely ignore borders.
- Presence and predatory behavior of miners from various countries who, attracted by gold, corrupt the Indians and operate in diverse areas without authorization and without respect for national borders or environment.
- Acts of foreign religious missions, who do not always work on their religious function.
- Presence of organized guerrilla groups and powerful drug cartels in neighboring countries.
- Intervention of multinational groups under various justifications: environment, Indian rights, internationalization of the rain forest.
- Difficulty neighboring countries have in protecting their border areas.[4]

Countering Gray Area Phenomena

Alvaro's article also includes valuable "lessons learned" concerning issues of interest to US policy makers and strategists. These issues include: recognizing the immediate danger to national welfare presented by GAP, including drug trafficking, insurgency, smuggling, lawlessness, poverty and refugee flows; developing interagency cooperation and integration to achieve policy goals—especially integrating military resources and operations with those of civilian government agencies; and putting someone in charge of multiagency actions in designated operating areas. Similar issues also confound US strategy development, and their resolution remains problematic.[5] During the early 1990s, US Southern Command initiated actions to improve interagency cooperation and the integration of multiagency resources in efforts to counter GAP—especially narcotrafficking and insurgency—in the Southern Theater. By 1994, essential funding for such initiatives was lost due to military cutbacks.

"Guerrillas in the Brazilian Amazon" demonstrates Brazilian recognition of several GAP threats to national sovereignty. Only recently has US national leadership placed emphasis on these kinds of dangers to our interests, notably in President Bill Clinton's *National Security Strategy.* "Transnational phenomena such as terrorism, narcotics trafficking, environmental degradation, natural resource depletion, rapid population growth and refugee flows also have security implications for both present and long–term American policy. In addition, an emerging class of transnational environmental issues are increasingly affecting international stability and consequently will present new challenges to U.S. security."[6] Brazil's economic development of Amazon states such as Roraima, Amazonas, Acre and Rondônia has alarmed some in the international community who fear that increased access to and use of the Brazilian Amazon's natural resources will bring harm to the global environment.

Alvaro's concern over French President François Mitter-

> **T**he strategic concept for using ground forces in these situations is that, despite the conduct of operations to destroy adversary forces, the Brazilian military war structure will not be activated and forces will continue to conduct unconventional military operations.

is a need for more efficient government action coordinated at the federal, state and city levels. However, to remain ready in the future for these types of situations, all military commands must stay updated on plans for integrated security.

Any prospective analysis involving the Brazilian Amazon's security must consider the present international environment and the implications of de-

mands by groups who have appointed themselves as the "New World Order's" leaders. In this new international system, where the United States is the only economic and military superpower, new centers of tension and friction have grown with relation to ethnic, religious and national identities.

Environmental questions of special importance also have been raised. Under the auspices of ecologi-

and's comment about a right to intervene in other countries' internal affairs when environmental issues are involved brings up other potential dangers to Brazil's sovereignty. Additionally, the perception that the United States also has designs on Brazil has found voice in recent years among some who have sincere concerns for US intervention policy and others who find the issue a convenient vehicle for domestic political posturing. For example, a São Paulo, Brazil, newspaper editorial titled "Brazil Surrounded" admonished its readers about advancing a so–called theory of the siege but still suggested that "The presence of American soldiers in the Amazon region is proof enough—after all, are they not also in Colombia, Venezuela, Peru, Bolivia, Paraguay and even in Argentina? What interests can the United States pursue in those countries but to hem in Brazil by monitoring its air space with powerful radars? Why would they intend to lay siege to Brazil? Because Brazil is the only developing country that can undermine the real power wielded by vast economic sectors in the United States inasmuch as by subduing environmentalists' restrictions, we can reach the Pacific!"[7]

Looking beyond the chimera of US intervention in the Amazon, Alvaro has identified rock–solid threats representing a GAP dynamic that US security specialists cannot ignore—the linkage of narcotraffickers and guerrillas. Since US involvement with conflicts in El Salvador and Nicaragua in the 1980s, support for counterinsurgency has been unpopular. However, overseas counterdrug operations have been funded. This has led to the peculiar assertion in some US interagency circles that no clear linkage exists among the narcotraffickers and guerrilla groups. But as Alvaro advises from first–hand experience in Brazilian border regions: "The problem's root can be linked to strong connections between foreign guerrillas and drug traffickers, creating the phenomenon of narcoguerrillas, particularly in Peru and Colombia. This situation could escalate crises that might threaten Brazil's vital interests in the Amazon. This especially concerns the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the national patrimony."

Brazil is taking direct action against the narcoguerrilla nexus as one objective in its counterdrug strategy. The US Andean Ridge strategy for reducing the movement of illicit drugs to the United States will remain problematic until the transnational narcoguerrilla linkage is accounted for in counterdrug campaign design.

In describing military operations in Brazil's border regions, Alvaro provides insight for integrating multiagency resources. Brazil's military leaders recognized there would be a need for interagency cooperation to integrate military counterguerrilla actions with other national and state government organizations. As Alvaro states, "There is a need for more efficient government action coordinated at the federal, state and city levels."

The problem of establishing a regional czar or lead agency was solved by establishing the Military Command of the Amazon as command headquarters with control of all units, including several civilian federal and state government agencies. In this case, the armed forces were seen as best able to command and control complex civil and military operations. While this model may not fit US interagency endeavors, the important point is that the Brazilians seized the initiative, put someone in charge and integrated multiagency actions.

A Strategy of Lassitude

Brazil's *Strategy of Lassitude* outlines national plans to defend Brazilian territory from intervention forces. This is a strategy for making the enemy weary—exhausting his national will. Certainly, this strategy demonstrates a serious intent to maintain sovereignty in the Brazilian Amazon and offers Brazil's view of intervention threats. Most interesting is that Brazil's military strategists were able to extend their vision for national defense beyond the stricture of today's popularized annihilation concepts to consider a range of options appropriate for the situation. US military planners might wonder if current staff training and military doctrine, which demands "prompt and decisive" warfare, could facilitate or even allow thinking about attrition–style strategies.[8]

cal preservationists, international social interest groups have constructed and spread a negative image of the Brazilian Amazon. The world has seen pronouncements, such as that by French President François Mitterrand, in which the defense of the Amazon rain forest is elevated to a cause of fundamental importance for humanity. Such pronouncements advocate the formation of supranational organizations to police the environmental management provided by the governments of underdeveloped or developing countries. This is an explicit presenta-

tion of the principle of *devoir d'ingerence* (right of intervention).[14]

It is not within this article's scope to assess future external threats to Brazil's vital Amazon interests. To confront a threat involving the possibility of a conflict against an extracontinental, multinational military force of superior combat power, the Army General Staff—responsible for formulating political–strategic policies and concepts—has already promulgated a "Strategy of Lassitude." By definition, this strategy seeks a prolonged attrition conflict

The lassitude strategy is a form of attrition warfare suited to the Brazilian Amazon's vast reaches. Remarkably, it is similar in intent to Mexico's National Defense Plan I for defending against foreign intervention on Mexican soil. The Mexican strategy is based on the use of regular and irregular forces to undertake an extensive guerrilla war against an intervention force.[9] Similarly, Brazilian operations will employ joint forces using predominantly guerrilla warfare concepts to grind down and exhaust an invader. Although a likely scenario for an incursion onto Brazilian soil may be difficult for the North American strategist to posit, the Brazilian military must seriously consider perceived dangers to its national patrimony.

It is still popular to quote Carl von Clausewitz in US military circles: "War is an act of force, and there is no logical limit to the application of that force."[10] Military strategists overlook Russian General Aleksandr Svechin, who reminds us that there are other strategic considerations beyond seeking the decisive battle. Svechin saw a span of intermediate forms of military operations between the extremes of destruction and attrition warfare. "The term attrition is a very poor expression of all the diverse shades of different strategic methods outside the realm of destruction. . . . A strategy of destruction is unified and allows for only one correct decision. In a strategy of attrition the intensity of armed conflict may vary, and thus each level of intensity may have its own correct decision. One can determine the level of intensity required by a given situation only through very careful study of economic and political conditions."[11]

This is exactly the approach taken by Brazilian strategists in forming their lassitude strategy. They are accounting for Brazil's economic, political and military elements of national power as they match strategy to conditions imposed by the mission, threat, geography, time and force structure.

Alvaro also demonstrates how closely Brazilian strategists parallel Clausewitz's tenet of the "remarkable trinity"—the need in war to maintain a balance among the people, army and government. "The passions that are to be kindled in war must already be inherent in the people,"

Clausewitz writes.[12] Alvaro makes clear the need to enjoin the support of the people in conducting a *Strategy of Lassitude*. Alvaro's article provides the North American reader with a concise account of jungle warfighting. But the significance of this example of Brazilian strategic thinking for US policy and planning is its description of politico–military intent and its potential use as a concept for countering some of today's gray–area dangers. *MR*

NOTES

1. Currently available in book stores is Gilberto Freyre's well–regarded history of Brazil from the mid–1800s to 1914, *Order and Progress* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1986). A contemporary North American's view of Brazil is found in Joseph A. Poge, *The Brazilians* (Reading, MA: Addison Wesley Publishing Co., 1995).
2. Carlos Tinoco, "Exército—Amazônia—Traíra," Exposicáo Do Ministro Do Exército Ao Senado Federal ["Army, Amazon, Traíra River," Testimony of the Minister of the Army to the National Congress] (Brasilia, Brazil: 4 April 1991), 7–15.
3. "O ataque da guerrilha," ["Guerrilla Attack"] *Veja* (Brazil, 6 March 1991), 24.
4. Tinoco, 10–15.
5. William W. Mendel and David G. Bradford, *Interagency Cooperation: A Regional Model for Overseas Operations*, McNair Paper 37 (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, March 1995).
6. President Bill Clinton, *National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement* (Washington, DC: the White House, February 1995), 1. Also, see the *National Security Strategy* (NSS), July 1994, 1. The last Bush administration NSS, January 1993, mentions the environment, terrorism and the illicit drug trade, 1, 11 and 18.
7. "Anti–Americanism Resurfacing," *FBIS–LAT–93–158 Daily Report* (São Paulo, Brazil: 18 August 1993).
8. GEN John M. Shalikashvili, *National Military Strategy* (Washington, DC: Headquarters, Department of the Army, February 1995), 13. The *Strategy* states: "Clear Objectives—Decisive Force. In any application of force, military objectives will be clearly defined to support our national political aims in the conflict. We intend to commit sufficient force to achieve these objectives in a prompt and decisive manner." With the advantage of the world's best military forces, the people and military leadership of the United States expect rapid, decisive victory. Should US strategic power wane, it may become necessary to consider other strategies.
9. Ignacio Ramirez, "El Ejercito: Su Estructura Estrategica y Su Doctrina de Guerra," ["The Army: Its Strategic Structure and Its Warfighting Doctrine"] *Processo* (Mexico, 14 February 1994), 7.
10. Carl von Clausewitz, *On War*, edited by Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976), 77.
11. Aleksandr Svechin, *Strategy* (Minneapolis, MN: East View Press, 1992), 246.

Colonel William W. Mendel, US Army, Retired, is a senior military analyst, Foreign Military Studies Office, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. He received a B.A. from Virginia Military Institute and an M.A. from the University of Kansas and is a graduate of the US Army Command and General Staff College and US Army War College. He held a variety of command and staff positions in the Continental United States, Europe, Korea and Vietnam and held the Maxwell D. Taylor Chair of the Profession of Arms at the US Army War College, Carlisle, Pennsylvania. He is a frequent contributor to Military Review. *His article* "The Cold War Returns" *appeared in the May 1994 issue.*

characterized by low–intensity guerrilla warfare to make the adversary tired in body and spirit.

The translation of the lassitude strategy to the operational level presupposes adoption of irregular warfare as the principal form of warfighting when there is a disequilibrium between the combat power of Brazilian forces and their possible opponents. The inferiority of Brazil's materiel resources and great disparity in the technical–scientific area precludes direct offensive or defensive conflict between the enemy and Brazil's conventional forces.

The great objective is to demonstrate to any potential enemy that the price to pay to maintain dominance over any region will well exceed the benefits. In this context, it is important to underscore that the Brazilian army is the only Latin American army with the same SF employment concept as the US Army. This concept holds that SF operational detachments will establish unconventional warfare operational areas. The difference between the US and Brazilian concepts is that while US SF will work with foreign populations outside US territory, the Brazilian SF will work with internal Brazilian populations—in a resistance movement environment—when an invasion threat to Brazilian territory occurs.

The concept of lassitude has been developed for two simultaneous levels of action: the material plane of the military forces and the moral plane of psychological action. On the material plane, the foreseen combat will be based on intense use of typical guerrilla actions. Regular forces need not be converted into guerrilla forces to effectively use guerrilla warfare techniques. This would be an inconceivable and damaging backward step in campaign development.

On the moral plane, one must distinguish the work to be developed from the diverse actors present. The objective will be to give the Brazilian soldiers and population the required moral support that will permit them to conduct a long–duration campaign. The same moral capability will drain the invader psychologically, forcing him to give up the fight. One must keep in mind that the campaign cannot be concluded until the sovereignty and integrity of the national patrimony is fully achieved. There is a growing national consciousness that the objective will only be achieved by the removal of all foreign elements from Brazilian territory.

Planning for a strategy of lassitude will require that Brazilian leaders correctly identify the center of gravity (COG). The invader's strategic COG is likely to be his national will that leads him into the situation. When he has suffered sufficient losses and the cost–benefit ratio is no longer in favor of action, the resolve for action will weaken. This will be the preponderant factor for the withdrawal of foreign military forces from Brazilian territory.

Conversely, Brazilians cannot ignore factors working against the new strategy. These include sparse population, unknown terrain, existence of unverified borders, marginal positioning in relation to transportation networks and nonintegration of numerous Amazon regions with Brazilian power centers. These factors can detract from a unified defense effort.

A National Focus

One must not forget that adopting "lassitude" presupposes sacrifices for the entire nation. It is likely that a powerful enemy will try to break the Brazilian national will, the prime component in the strategy's implementation. This is truly the focal point to be developed: Establish and consolidate a national will which directly supports the defense of Brazil's vital interests in the Amazon.

The vestiges and ruins of numerous forts and the restored artillery batteries with their old bronze cannons are testaments to more than 350 years of fighting by Brazil's ancestors to conquer and maintain sovereignty in the Brazilian Amazon. Guerrilla warfare techniques have been the constant theme in this struggle.

The jungle environment, territorial extension, Brazil's immense border, sparse population, lack of transportation and precarious communications are all characteristic factors of the Amazon area. The high priority of the Amazon to Brazilian interests, the unique nature of the region and the finite limits of

The difference between the US and Brazilian concepts is that while US SF will work with foreign populations outside US territory, the Brazilian SF will work with internal Brazilian populations—in a resistance movement environment—when an invasion threat to Brazilian territory occurs.

Brazil's armed forces have led to the development of a singular style of combat.

Through the years, the true Amazon developmental principle has been the pioneer actions and bravery of the Brazilian armed forces. In the most remote locations of the region, FAB has influenced the formation and consolidation of the population's nationality. And the mission to emplace Brazilian culture into the hearts and minds of each citizen, over and above the mission of maintaining the safety of thousands of border kilometers, has been realized in the sacrifice and commitment of Brazilian soldiers in the Amazon.

But the defense of Brazil's vital interests is not the exclusive work of the Amazon's soldiers. It is a responsibility of all Brazilians, military and civilian, including those of other areas of Brazil. If an external threat should materialize, all Brazilians will be needed to contribute to defending the Amazon, using guerrilla warfare if necessary, as we have done in the past and are still doing today.

Brazil continues to use its military power to protect its economic, political and social interests in the Amazon. By providing the distant and recent history of the Brazilian army's role in regional security and development, one can better understand the strategic importance of the Amazon region. Brazil's guerrilla warfare experience, linked to the military history of the Amazon basin, provides a basis for future strategic concept development for protecting Brazil's national patrimony. Brazil's determination to provide security and integration for the Amazon is best stated by former Brazilian army leader General Rodrigo Otávio: "Hard is the mission to develop and defend the Amazon. But harder, however, was that of our ancestors in conquering it and maintaining it." *MR*

NOTES

1. Francisco Caldeira Castelo Branco was the Portuguese commander who founded and governed Belém until he was ousted in 1618.

2. Antonio Raposo Tavares was a Brazilian explorer. He was governor of the São Vicente Captaincy (in colonial Brazil, a jurisdictional division corresponding to a province) and head of the so-called exploration of the territorial limits, which reached the Amazon and returned to São Paulo in 1650. The expedition covered more than 12,000km and was the most extensive of all the geographical reconnaissance expeditions undertaken in Brazil.

3. *Uti Possidetis* ("as it exists now") is the application of a principle of Roman private law to the field of international law. Enunciated in the 1750 Treaty of Madrid, which was signed by Spain and Portugal, it constitutes a master stroke of international politics in relation to the New World.

4. The Tordesillas Meridian was determined by the Treaty of Tordesillas, between Spain and Portugal, which settled conflicts over lands explored by Columbus and other late 15th–century voyagers. The original demarcation line, established by Pope Alexander VI, ran from pole to pole 100 leagues west of the Cape Verde Islands. At Tordesillas, the meridian was moved to 370 leagues west of the Cape Verde Islands, or between 48 and 49 degrees west of Greenwich. This new demarcation was ratified by Pope Julius in 1506. The new boundary enabled Portugal to claim the coast of Brazil after its discovery by Pedro Alvares Cabral in 1500. Brazilian exploration and settlement far to the west of the demarcation line in subsequent centuries laid a firm basis for Brazil's claim to vast areas of South America's interior.

5. The Pernambucan Insurrection (1645 to 1654) was a successful rebellious movement against the Dutch government in northeast Brazil. This historical event marked the beginning of the Brazilian nationality. Antonio Dias Cardoso, André Vidal de Negreiros, Henrique Dias and Felipe Câmaro are among its heroes.

6. The Bolivian Syndicate was an agricultural company, established with English and North American capital, which tried to seize control of the state of Acre (1901). Headquartered in Bolivia, it had its own police force and armed fleet. Company representatives arrived at the village of Antimari on the Acre River but changed their minds because revolu-

tionaries dominated the whole river, and Bolivian interest and resistance were fading fast.

7. The Federalist Revolution (1893 to 1895) was an armed movement in the state of Rio Grande do Sul in southern Brazil, which originated from disagreements between Republicans and Federalists and occurred as Floriano Peixoto was assuming the Brazilian presidency.

8. The Treaty of Petrópolis was signed by José Maria da Silva Paranhos, the Baron of Rio Branco, the minister of foreign affairs and the representatives of Bolivia. Through this treaty, Brazil acquired, by purchase and exchange, the territory that is today the state of Acre.

9. The Madeira–Mamoré railroad was built connecting the towns of Guajará–Mirim, on the border with Bolivia, and Porto Velho, in western Brazil on the border between the states of Amazonas and Rondônia. It was used to transport rubber to the Madeira River and was known as the "devil's railroad" because of the great number of deaths during its construction.

10. The city of Marabá is located on the Tocantins River about 450 miles upstream from the Atlantic Ocean and city of Belém. The Tocantins flows south to north.

11. *Bico do Papagaio* (Parrot's Beak) is a region that was originally along the border between the states of Goiás and Pará and was so named because its outline, formed by the Tocantins and Araguaia rivers, resembles a parrot's beak. This region today is in the newly formed state of Tocantins.

12. In 1992, the five special border battalions were reorganized into jungle infantry battalions with greater combat capabilities.

13. The *Cabeça do Cachorro* (Dog's Head) is in the northwest region of the Brazilian Amazon bordering Colombia. The shape of this region, which includes the villages of Iauaretê, Querarí and São Joaquim, gives rise to its name.

14. The Nongovernmental Agencies' World Conference, held 17 to 20 December 1991 at France's request, brought together 800 delegates from all over the world. During his speech, French President François Mitterrand alluded to the *devoir d'ingerence* of the world community in the protection of the environment, suggesting the creation of a supranational guardian authority.

Colonel Alvaro de Souza Pinheiro is the Brazilian liaison officer to the US Army Combined Arms Center, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, and a consulting editor for the Military Review *Portuguese edition. He is a graduate of the Brazilian Army Command and General Staff College and the Brazilian Army War College. He has held a variety of command and staff positions, including instructor, Brazilian Army Military Academy, Infantry Advanced Course and Command and General Staff Course; commander, 1st Special Forces Battalion (Antonio Dias Cardoso Battalion), Rio de Janeiro, Brazil; and staff officer, Plans and Operations Division, and special assistant to the commander, Brazilian Army Ground Operations Command, Brasília, Brazil.*

Force
Projection

US Army doctrine states that "Force projection is the demonstrated ability to rapidly alert, mobilize, deploy and provide on-where in the world." This water examines the operational force projection challenges commanders must consider as they face significant reductions in forward-based capabilities and adjusting shifts in troops, bases and global elsewise. Because prudent commanders, reserved terms and rapid force projection of soldiers and equipment demand that leaders design and develop rapidly deployable, strategically deployable forces capable of achieving decisive results in war and in a status other than war. If America's Armies are to be fully prepared for the future, leaders must master the many challenges associated with force projection, today.

The Human Dimension in Force Projection:
Discipline Under Fire

Lieutenant Colonel Faris R. Kirkland, US Army, Retired;
Morten G. Ender; Colonel Robert K. Gifford, US Army;
Kathleen M. Wright; and David H. Marlowe

ALTHOUGH MOST SOLDIERS and junior leaders involved in Operation *Just Cause*, the 1989 US invasion of Panama, saw combat for the first time during that operation, they behaved like veterans. This is the payoff from two decades of mutually supportive innovations in training, leadership and manning that have altered the US Army's human dimension.[1] Applied differently in the 20 infantry battalions committed to *Just Cause*, these innovations provided realistic training that provided the Army with soldiers who had confidence they could accomplish their missions; leaders who fostered a sense of responsibility and readiness to go to war; and soldiers and leaders who trusted one another and could work together under stress. The battalions successfully went from peace to war overnight and, from the outset, waged war with a skillful mix of violence and restraint. These attributes make the US Army a force that is well prepared for rapid projection into unpredictable situations that require sensitivity to the postwar responses of indigenous populations.

The Department of Military Psychiatry, Division of Neuropsychiatry, Walter Reed Army Institute of Research (WRAIR), has been studying the human dimension evolution in the Army since 1980.[2] A WRAIR team conducted a systematic debriefing of the soldiers who did the fighting in *Just Cause*.[3] The words and actions reported here represent the responses from those interviews. By comparing them with historical studies, the reader can derive an assessment of the force's operational efficiency.[4] This article will discuss three aspects of that efficiency: acceptance and implementation of restrictive rules of engagement (ROE), competent performance by battle–naive personnel and junior personnel acceptance of responsibility for and adapting to unfamiliar and rapidly changing missions.

The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not purport to reflect the position of the Department of the Army, the Department of Defense or any other government office or agency.—Editor

> [The soldiers] acceptance of the ROE can be credited to discipline, although it pushes the limits of traditional conceptualizations of discipline. The words soldiers and leaders used to describe the ROE made it clear they were shocked and dismayed to have to abandon their training in suppressive fire and voluntarily concede the first shot to the enemy. But they understood—they grasped the purpose of the ROE and the essence of their role.

Just Cause was a series of small, violent infantry actions conducted within a policy of restraint to minimize friendly and enemy casualties. Within 48 hours, the initial assault force of about 7,000 overwhelmed the forewarned Panamanian Defense Forces (PDF)—a military establishment numbering 7,400 supported by about 1,800 in paramilitary "dignity battalions."[5] US forces accomplished their missions with few casualties among friendly personnel and Panamanians.[6] Most analysts describe the assault forces and the 13,000 soldiers in follow–up operations as using firepower sparingly and behaving with competence, restraint and compassion.[7] It is worth reflecting on what the soldiers in *Just Cause* did and how they did it—we are likely to need those capabilities again.

Rules of Engagement

Preventing Panamanian death and injury and property and infrastructure damage were crucial to Operation *Just Cause*'s political and psychological success. The ROE—designed to protect Panamanians—increased the infantrymen's vulnerability by sharply limiting the use of fire–support systems. No indirect fire by mortars or artillery was allowed and howitzers were only used in direct fire with delay–fuzed shells that burst inside buildings.[8] Panamanian armored vehicles, antiaircraft weapons and machineguns were taken out by single shots, missiles or

US soldiers taking part in an exercise to defend the Panama Canal.

US battalions in Panama engaged in "[E]xercises that permitted scouting target areas, rehearsing maneuvers and masking increased activities." These exercises, called SAND FLEAS, asserted US rights under the treaties between Panama and the United States and often led to confrontations with PDF soldiers. . . . US soldiers maintained discipline and restraint in these dangerous and uncertain situations.

bursts of fire from AC–130 gunships and helicopters.[9] Firepower was often demonstrated rather than applied. Only two aerial bombs were used. They were dropped by F–117As on the remote and isolated PDF base at Rio Hato with offsets to prevent casualties among enemy troops.[10] At Fort Amador, a howitzer was fired into an unoccupied building next to those held by the PDF 5th Rifle Company.[11] This was done to induce PDF soldiers to surrender without bloodshed or damage to the infrastructure or private property.

ROE limited use of infantry weapons also. In the initial stages of combat, the "[R]ules of engagement prevented soldiers from firing unless they were certain that the shot would kill the enemy."[12] The ROE prohibited suppressive fires on likely enemy positions. Rather than achieve fire superiority early as they had been trained to do, US soldiers had to let the enemy have the first shot. The ROE made missions harder and more dangerous, but the soldiers understood them and carried them out. One senior noncommis-

sioned officer (NCO) said, "We all had problems with the rules of engagement, but when we explained them to the men they took it in stride." One squad leader reported: "None of our men fired. Discipline was good. We didn't have to tell people not to shoot." A private recounted that "We had to cross the whole city. We were shot at four times on the way out. On the way back, they were shooting from the rooftops, but we could never precisely identify the shooters. We didn't fire one round the entire battle. We were told not to shoot and we obeyed. We had lots of opportunities to fire but we handled them without firing."

These words reflect unassuming pride in embracing the ROE. Several soldiers described the fire discipline in their own units as excellent but characterized other units as trigger–happy. However, it is a normal part of combat folklore to regard members of other units as less competent than one's own. In Panama, fire discipline was the focus because it was the hardest part of the operation. In later stages, as the likelihood of organized resistance diminished, the ROE were progressively tightened.[13] Although essential, the ROE put extraordinary demands on soldiers' poise, understanding and self–discipline and on leaders' credibility.

Behavior of Battle–Naive Soldiers in Combat

Leaders' comments about their subordinates' performance during their "baptism by fire" were generally favorable and emphasized the close relationship between what the soldiers had learned to do in training and their behavior in combat. A battalion commander remarked that "The first operation encountered sniper fire. The soldiers did everything they should have done. They accomplished the mission, kept communications in, reported properly and maintained fire discipline."

Two battalions making an airborne assault against an alerted and well–armed PDF unit had their aircraft and some soldiers inside hit by antiaircraft automatic weapons.[14] Each battalion had two killed and scores injured or wounded. Despite their losses, in the words of a staff officer: "Their firing was well–disciplined. There was no yelling or signs of panic. They were doing what they were trained to do." Another staff officer said, "I looked around the drop zone, and it was like a training exercise—they knew what to do and did it."

A company commander stated that he "was surprised at how well they did. They moved from cover to cover while another soldier covered them." Another commented: "I have never seen patrol tech-

A Specter gunner executing his preflight weapons check before liftoff during *Just Cause*. Panamanian armored vehicles, antiaircraft weapons and machineguns were taken out by single shots, missiles or bursts of fire from gunships, helicopters and ground weapons.

Preventing Panamanian death and injury and property and infrastructure damage were crucial to Operation Just Cause's *political and psychological success. The ROE—designed to protect Panamanians—increased the infantrymen's vulnerability by sharply limiting the use of fire–support systems. No indirect fire by mortars or artillery was allowed and howitzers were only used in direct fire with delay–fuzed shells that burst inside buildings.*

nique followed so perfectly since Ranger School." A platoon leader in a company that was clearing police stations held by Panamanian President Manuel Noriega's supporters said: "We used minimal commands. The soldiers reacted as they had trained. Everyone knew what to do. It was easy for me." A typical comment by a squad leader about his soldiers was: "They were scared. We were in a foreign land where the enemy knew the territory, but their training was ingrained. They knew what to do and they did it. No one froze. As we went through the town, they looked to the right, left and above. They did it just right. I didn't have to tell them anything."

Junior enlisted soldiers recalled that knowing what to do helped them manage their fear, as well as accomplish their missions. One said, "It was almost like another day in the field even though we were scared. Everyone worked together because they knew their stuff." A member of another unit said, "At the Marriott, there were snipers on the roofs. It was scary, but we did a professional job; everyone did what he was supposed to do."

Most squads had strong horizontal cohesion. The soldiers' primary concern, even before self and family, was their comrades' welfare. Their interdependence was evident in comments such as: "I worried that I might screw up and get one of the guys hurt." The synergy between training and cohesion was evident in a private's comment: "We didn't need commo on patrols at night. We understood that each would do what he had to do. We could count on each other, we respected and trusted each other." As always in combat, the other members of his squad and platoon were the soldier's primary source of emotional support.

One private reported an experience that was shared by many: "I was really upset about having killed a PDF soldier. But the guys all told me it was what we were

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A senior NCO [recalled]: "Most of the operations were done at squad level—roadblocks, clearing rooms, curfew enforcement and anti-looting patrols. Most of the time, the squads were out of visual contact and sometimes, out of radio contact with higher headquarters." The junior NCOs' ability to operate independently permitted a large number of operations to be carried out concurrently, enhanced the tactical flexibility of the major units and multiplied the perceived strength of US forces.

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here to do and any one of us would have done what I did. It made all the difference."

A platoon in another company involved in the Commandancia assault had 21 of its 26 members wounded.[15] The five uninjured men and several of the wounded persevered in the mission. The platoon leader said of his young NCOs and privates: "I'm proud of the guys. I had to report that the platoon was combat ineffective, but we were still a force. One of my soldiers risked his life to rescue a damaged armored personnel carrier while under fire. Then we rounded up a Marine LAV [light armored vehicle] and a squad from another unit and broke through the wall."

Junior sergeants demonstrated coolness, courage and professionalism under fire. A member of one squad said that during the battle, "Our squad leader was keeping an eye on us. He was always talking to us, calling us by name. His voice helped." When all members of a fire team clearing a building in the Commandancia were wounded by a grenade, the leader of the other team led his men over their fallen comrades to complete the mission. He said, "It was the hardest thing I ever did."

Acceptance of Responsibility by Junior Enlisted Soldiers

Four battalions airlifted to Panama in follow–up operations were at low levels of alert when they received orders to deploy. Two were in block leave status with many of their leaders away on leave. Many of the tasks to prepare the battalions to deploy fell to privates who packed the equipment and organized the convoys. The units were "wheels–up" in less than 26 hours. One battalion commander noted:

"We would have been in a world of hurt if the young first–termers hadn't just taken over. We had our departure times and we had to meet them. Most of the NCOs and officers didn't get back until the packing process was well along."

The men who did the job were not as impressed with themselves: "It wasn't that big a deal. We had done it all before." These soldiers were not only well trained, they were personally committed to the mission.

The official report from the Center for Army Lessons Learned states: "*Just Cause* was won by small unit leaders."[16] A senior NCO elaborated: "Most of the operations were done at squad level—roadblocks, clearing rooms, curfew enforcement and antilooting patrols. Most of the time, the squads were out of visual contact and sometimes, out of radio contact with higher headquarters." The junior NCOs' ability to operate independently permitted a large number of operations to be carried out concurrently, enhanced the tactical flexibility of the major units and multiplied the perceived strength of US forces. However, it also added to the strain on the NCOs. One sergeant in charge of an isolated roadblock reported: "I put the track on one corner and an M–60 on the opposite corner. It was just us." Another said, "It was hard to tell who was enemy and who was civilian. There were a lot of drunks driving around and we didn't want to shoot up any civilians. There was no one to tell us; we just had to decide." The NCOs could operate independently because their officers had empowered them during training.

Before Operation *Just Cause*, US battalions in Panama engaged in "[E]xercises that permitted scouting target areas, rehearsing maneuvers and masking increased activities."[17] These exercises, called *SAND FLEAS*, asserted US rights under the treaties between Panama and the United States and often led to confrontations with PDF soldiers who responded with threatening gestures. One US soldier said, "I was scared. We couldn't shoot unless we were fired at—even when they pointed a weapon at you." US soldiers maintained discipline and restraint in these dangerous and uncertain situations. One squad leader reported that when his *SAND FLEAS* patrol was stopped by a PDF roadblock: "We brought an interpreter to read a copy of the 1978 treaty. The PDF didn't understand. It became a case of going through. We notified higher. We went into a standing overwatch formation while the M–60 gunner covered the windows of the PDF billets. We didn't know who was in the windows. It was real tense."

The *SAND FLEAS* were an important part of training for battalions with assault missions. They were prolonged, highly stressful training exercises that strengthened cohesion while rehearsing the mission on the actual ground.

Once *Just Cause* began, each battalion received a series of missions requiring rapid changes in perspective and behavior.[18] One unit began with a parachute assault, transitioned to guarding the embassy and then assumed constabulary responsibilities. The company commander said: "Stability operations is not their normal job. They did it because they were told to. They didn't like it, but they did a real good job." Another battalion defeated a PDF company, then adapted immediately to civic action roles—law and order; restoring water, gas and sewer services; and arranging food distribution. A senior NCO noted: "It was hard to go from war to constabulary . . . but they kept their focus."

A third battalion conducted a night air assault, set up a city government and then trained ex–PDF soldiers to assume constabulary duties. One US soldier remarked: "We worked with Panamanians on humvees with us doing the work. The Panamanians were there to learn how we did it and how to relate to the people." Commenting on his soldiers' responses to the changing missions, a company commander said, "The soldiers' performance never changed. It was always outstanding. The key was self–discipline."

The stories and observations from the soldiers who executed Operation *Just Cause* are similar to those told by soldiers in any conflict. But two facts are remarkable about the soldiers in *Just Cause*. The first is that while using minimal force, they quickly crippled the ability of an armed force to engage in combat, thus enabling the United States to achieve its objectives without creating a hecatomb in a country with which it wished to cooperate. The second remarkable fact is that the soldiers did almost everything right on the first day of the conflict.

The soldiers who went to Panama were the exemplars of a quiet revolution that the Army has been going through for about a decade. The revolution is the result of mutually supportive changes in training, leadership and manning. It is worthwhile reviewing these developments and how they paid off in combat.

Training

Two aspects of training for Operation *Just Cause* merit discussion. The first is that rehearsals were crucial to the success of the initial assaults. Commanders and leaders at battalion level and below repeated one theme over and over: The soldiers knew

Mechanized infantry searching out snipers in the area around the Panamanian Defense Forces Headquarters.

US Army

The official report from the Center for Army Lessons Learned states: "Just Cause was won by small unit leaders." . . . Junior enlisted soldiers recalled that knowing what to do helped them manage their fear, as well as accomplish their missions. . . . Most squads had strong horizontal cohesion. The soldiers' primary concern, even before self and family, was their comrades' welfare.

what they were supposed to do. The five battalions stationed permanently or temporarily in Panama rehearsed their missions repeatedly for three or four months on the ground over which they would fight, and the Ranger battalions rehearsed the seizure of the airheads on ground adapted to resemble the target areas.[19] The knowledge and mutual confidence the soldiers developed during the rehearsals enabled them to perform their missions competently and manage the fear engendered by initial exposure to combat.

The second and more important aspect concerns training a rapidly deployable infantry force to perform at a high level of proficiency in a variety of operations. In *Just Cause*, most battalion missions and all missions for the third wave of units were not

rehearsed. Though some battalions given building clearing missions had had some urban combat training, many had not. None of the infantry units were trained in constabulary or nation assistance duties. Soldiers complained and expressed anxiety at undertaking missions which they did not feel capable of

> **The training aspects of the revolution the Army has undergone include increased emphasis on realism, with frequent live–fire exercises; organizational efforts to allow longer periods of time for meaningful training; force–against–force training capped by the combat training centers; and a cultural shift toward valuing the warrior as well as the manager.**

doing competently. But battalions in all three echelons successfully carried out their missions. Their adaptability was not the product of rehearsals; it was the product of soldiers' interest in military matters and pride in being competent—both of which energized participation in and absorption of general infantry training.

The training aspects of the revolution the Army has undergone include increased emphasis on realism, with frequent live–fire exercises; organizational efforts to allow longer periods of time for meaningful training; force–against–force training capped by the combat training centers; and a cultural shift toward valuing the warrior as well as the manager. The latter development is manifest at company level in leaders who believe they will lead their units in combat, who seek to learn about the techniques of fighting and who share their knowledge and interest with their subordinates. Leaders' competence and commitment have enhanced their subordinates' involvement with and retention of training.

Leadership

The most remarkable phenomenon of Operation *Just Cause* was the soldiers' acceptance and implementation of ROE that were dangerous and counterintuitive from their perspective. The ROE were not rehearsed. Although the five battalions that engaged in *SAND FLEAS* maneuvers in Panama had practiced using restraint, the ROE were a surprise even for them. Soldiers in some of the other 15 battalions said they learned about the ROE while in the air en route to Panama. Their acceptance of the ROE can be credited to discipline, although it pushes the limits of traditional conceptualizations of discipline. The

words soldiers and leaders used to describe the ROE made it clear they were shocked and dismayed to have to abandon their training in suppressive fire and voluntarily concede the first shot to the enemy. But they understood—they grasped the purpose of the ROE and the essence of their role in Panama. They accepted the additional danger and took pride in forbearing to fire. This process entailed a cognitive grasp of the mission and an emotional commitment that transcended discipline. The soldiers' comments suggest that they did not embrace the ROE simply because they were told to, but because their leaders had explained the importance of the ROE to the mission and because they were committed personally to performing competently as soldiers.

The WRAIR research team has been observing the emergence of interest, pride and commitment in first–term soldiers since the mid–1980s. Early research in cohesion, operational readiness and training (COHORT) units indicated that the young soldiers' nascent professionalism sometimes collided with their commissioned and noncommissioned leaders' needs to impose control.[20] But between 1985 and 1989, many soldiers moving into squad/team/section/tank leader and company officer positions appeared to be more secure about trusting subordinates. By empowering their subordinates and channeling their enthusiasm through mentoring, these leaders allowed their interest in military matters and commitment to military professionalism to flourish.

Concurrently, leaders in many units have succeeded in creating a belief that the purpose of military units in peacetime is to prepare seriously for war. The result has been emerging trust, respect and interdependence across ranks and a growing focus on substantive capabilities for warfighting rather than on "eyewash" and looking good. An Army culture is evolving in which there is an agreement among both privates and leaders to "choose the harder right instead of the easier wrong"—to work toward being an effective soldier rather than to "get over" and to act for the long–term good of the unit rather than to simply put on a good show.[21]

The personnel stability promised by the COHORT system gave some units the opportunity to conduct accretive training—to build the collective skills of units throughout a three–year period. Learning enough to organize a progressive three–year training cycle was a major challenge for most leaders. Before COHORT, no unit conducted a cycle longer than one year, and most were shorter. Leaders who know more can teach more, be more credible with their subordinates and handle a wider range of independ-

(*Left*) Manuel Noriega and Drug Enforcement Admin–istration guards preparing to fly to the United States.

(*Above*) A portion of the drug money confiscated from Noriega's private office.

Two facts are remarkable about the soldiers in Just Cause. *The first is that while using minimal force, they quickly crippled the ability of an armed force to engage in combat, thus enabling the United States to achieve its objectives without creating a hecatomb in a country with which it wished to cooperate. The second remarkable fact is that the soldiers did almost everything right on the first day of the conflict.*

ent missions. The effects of these developments in leadership doctrine and behavior may have been evident in Panama in the ability of junior leaders to operate autonomously, subordinates to take over from fallen leaders and privates to assume responsibility when leaders were absent.[22]

Manning

Of the many policy initiatives that make up the revolution in the Army, the COHORT concept of keeping soldiers together through initial entry training and for three years in a battalion was probably the most significant. The COHORT system, in hiatus now but scheduled to be relooked in 1997, promised to support training and leadership by ending the personnel turbulence that had emasculated both since the 1940s. Debate over COHORT and experience in CO-HORT units has brought many issues of leadership and training into sharp focus. Respect and trust across ranks, leaders' responsibilities for their subordinates and the relationships among command behavior, family morale and soldiers' performance assumed greater importance in the COHORT context.[23]

Only one of the assault battalions in *Just Cause* was a COHORT unit. It is possible that some non–COHORT units achieved COHORT–like cohesion through several months of intense training under near–combat conditions. Most of the follow–on battalions were COHORT units and demonstrated high levels of adaptability in constabulary and nation assistance roles.

The soldiers of Operation *Just Cause* demonstrated intelligent professionalism, proud and disciplined embrace of dangerous but necessary ROE and the organizational and individual ability to adapt quickly from peace to combat to constabulary to nation assistance duties. Junior enlisted soldiers and leaders at all levels seemed capable of understanding a complex set of rapidly changing missions and executing orders with good judgment and restraint. Commitment, flexibility and cohesion take time to develop. In earlier conflicts, these qualities evolved during combat at the cost of initial defeats and heavy casualties.[24]

Most of the battalions that served in *Just Cause* had developed commitment, flexibility and cohesion

in peacetime. Though they were trained and organized in different ways, the battalions were able to deploy rapidly and be effective in combat upon arrival in Panama. The result was a quick, decisive and comparatively bloodless victory. *Just Cause* demonstrated that keeping soldiers together for intense and meaningful training develops cohesive, competent and adaptive units.[25]

The policies on cohesion, NCO development and leadership that created the command climate present in units that carried out *Just Cause* are still evolving, and units varied in the degree to which they were beneficiaries of them.[26] We will not always have the opportunity to carry out four months of *SAND FLEAS* and rehearsals. Any dilution of the policies that support the development of cohesion and unit competence will directly and quickly weaken the capability of the Army to rapidly project force. **MR**

NOTES

The data on which this article is based were collected by a team from the Department of Military Psychiatry, Division of Neuropsychiatry, Walter Reed Army Institute of Research, under David H. Marlowe, Ph.D. The team also included William Y. Deerfield; Elizabeth L. Dodge; James E. Hall; Nancy L. Harrison; Mollie R. Lytle; James E. McCarroll, Ph.D.; Lena M. Rapp; Robert J. Schneider, Ph.D.; and Joel M. Teitelbaum, Ph.D.; and had the assistance of Lieutenant General Robert M. Elton, US Army, Retired; Colonel Herman Keizer Jr.; and Robert Hannan, Ph.D.

1. US Department of the Army (DA) Pamphlet (Pam) 608–41, *The Army Family* (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office [GPO], 1983); *White Paper 1984: Light Infantry Divisions* (Washington, DC: Office of the Chief of Staff of the Army, 1984); DA Pam 600–50, *Leadership Makes the Difference* (Washington, DC: GPO, 1985); and US Army Field Manual (FM) 22–102, *Soldier Team Development* (Washington, DC: GPO, March 1987).
2. David H. Marlowe, et al., *New Manning System Field Evaluation, Technical Report No. 1* (Washington, DC: Walter Reed Army Institute of Research [WRAIR], September 1985), ADA–162087; Faris R. Kirkland, et al., *Unit Manning System Field Evaluation, Technical Report No. 5* (Washington, DC: WRAIR, September 1987), ADA–207193; Faris R. Kirkland, *Leading in COHORT (Cohesion, Operational Readiness and Training) Companies, Report NP–88–13* (Washington, DC: WRAIR, 21 December 1987).
3. WRAIR conducted 98 individual and 131 group after–action interviews in 10 infantry battalions and two military police companies. The sample included 112 officers, 275 noncommissioned officers, 424 privates and seven nonmilitary personnel. Interviews were usually 90 minutes long with one interviewer and one note taker. The sampling plan, which was achieved to the extent possible without disrupting unit training, included the battalion commander and command sergeant major, the commander and first sergeant of the two companies that were most heavily engaged, the platoon sergeants of those companies, a group of squad leaders from those companies and two groups each of 10 privates from each of the two companies. The research team guaranteed anonymity to the respondents so that neither individuals nor units could be identified. The data, consisting of 1,200 pages of notes, are summarized in Faris R. Kirkland and Morten G. Ender, "Analysis of Interview Data from Operation Just Cause" (Washington, DC: WRAIR Department of Military Psychiatry, 25 June 1991), departmental working paper.
4. Thomas Donnelly, Margaret Roth and Caleb Baker, *Operation Just Cause: The Storming of Panama* (New York: Lexington Books, 1991); Malcolm McConnell, *Just Cause* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1991); US Department of the Army Center for Army Lessons Learned, *Soldiers in Panama: Stories of Operation Just Cause* (Washington, DC: Office of the Chief of Public Affairs, undated); *Operation Just Cause: The Storming of Panama*, edited by Bruce W. Watson and Peter G. Tsouras (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1991); and Gordon Rottman and Ron Volstad, *Panama 1989–90* (London: Osprey Publishing, 1991).
5. The initial attack was made by eight US Army battalions (two permanently assigned, three that reinforced troops on the ground in Panama and three that parachuted in), one Marine battalion and minimal supporting armor and artillery units. See Rottman and Volstad, 13–14, 30–32 and 45–52; and Lorenzo Crowell, "The Anatomy of Just Cause: The Forces Involved, the Adequacy of Intelligence, and its Success as a Joint Operation," in Watson and Tsouras, 70.
6. The official death toll from the fighting was 23 US servicemen, 314 Panamanian Defense Forces soldiers and 220 Panamanian civilians. See Bruce W. Watson and Law-

rence S. Germain, "Chronology," in Watson and Tsouras, 218.
7. For contrasting views, see Edward N. Luttwak, "Just Cause—A Military Score Sheet," *Washington Post* (31 December 1989), 64. This article was reprinted in *Parameters* (March 1990), 100–101. Also see Francisco Goldman, "What Price Panama," *Harpers* (September 1990), 71–75 and 78; and the Independent Commission of Inquiry on the US Invasion of Panama, *The US Invasion of Panama: The Truth Behind Operation "Just Cause"* (Boston, MA: South End Press, 1991).
8. Samuel S. Wood Jr., "Joint Fire Support in Low–Intensity Conflict," *Military Review* (March 1991), 15–17.
9. AC–130 aircraft fired 105mm, 40mm and 20mm guns into buildings, at vehicles and at air defense weapons (Rio Hato, Tocumen–Torrijos Airport, approaches to the Pacora River bridge). In several instances, helicopters used automatic weapons or Hellfire missiles to destroy enemy weapons, armored vehicles and communication facilities. See Noris Lyn McCall, "Assessing the Role of Airpower," in Watson and Tsouras, 115–22.
10. McConnell, 73–77.
11. Ibid., 179 and 182–83; and Donnelly, et al., 177–81.
12. Donnelly, et al., 144.
13. Steven N. Collins, "Just Cause Up Close: A Light Infantryman's View of LIC," *Parameters* (Summer 1992), 58–62.
14. McConnell, 84–87 and 91; and Donnelly, et al., 342.
15. Thomas Donnelly, Margaret Roth and Caleb Baker, "Operation Just Cause, The Untold Tale," *Army Times* (30 December 1991), 18.
16. Center for Army Lessons Learned, *Operation Just Cause, Lessons Learned*, vol. 1, *Soldiers and Leadership* (Fort Leavenworth, KS: US Army Combined Arms Command, October 1990), 1–18.
17. Crowell, 79–80; and Donnelly, et al., 49–50.
18. LT Clarence E. Briggs wrote a book, *Operation Just Cause: Panama, December 1987* (Harrisburg, PA: Stackpole Books, 1990), organized specifically around the succession of five totally dissimilar classes of missions assigned to his battalion—3d Battalion, 504th Airborne Infantry.
19. Michael E. Seitz, "Command, Control, Communications, and Intelligence (C3I) Factors," in Watson and Tsouras, 106; and Donnelly, et al., 328–30.
20. Kirkland, et al., *Unit Manning System Field Evaluation*, 12 and 17; and Kirkland, *Leading in COHORT Companies*, 2.
21. Lewis Sorley, "Doing What's Right: Shaping the Army's Professional Environment," *Parameters* (March 1989), 12.
22. The leadership doctrine that emerged in conjunction with COHORT is expressed in *White Paper 1984: Light Infantry Divisions*; and DA Pam 600–50.
23. Faris R. Kirkland and Pearl Katz, "Combat Readiness and the Army Family," *Military Review* (April 1989), 63–74.
24. For an overview, see *American Military History*, edited by Maurice Matloff (Washington, DC: GPO, 1969), 389–90, 432–35, 477 and 549–50. Also see specific accounts of defense by the US 26th Division against a German attack at Seichepry in April 1918, the Japanese conquest of the Philippines in 1942, the Battle of Kasserine Pass in 1943 and the North Korean and Chinese attacks in Korea in 1950.
25. J.A. Simonsen, H.L. Frandsen and D.A. Hoopengardner, "Excellence in the Combat Arms," *Military Review* (June 1985), 19–29.
26. FM 22–102, *Soldier Team Development* (Washington, DC: GPO, March 1987); *White Paper 1984: Light Infantry Divisions*; and DA Pam 600–50.

Lieutenant Colonel Faris R. Kirkland, US Army, Retired, is a guest scientist, Department of Military Psychiatry, Water Reed Army Institute of Research (WRAIR), Washington, D.C. He received an A.B. from Princeton University and an M.A. and Ph.D. from the University of Pennsylvania. His previous positions include instructor, University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia; and senior scientist, University City Science Center, Philadelphia. His article "Training Lieutenants" appeared in the May 1992 issue of Military Review.

Morten G. Ender is an instructor, Department of Sociology, University of North Dakota, Grand Forks, North Dakota. He received a B.A. from Sonoma State University and an M.A. and Ph.D. from the University of Maryland. His past positions include research fellow, Department of Military Psychiatry, WRAIR, Washington, D.C.

Colonel Robert K. Gifford is chief, Department of Military Psychiatry, WRAIR, Washington, D.C. He received a B.A. from Haverford College, an M.S. from St. Mary's College of San Antonio and an M.Phil and Ph.D. from Yale University. His previous positions include director, Army Operational Medicine Research, US Army Medical Research and Materiel Command, Fort Dietrich, Maryland.

Kathleen M. Wright is deputy chief, Department of Military Psychiatry, WRAIR, Washington, D.C. She received a B.A. from the College of William and Mary and a Ph.D. from Cornell University. Her previous positions include deputy chief for science, Department of Military Psychiatry, WRAIR.

David H. Marlowe is the senior scientist, Division of Neuropsychiatry, WRAIR, Washington, D.C. He received a B.A. from Brooklyn College and an M.A. and Ph.D. from Harvard University. He served as chief of WRAIR's Department of Military Psychiatry for more than 22 years.

The Logistics Civil Augmentation Program

Major Camille M. Nichols, US Army

JOINT TASK FORCE (JTF) commanders realize that the Logistics Civil Augmentation Program (LOGCAP) is essential to conduct successful military operations other than war (OOTW). The ability of the operational commander on the ground to provide logistic support to his forces has proved to be critical in the success of OOTW missions. Current fiscal, political and force structure policies limit the availability of military logistic assets for JTF commanders' missions. This shortage of critical assets can be overcome by using the civilian contractor support provided by LOGCAP. This article will discuss the development of the LOGCAP concept, the regulatory guidance and the program's use prior to 1992. The current program's focus, its administration and the contract details are provided so the combat commander can understand how to best use the program for his operations.

The strategic landscape has dramatically changed since the Cold War's end, causing corresponding changes in the operational landscape. Operational commanders, commanders in chief (CINCs) and JTF commanders are faced with reductions in forward–assigned units and a shift to a regional orientation with much broader ranges of conflicts and crises. Current national military strategy places more responsibility on commanders to plan and execute missions in their areas of responsibility (AORs).[1] These missions will most likely include operations such as security and humanitarian assistance, peace enforcement, peacekeeping and disaster relief. This challenges operational commanders on how to best employ logistic support to accomplish their missions. Civilian contractors are an essential component of our ability to provide the logistic support and sustainment needed for the military operations required to execute national security strategy.

Leaders must know which logistic tools are available for executing assigned missions. To develop a good logistic support plan, commanders must under-

> *The world is not going to get any more stable, the US military is going to get smaller and the United States is going to respond to more regional crises. The only way we can continue to respond to OOTW is by deploying civilian contractors with military forces. LOGCAP is a powerful tool and has the potential to support not only OOTW but major regional contingencies as well. We must continue to harness all available resources and civilian logistic support use.*

stand what LOGCAP is, its advantages over traditional logistic support methods, how it has been used in recent OOTW missions and why it may be the best means of augmenting logistic support in future military contingencies. LOGCAP is an alternative that validates the appropriateness of using contracted civilian support during OOTW. The ongoing debate—what should the military force structure contain—will shape future logistic support. LOGCAP can help provide that logistic support structure.

LOGCAP Comes of Age

Using civilian contractors for logistic support during armed conflict is not new. Contractors were used during the Napoleonic Wars, American Revolution, Civil War, World Wars I and II and the Korean War. Despite this, President Lyndon B. Johnson's decision not to call up the Reserve Component (RC), and the consequential reliance on civilian contractor support during Vietnam, led Army logisticians to determine a need existed for a preplanned methodology for using contractors. The Army formalized this concept in 1985 in US Army Regulation (AR) 700–137, *Logistics Civil Augmentation Program.* "The LOGCAP objective is to preplan for the use of civilian contractors to perform selected services

in wartime to augment Army forces."[2]

The Army is doctrinally responsible for logistic support to joint operations 60 days after they begin and is required to develop the plans and force structure for this support. The Army's force structure decides which types of units are needed, how many are needed, the geographical location of the units and the status of the units—Active Component or RC. The classification types are combat, combat support (CS) and combat service support (CSS) units. CS and CSS units provide logistic support and perform specific logistic functions such as transportation; supplying provisions, fuel, ammunition and equipment; material handling; medical support; construction; security; administration and maintenance. Because most of the Army's logistic support is in the RC, the Army might not be able to deploy needed support if the president does not allow a Reserve call-up, as was the case in Vietnam.

The Army in the mid-1980s had a declining budget and a force structure "mix"—number of combat units versus support units—that could not provide the required support capability for some US operational plans. This assessment recognized that civilian support was necessary, and LOGCAP became a means to get that support. The Total Army Analysis (TAA) determined how many and what types of units it would need to support the regional contingencies and war plans developed and approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS). TAA also identified force structure shortages, by number and types of units, required to support these plans. The TAAs conducted during the 1980s reflected the logistic unit shortages as Composition 4 (COMPO 4) and identified Composition 9 (COMPO 9) units where civilian contractors could be employed to meet logistic requirements.[3] To acquire these COMPO 9 assets, AR 700-137 tasked each major Army command to coordinate with its CINC to use LOGCAP to establish contracts with civilians to support the identified TAA shortfalls in its AOR. Army force planners and senior leaders knew that using civilian workers would be necessary to meet the logistic requirements in regional contingencies and war plans.

Despite this formalized requirement to have civilian contractors ready to support the plans, very little was done with LOGCAP until 1992. Operations *Desert Shield* and *Desert Storm* revealed that to support and perform its assigned missions, the US military was dependent on civilian contractors. LOGCAP was not used in the Gulf, but hundreds of civilian contractors were individually "contracted" to provide the logistic support coalition forces required. Lieutenant General William G. Pagonis, US Central Command's (USCENTCOM's) senior op-

erational logistician, commented that "It has been and will continue to be necessary to rely upon the private sector for support that we should have in-house."[4]

The war validated the need for preplanned civilian support availability. This realization, coupled with the force drawdown, declining military budgets, uncertain world order and the increasing likelihood of OOTW, motivated Army logisticians to use LOGCAP to obtain contractor support and make it a viable program. In keeping with the Army's mandate to be a power-projection force, LOGCAP was revised so that a single, worldwide contract could be used to preplan for theater facilities and logistic services for any contingency or war.[5] The US Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) was given program management authority and responsibility to award and administer the Army's contract, giving the Army the ability to provide the military and civilian logistics assets necessary for each CINC's military operations. Operational commanders could now come to the Army logistics staff to use the LOGCAP contractor when they needed civilian logistic support in their AORs.

Contract Specifications

USACE awarded the LOGCAP contract to Brown and Root Services Corporation on 3 August 1992. The contract is a "cost-plus-award fee" contract with one base year and four option years. Structured for easy modification, the contract can best be viewed as an umbrella for studies and logistic support plans. The base contract funds a small contractor staff to perform studies and conduct logistic planning and training with the CINCs' staffs. Using the contractor for a contingency will be treated as an option to the base contract and must be funded before mobilizing the contractor's assets. The notional support package the contractor has been asked to plan to execute in an AOR is to provide construction, facilities management and general logistic support services to a force of 20,000 for up to 180 days.[6] The contractor plan assumes no government equipment will be furnished and no government airlift or sealift will be available to move the contractor's assets into the AOR. The contractor provides all management, personnel and equipment necessary to perform the services for which he is contracted. The contract mechanism is flexible so that it may be tailored to meet almost any support requirement in any type of contingency. The CINC or JTF commander can use contractors for: exercise support, forward support, sustainment, redeployment, residual forces support, pre-positioning and civil assistance. The current LOGCAP concept provides the flexibility for US forces to respond to "short-notice"

Warehouse and office personnel work on the line to eliminate shipping backlogs during *Desert Shield.*

US Army

"The LOGCAP objective is to preplan for the use of civilian contractors to perform selected services in wartime to augment Army forces." . . . very little was done with LOGCAP until 1992. Operations Desert Shield *and* Desert Storm *revealed that to support and perform its assigned missions, the US military was dependent on civilian contractors. LOGCAP was not used in the Gulf, but hundreds of civilian contractors were individually "contracted" to provide the logistic support.*

military contingency operations anywhere in the world to support a combatant commander.

LOGCAP Utilization

The Brown and Root contract had barely been established when a contingency arose requiring the contractor's services. President George Bush's 4 December 1992 announcement that US troops would be sent to Somalia supplied the perfect scenario to employ LOGCAP for the first time. USCENT-COM's plan for Operation *Restore Hope* was to send the US Marine Corps (USMC) to secure the port and establish a base of operations and then have US Army units conduct humanitarian relief operations. The Navy Facilities Engineering Command (NAV-FAC), responsible for providing construction and facility support in East Africa, became responsible for supporting USMC logistic requirements. NAVFAC knew the area was very austere and lacked the infrastructure to support a base camp. NAVFAC also knew logistic support was needed immediately and was aware of the political desire to minimize US troop presence. The best option available to support the Marines' humanitarian mission in Somalia was civilian contractor support. The Marines asked the

Army to mobilize the LOGCAP contractor.

The contractor's responsiveness was remarkable given the fact that no prior planning had been done for this area. Contractor personnel were on the ground in Somalia one day after the USMC landing. LOGCAP augmented the US Logistics Command under the Unified Task Force (UNITAF) until May 1993, when the UN mandate went into effect and UNOSOM (UN Operations in Somalia) was formed. LOGCAP continued to augment the US CSS force structure under UNOSOM, providing support to both US and multinational forces. When the president–directed withdrawal of US forces began in December 1993, LOGCAP became the sole provider of logistic support for UNOSOM. This continued through March 1994, when US participation in UN-OSOM ended.

Civilian support was more appropriate in Somalia than military support. The LOGCAP contractor mission included: base camp construction, maintenance and repair; food supply and service; laundry service, field showers and latrines; generator servicing and power production; water production and distribution; portable toilet servicing; solid waste management; bulk petroleum handling; and transportation

and linguistic support. The US committed more than $104 million to the LOGCAP contract—almost $63 million to support US forces and the remainder for UN support until March 1994.

The contractor received numerous accolades, including one from the JCS chairman. The JTF commander and USCENTCOM staff believe their mission was successful because LOGCAP gave them

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the ability to support this power–projection contingency operation. Although there were problems with the contract's mechanics, the LOGCAP concept was validated as was the role of civilians supporting contingency operations.[7]

LOGCAP use was not totally efficient. Both the contractor and the military had some problems. The military's difficulties centered on the execution, administration and responsibility for the program and contract. Finding funds to obligate against the contract was the biggest problem. In fact, the contractor started to demobilize during the transition of operations to the UN. In general, contractor problems were minor and anticipated.

The LOGCAP contractor was also employed to support Operation *Support Hope* in Rwanda, another short–notice OOTW mission. Brown and Root handled the production, distribution and storage of potable water. Civilians, in conjunction with a small number of US soldiers, drilled wells. The operation ran from July to September 1994 and cost the Army more than $6 million. This humanitarian mission favored the use of civilians over a larger US troop commitment to carry out US national policy.

The US Atlantic Command (USACOM) spent more than a year planning for Operation *Uphold Democracy* in Haiti—LOGCAP was included almost from the start.[8] The USACOM staff recognized LOGCAP's success in Somalia and decided in its contingency planning to use LOGCAP support to mitigate potential military shortages.

The contractor was mobilized in September 1994 to support both US and multinational forces. As of October 1994, $96 million was committed to the contract. The LOGCAP contractor constructed base camps and wired electricity in buildings. He also provided base camp operations, laundry services, food service operations, maintenance, transportation, road maintenance and other unit–supply functions. The contractor was also prepared to provide guard services, medical services and airfield repair. His mission in Haiti was closer to the notional support package envisioned when USACE awarded the base contract in 1992.

President Bill Clinton decided to send forces back to Saudi Arabia to counter Iraq's renewed threat in October 1994. LOGCAP was used to support US forces in both Saudi Arabia and Kuwait during Operation *Vigilant Warrior*. The contractor was mobilized in October and supplied food service operations, transportation service for line–haul and troop transport, laundry service and material handling services. A USCENTCOM goal was to minimize the number of troops involved in this mission, which may mean an even larger role for the contractor in the future.[9] Discussions are now under way concerning the use of LOGCAP to conduct evacuation and redeployment operations in support of UN forces in Bosnia.[10] Using civilian contractors to provide support in OOTW has both political and military benefits we are only beginning to realize.

LOGCAP Problems

Some LOGCAP problems exist. However, they are not insurmountable, and efforts have already begun to minimize or eliminate them. The biggest problem is funding contractors' work during contingencies. The secretary of defense's efforts to include a line item in the budget for contingency operations will help. While the program has been viewed as expensive, this perception cannot be validated because there is no reliable way to compare the contractor's actual costs with the military's costs to perform the same functions. There also is no effective way to evaluate the costs of LOGCAP versus the benefits it provides to the operations.

Another problem area is the risk contractors may face in hostile AORs. LOGCAP uses civilian contractors during wartime and in nonwar operations. Requiring civilians to work for the military in a hostile environment brings a certain amount of risk above what can normally be considered the "cost of doing business." This risk must be analyzed, since it has a direct bearing on the JTF commander's decision to use a LOGCAP contractor. A hostile environment affects the contractor's ability to perform his mission and will require military units to protect the contractor's personnel and equipment, creating a potentially unacceptable situation. The JTF com-

Sea–Land cargo containers stored by the deep–water piers at DaNang, South Vietnam, 1969.

Requiring civilians to work for the military in a hostile environment brings a certain amount of risk above what can normally be considered the "cost of doing business." This risk must be analyzed, since it has a direct bearing on the JTF commander's decision to use a LOGCAP contractor. A hostile environment affects the contractor's ability to perform his mission and will require military units to protect the contractor's personnel and equipment, creating a potentially unacceptable situation.

mander must evaluate his operation with respect to the risks to civilians and the military operation if he must provide troops to protect the contractor's operation. This diversion of armed forces could impede the commander's mission accomplishment. The inability to accurately predict OOTW's volatility creates a situation of uncertainty. Commanders must conduct risk analyses before selecting LOGCAP solutions. However, civilian contractors should not be totally discounted when the situation turns sour— Brown and Root proved themselves by performing admirably "under fire" in Somalia.

Another problem was overall program management. The regulation governing LOGCAP is out of date with respect to who administers the program and use of a single contractor instead of several. The Army is currently rewriting the regulation and is considering assigning program management to the US Army Materiel Command.[11] Program execution and administration during contingency operations has also proved to be confusing and cumbersome. Training programs must be developed for contracting officers, contracting administrators from the Defense Logistics Agency and JTF logistics staffs. Training must focus on how the contract should be

implemented; how task orders should be written; contractor performance evaluation criteria for award fee determination; what incentives are available for the contractor to reduce costs; and how to make the most efficient use of contractor resources.

LOGCAP Versus Traditional Logistic Support Options

LOGCAP is one means available for overcoming logistic support shortfalls during military operations. Other logistic support options exist, but they all have limitations and weaknesses. A review of these traditional logistic options in light of LOGCAP's benefits is useful so that LOGCAP's power and utility are better understood. The most traditional means of providing logistic support is to deploy CSS units. Reserve units have the capability to furnish the support required and, as evidenced during the Gulf War, perform their functions efficiently. While the cost of equipment and unit training is already included in the military budget, funds to mobilize Reservists for operations do not exist and must be reprogrammed. RC unit deployments compete with combat units for strategic lift, which is a very limited mobility asset. The LOGCAP contractor, on the other hand, does

not compete for strategic lift because he mobilizes his personnel and assets using his own lift capabilities. In an emergency, strategic lift could be allocated to the contractor for expediency or cost savings.

Another alternative to AOR logistic support is expanding host nation support (HNS) agreements. Many current regional contingency and operations plans depend on HNS to provide some logistic support deployed JTFs require. HNS is essential to the success of some war plans because US forces cannot deploy all required supplies, fuel, food and potable water. HNS agreements differ by nation and, to a great extent, depend on the host nation's political, economic and social situations. Additionally, we do not have HNS agreements with every nation, and some current HNS agreements cannot be expanded to accommodate shortfalls in logistic support, manpower and equipment without overly burdening the host nation. Support plans that rely on HNS from a Third World nation with a limited infrastructure can create a dangerous situation for the operational com-

mander. Therefore, HNS is not always an acceptable solution and would not have worked in Somalia, Rwanda or Haiti. LOGCAP does not depend on the host nation's economic infrastructure, because the contractor has the ability and authority to obtain his manpower, materials and equipment from anywhere in the world in order to provide the required services to perform the contract. LOGCAP is a powerful feature that offers the commander maximum flexibility with minimal liability.

Another viable alternative is to set up a centralized contingency contracting office, as was done in the Gulf War. This contracting office receives unit requirements, prioritizes them and then contracts directly with local merchants to obtain the required support.[12] *Contingency contracting* is best described as contracting performed in support of emergencies involving military forces in overseas locations where the contract actions conform to the policies and procedures of the Federal Acquisition System. This process is different from LOGCAP because it has

A Dedicated Forward Logistics Element Concept

Major Cindy–Lee Knapp, US Army

Imbedded in US Army logistics doctrine is the concept of supporting the forces as far forward as possible. All support field manuals—from small–unit to corps level—emphasize this, especially in relation to support for combat maneuver elements. Although this concept is fully integrated at division level and below, it is still underdeveloped at corps level. Operations *Desert Shield* and *Desert Storm* revealed marked shortfalls, both in the field and in doctrine, in combat service support (CSS) to corps artillery units—particularly in bulk fuel, ammunition and maintenance.

During the Gulf War, III Corps Artillery experienced breaks in CSS for two main reasons: Corps artillery had no dedicated direct support (DS) structure, such as a support battalion in divisional combat units; and corps–level CSS doctrine emphasizes area support even though corps artillery is a highly mobile force. As a result, there was a lapse in DS maintenance, fuel and ammunition. When III Corps Artillery began operations, it found itself fumbling to establish and maintain logistic support. Corps logistics doctrine advocated that corps support groups (CSGs) provide support to all nondivisional units in and passing through their areas of responsibility, but doctrine did not advocate that support *should* follow the customer across the battlefield. Every time a III Corps Artillery brigade left one CSG sector, it had to establish new relationships with another CSG and its subordinate units. This often led to a breakdown in support until the field artillery brigade established contact with and arranged for support from the CSG responsible for that sector. The onus was on the customer, not the CSS community. As a result, the logistic support for III Corps Artillery was not as continu-

ous or as responsive as it should have been.

Today, even with Gulf War lessons learned, little has changed in CSS doctrine. Although corps–level logistics doctrine advocates support as far forward as possible, it is still managed on an area basis. This may be adequate for most nondivisional units, but not for highly mobile corps artillery units. After *Desert Shield/Desert Storm*, the concept of forward logistics elements (FLEs) emerged. US Army Field Manual (FM) 54–30, *Corps Support Groups,* states that "Forward logistics elements provide a responsive means to get critical support to corps forces. They may be used to help shape the battle as corps forces employ forward of the division. Establishing forward logistics elements in a staging area supports pursuit and onward movement. Forward logistics elements can also form the basic core of a task force tailored to accompany corps forces, such as a corps FA [field artillery] brigade, operating in a non–US Army corps or supporting an ally or sister service."[1]

The Army, however, should take the "FLE concept" one step further to provide continuous logistic support to highly mobile corps artillery units. Corps support commands (COSCOMs) should establish dedicated FLEs for corps field artillery brigades, not only when they are operating outside the corps' boundaries but also when they operate within the corps' sector. Existing doctrine in FM 63–3, *Corps Support Command,* and FM 54–30 should be written to reflect this dedicated FLE concept, which is simply this—that the COSCOM task–organizes logistics elements such as maintenance, fuel and ammunition into dedicated corps field artillery brigade FLEs and attaches them to the corps support battalions (CSBs) responsible for that sec-

many contracting officers contracting with many contractors, all of whom are competing for limited available materials and a limited supply of laborers and skilled workers.

One contracting officer and one contractor run LOGCAP. The contractor obtains the needed materials and workers. There is no competing for scarce resources and no requirement for numerous contracting officers. The contingency contracting office works well in an environment that has a mature infrastructure and an almost unlimited amount of resources and materials. However, in underdeveloped economies with limited resources, contracting officers unfamiliar with the region would have difficulty obtaining the supplies necessary to support the operation. The size of the contracting office staff depends on the size and location of the military operation. Because a limited number of officers are trained to perform these functions, their availability and experience have a big impact on this method's feasibility for acquiring logistic support. Using a

LOGCAP civilian contractor in these situations— instead of military officers—capitalizes on the contractor's ability to provide resources to quickly overcome even the most austere environments, as evidenced by Brown and Root's performance in Somalia and Rwanda.

These alternative logistic support methods have limitations due to the number of personnel and units that can perform support activities and the availability of assets. This does not mean LOGCAP must be the solution or is a panacea for every contingency. LOGCAP does, however, offer an operational commander another support capability that can succeed in most OOTW scenarios.

LOGCAP Advantages and Potential

LOGCAP has other advantages besides those mentioned previously—primarily flexibility. A JTF commander can tap into the contractor's full range of global corporate assets almost instantly and not have to wait for a Reserve call–up or a delay of the 10 to

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tor's support. The FLEs would collocate with their supported field artillery brigades and would move with them across the battlefield. The COSCOM would detach and attach the FLEs to various CSBs as they move across the corps' sector.

Typically, a FLE is controlled by one captain and one quartermaster master sergeant. The Class III (fuel) section is controlled by two staff sergeants; the Class V (ammunition) section is controlled by one ordnance (munitions) lieutenant and one sergeant first class; and maintenance teams are controlled by one ordnance (maintenance) lieutenant and one sergeant first class. These fixed assets come out of existing COSCOM units.

The composition of a dedicated FLE is a generic company–size force for a specific type corps field artillery brigade. Required force structure would be tailored to the actual combat force supported, using allocation rules and the factors of mission, enemy, troops, terrain and weather and time available. The ability to task–organize FLEs is based on the assumption that COSCOM would be force–structured with the required maintenance augmentation teams and overall capability to support the assigned corps artillery.

The FLE would provide DS for critical Class III and V and maintenance identified by the brigade S4 and would establish a consistent point of contact regardless of movement distances or frequency. The FLE's maintenance contact teams supporting the battalion trains would move with those trains. If an artillery battalion is attached to another field artillery brigade, that supporting maintenance team would be attached to the dedicated FLE sup-

porting the gaining field artillery brigade.

The CSB would provide all other supplies and services to the field artillery brigade as it does with other nondivisional units in its sector. It would provide life support, organic maintenance and command and control to the FLE.

The 13th COSCOM, Fort Hood, Texas, successfully implemented this dedicated FLE concept during several warfighter exercises—a paradigm that may be adapted by any COSCOM to support its unique and highly mobile combat forces. Because the dedicated FLE concept is working now, it serves as a model to provide continuous, responsive support for corps artillery units. The current doctrine in FM 63–3 and FM 54–30 should be rewritten to reflect the dedicated FLE concept. Operations *Desert Shield* and *Desert Storm* showed us the shortfalls of the current doctrinal support structure. Since then, several III Corps exercises demonstrated the improvement to support provided by the FLE concept. Simply stated, the FLE concept works where it counts most—on the battlefield.

NOTES

1. US Army Field Manual 54–30, *Corps Support Groups* (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 17 June 1993), 1–7.

Major Cindy–Lee Knapp is the executive officer, 299th Forward Support Battalion (FSB), 1st Infantry Division (Mechanized), Schweinfurt, Germany. She received a B.S. from Shippensburg University and is a graduate of the US Army Command and General Staff College. She has held a variety of command and staff positions in the Continental United States and Europe, to include maintenance officer, Assistant Chief of Staff for Materiel, 13th Corps Support Command, Fort Hood, Texas; commander, Company B, 54th FSB, 3d Armored Division, Friedburg, Germany; and maintenance shop officer, 724th Maintenance Battalion, 24th Infantry Division (Mechanized), Fort Stewart, Georgia.

30 days needed to deploy a Reserve CSS unit. The commander need not worry about the unit's equipment status, readiness or deployment into the AOR. He just has to write a clear statement of work and allocate the funds to purchase the support he needs. Additionally, the civilian contractor can enhance the regional and country studies that the CINCs perform when developing and updating their contingency and operations plans. Once the CINC determines what the support requirements will be, he can use LOGCAP as he deems necessary.

Civilian contractors provide alternatives to US force commitment. Using LOGCAP instead of military logistics personnel can alleviate the political and social pressures that exist in the United States anytime military forces are deployed. America could fulfill some of its obligations to organizations such as the UN and NATO by having our LOGCAP contractor provide our pledged logistic support, as was done in Operation *Restore Hope*. The presence of US military forces may not always have a stabilizing effect and may actually escalate violence. This translates into keeping the number of military forces involved in a region to a bare minimum. By using civilians to support humanitarian operations, we exert influence in a more subtle manner and with less risk to our forces and world image.

LOGCAP supports the principles for joint OOTW—specifically, unity of effort, objective, restraint, legitimacy and perseverance.[13] Using a civilian contractor in OOTW has both political and fiscal advantages. A CINC faced with force downsizing problems, unit readiness posture and questionable public support for military involvement can use LOGCAP capabilities to eradicate the drain on his ability to respond to regional contingencies. Thus, LOGCAP becomes a logistic force multiplier as well.

The bottom line: The world is not going to get any more stable, the US military is going to get smaller and the United States is going to respond to more regional crises. The only way we can continue to respond to OOTW is by deploying civilian contractors

with military forces. LOGCAP is a powerful tool and has the potential to support not only OOTW but major regional contingencies as well. We must continue to harness all available resources and civilian logistic support use.

Our national security strategy states that the military will engage in OOTW. President Clinton stated that "In an integrating and interdependent world, we simply cannot be successful in advancing our interests—political, military and economic—without active engagement in world affairs."[14] This active engagement will surely include peacekeeping, peace enforcement and humanitarian assistance, as evidenced by the US responses in Somalia, Rwanda, Haiti, Kuwait and Cuba.

Operations such as these require more logistic support force capabilities than combat capabilities.[15] Unfortunately, most of that support force exits only on paper (COMPO 4 and COMPO 9) or in the RC, which may not be readily deployable to support short–notice operational contingencies. Force structure and political and fiscal constraints limit the military's ability to execute national security strategy. However, the CINCs and JTF commanders can meet support capability demands by using LOGCAP and civilian contractors to furnish the logistic assets needed. As stated in a lessons learned report on Operation *Restore Hope*, "LOGCAP can be a force multiplier in support of contingency deployments, especially in countries where the US does not maintain a continuing presence."[16] Civilian support has proved itself admirably in war and nonwar operations.

LOGCAP is truly a "diamond in the rough." Although the program has existed for 10 years, it has only recently been used. It is becoming a shining example of innovative methods that successfully accomplish military missions. Civilian use is the key to solving commanders' logistic support and OOTW sustainment shortfalls. Once the commander determines LOGCAP is appropriate for the contingency, operational support can begin almost immediately when the Army is informed that a civilian contractor is required. The program is a powerful tool, once users understand its value, contract mechanism, funding process and planning requirements.

The military had the luxury in the 1980s of a supportive budget and Congress and a known enemy. The situation is dramatically different today. The military must exploit all available means, both traditional and nontraditional, to be successful in executing national military strategies. Civilian contractor use is a support source the military has been reluctant to tap. Civilians must be used in every possible scenario so that scarce military forces are available for regional

Civil Affairs in Haiti

Colonel Eric A. Doerrer, US Army Reserve, Retired

OPERATION *Restore Democracy* in Haiti provided the ideal opportunity to use civil affairs (CA) military components in the very highest degree of effectiveness. There could be no greater "economy of force" or "force multiplier" than a trained, properly organized and equipped CA component within the Haitian operation. CA organizations, with well–thought–out missions, produced enormously beneficial results for overall US and UN policy goals in Haiti.

This article will provide a brief review of CA capabilities as they applied to Haiti; a summary of how the CA mission evolved and how CA was organized to accomplish its missions in Haiti; a look at some of Haiti's problems and accomplishments; the subsequent CA lessons learned; and some destabilizing US policy influences during the operation.

CA Capabilities

Civil affairs provides the military highly needed civilian skills which include: transportation; public works; government affairs and public administration; contract and administrative law; public welfare and sanitation; communications; and public health. In short, CA has the capability to fulfill higher echelon missions of providing for complete military government. These capabilities are the CA *functional areas*, a primary reason CA remains a Reserve Component (RC). It would be too costly and ineffective to retain such expertise in the Active Component (AC). Nevertheless, CA is ready and should be used in both the planning and execution of any operation involving US peacekeeping forces. Because it uses indigenous assets to their fullest extent, CA provides a great "economy–of–force" element. Each functional area expert works with the host nation to implement the changes needed to fulfill the mission. CA personnel must become functional area experts on the countries or regions that are likely areas of US involvement.

> It did not take long for the 82d Airborne Division to recognize that "restoring democracy" was going to involve more than merely removing the military regime's threat. . . . CA skills are most needed in this environment—skills primarily found in the RC's higher echelon CA units, those units that should have been involved in the initial planning and execution of Restore Democracy.

CA Mission and Organization in Haiti

Initial planning for *Restore Democracy* did not provide the kind of mission analysis or organizational structure readily needed for CA. The operations order from US Atlantic Command did not include a CA annex. It did not take long for the 82d Airborne Division to recognize that "restoring democracy" was going to involve more than merely removing the military regime's threat—it quickly became a nation assistance mission. CA skills are most needed in this environment—skills primarily found in the RC's higher echelon CA units, those units that should have been involved in the initial planning and execution of *Restore Democracy*.

When the 82d moves, current doctrine calls for deployment of the only AC CA unit—the 96th CA Battalion. Following a precedent set by the 96th CA Battalion, the CA component in Haiti was quickly organized into 21 direct support (DS) two–man teams with no general support (GS), and minus supply and administrative elements. These DS teams were deployed with Special Forces detachments scattered throughout six operational zones.

When the 25th Infantry Division (Light) under Major General George A. Fisher Jr. took over the Haiti operation from the 10th Mountain Division (Light), companies from the West Coast's 351st CA Command were called for the first time to support an

A captain from the 3d Special Forces Group teaches English to a group of Fad'h soldiers in Gonaives, Haiti, October 1994.

A most profound problem is Haiti's lack of a professional, administrative structure. The military has been the most stable governmental structure since the US occupation in 1913. Even after "Papa Doc" Duvalier's attempt to gut the military, the force still remained a stable, somewhat professional entity. The military establishment is now completely dismantled, but the new National Police Force is not yet sufficiently trained to fill the power vacuum with a professional, civilian–based organization. This will be an ongoing problem, requiring professional oversight to avoid the resurgence of corruption and human rights abuses.

ongoing mission. The 448th CA Company supports the 25th Infantry Division and followed it to Haiti for its designated 179–day cycle, followed by the nonaffiliated 407th CA Company from the Midwest. Both companies accomplished the missions handed down to them, even though the overall organization in Haiti had become a UN mission (UNMI).

The 445th CA Company was the last unit assigned to Haiti. Collocated with the 351st CA Command in Mountain View, California, it conducted a CA mission analysis to "secure a stable environment," and determined that the mission priorities should be to:

⊙ Establish a legal system that included police, courts and civil administration, thereby overcoming a complete vacuum left by the removal of all government and administrative organizations.

⊙ Establish/restore a functioning infrastructure such as roads, electricity, telephone systems and public sanitation systems.

⊙ Educate the general public about basic hygiene and public sanitation.

Given these priorities, the 445th CA Company needed to properly organize its support to perform its implied missions. The number of DS teams were reduced to set up a GS team consisting of a captain (civil engineer), a sergeant (electromechanical maintenance technician) and a specialist (educator). A small administrative support team was also organized for the company's headquarters operation.

Because the DS teams were attached to the Special Operations Task Force (SOTF), there was no coordination between the SOTF and the zone commanders concerning civil action projects within the operational zones. The problem was exacerbated by the fact that many projects were being started that would not be finished by the time *UN Mandate 1007* expired on 29 February 1996. These problems were brought to the U3's attention. After a review by Ma-

Civil affairs personnel involved the locals by teaching them how to make repairs and properly maintain their homes and other buildings.

jor General Joseph W. Kinzer, he directed the CA commander to report directly to him instead of the SOTF chain of command. Projects that could not be finished before the UN mandate expired were to stop. Further, all projects had to be cleared through zone commanders.

Haitian Problems and CA Assistance

Haiti's infrastructure needed almost everything to stabilize it. The roads were too narrow to carry heavy truck traffic, especially in Port au Prince. The capital had become a *blokus*, which in our terms, means total traffic gridlock. There were few functioning traffic lights and traffic police working the streets. Every intersection was an obstacle of competing trucks, cars, wheelbarrows, cattle, earth movers, donkeys and pedestrians. Often, vehicles were packed so close trying to get through an intersection that pedestrians and motorcycles could not squeeze through. Traffic did not move for hours.

Typically, when cars or trucks broke down, they remained right where they were on the narrow roads, causing enormous traffic jams in both directions. US military vehicles cleared wrecks or breakdowns. Through the efforts of the newly formed 445th GS team, they involved the locals in solving problems by using local Haitian towing companies contracted to do the cleanup.

In the provinces outside the capital, most roads—with the exception of four main highways—are merely trails passable only by 4–wheel–drive vehicles in dry weather. Most main highways have washed–out bridges in urgent need of repair. CA teams worked with Haitian contractors and laborers on the projects, teaching them how to properly maintain their roads.

The electrical supply was a major infrastructure problem. Not only was service sporadic at best, it was also uncontrolled. There are no meters on the average house and only flat fees are charged, regardless of consumption. This was the cause of many blackouts. Because consumption cannot be predicted, overloads are constant. There is also the age–old practice called *cumberland*, whereby people simply connect a line to another area and tap power from there if the lights are out.

A widespread outage that occurred in Port au Prince's Delmas area, continued so long that anti–government manifestations broke out. The CA GS team's electromechanical expert delved into the problem. He discovered that vital parts needed to fix the outage had been stuck in a customs warehouse for almost three months. The CA expert coordinated

Because the DS teams were attached to the SOTF, there was no coordination between the SOTF and the zone commanders concerning civil action projects within the operational zones. . . . [The] problems were brought to the U3's attention. After a review by Major General Kinzer, he directed the CA commander to report directly to him instead of the SOTF chain of command. Projects that could not be finished before the UN mandate expired were to stop. Further, all projects had to be cleared through zone commanders.

with a government minister to get the parts released so repairs could be made.

A most profound problem is Haiti's lack of a professional, administrative structure. The military has been the most stable governmental structure since the US occupation in 1913. Even after "Papa Doc" Duvalier's attempt to gut the military, the force still remained a stable, somewhat professional entity. The military establishment is now completely dismantled, but the new National Police Force is not yet sufficiently trained to fill the power vacuum with a professional, civilian–based organization.[1] This will be an ongoing problem, requiring professional oversight to avoid the resurgence of corruption and human rights abuses.

Haiti's customs system is a source of administrative

Attacking Through the MIST

Major Melvin E. Shafer, US Army

Information is the key to successful military operations; strategically, tactically and technically, from war to operations other than war, the adversary who wins the information war will prevail.
—General Glen K. Otis, US Army, Retired
Information Campaigns, 1991

As operations other than war (OOTW) missions continue to increase, every available means to minimize risk, maximize efficiency and create synergy must be engaged. In today's spartan–resource environment, this will ensure that missions ranging from peace enforcement and counterdrug operations, to supporting democracy and humanitarian assistance (HA), will successfully bear up under the intense scrutiny of the political, military and public sectors. Trends show that information operations are increasing and have a measurable effect on OOTW policy and decision making at all government levels. The US Army must improve, develop and activate information operations systems commensurate with engagement and enlargement policies. Psychological operations (PSYOP)—a subset of information operations and the first of information warfare's four pillars—offers a nonlethal resolution mechanism for the United States in OOTW.[1] It is here that US government and joint task forces (JTFs) can attack through the "MIST" (Military Information Support Team).[2]

PSYOP in OOTW give ambassadors and JTF commanders an efficacious methodology to engage selected audiences. While it may be difficult to conceptualize PSYOP's use in certain aspects of OOTW, it is a significant force multiplier, giving leaders powerful resources to achieve desired end states. The Special Operations Forces (SOF) MIST offers a complete package of technology, analysis and the human dimension that is compatible with any OOTW scenario. A SOF MIST study describes how PSYOP may be used to enhance preparedness and efficiency and accomplish specific OOTW missions.

MISTs are manned by soldiers from the Army's 4th PSYOP Group (Airborne), Fort Bragg, North Carolina, who use information to encourage, inform and persuade selected audiences. A typical MIST is a five–man element composed of a PSYOP officer; a noncommissioned officer; two PSYOP specialists with photography, videography, journalism or editing skills; and a civilian analyst with linguistic and area studies specialties. Both the US Navy and Air Force participate in information support operations conducted by the 4th PSYOP Group, establishing and furthering jointness.[3] A MIST is task organized to provide theater–coordinated, peacetime military information support to embassies abroad in accordance with Department of Defense (DOD) directives.[4] The following case study describes a MIST, its mission and information program process and how it makes a vital contribution in OOTW.

The Mission. Approved by the theater commander in chief to help achieve his regional goals, and coordinated with the US State Department, a MIST supports the US ambassador and country team with expertise and advice, as well as with print, audio and audio–visual information products that help promote US national interests and objec-

tives. The MIST is a low–cost, high–return–on–investment activity that complements any peacetime operational mission. In particular, any country team can broaden its information program with MIST augmentation, capitalizing on the team's analysis and observations and maximizing the political value of relationships with US and host nation (HN) military and law enforcement agencies. Because its mission is to support the country team as the team trains on PSYOP mission–essential tasks, the MIST's greatest value is its ability to plan, develop and conduct activities in direct support of a country team's programs. For example, the 1st PSYOP Battalion mission–essential task list (METL) is a series of critical tasks that determine the team's combat readiness and relate to its deployability effectiveness. The 1st PSYOP Battalion MIST METL:

- Analyzes the supported unit's mission and develops a PSYOP mission.
- Plans and conducts peacetime military information support operations in support of the HN.
- Develops an information campaign plan.
- Collects information and conducts target analyses.
- Develops products from selected themes and symbols (print, audio and video).
- Conducts pretesting and obtains product approval.
- Disseminates products and conducts post–testing.
- Performs liaison coordination activities.
- Maintains language proficiency.

Deployments from the Continental United States into theater provide the primary MIST training vehicle to develop, coordinate, integrate and execute implied and specified battalion, theater and country team goals and objectives. While the majority of MIST missions have been US Southern Command, US Atlantic Command and counterdrug operations, MISTs support all OOTW operations, the preponderance being HA, nation assistance and security assistance.[5] All temporary duty deployments with the MIST are long–term, Secretary of Defense (SECDEF)–approved, Joint Chiefs of Staff–directed deployments that are renewable every 179 days. Short–term efforts of three to five weeks in duration further enhance the team's ability to reach stated goals and objectives by deploying additional soldiers and civilian analysts into country.[6] All deployments, except security assistance, are handled through the team's command structure at Fort Bragg.[7]

The Process. Peacetime information programs are generally implemented in seven phases. Gaining approval from the SECDEF and the country team, in accordance with DOD Directive 3321.1, is only the first step.[8] Following SECDEF approval, the HN must give approval for MIST involvement. Once that occurs, the MIST helps the

US Military	Country Team	Host Nation
Team	Ambassador	Armed Forces
Regional	USIS USAID DCM	National Police
Battalion	Military Group	Drug Police
US Special Operations Command**	Drug Enforcement Administration	Ministries of Health, Interior, Alternative Development
Unified Commands	Embassy political sections	
Joint Chiefs of Staff	Narcotics Affairs Section (NAS)*	
	Nongovernmental Organizations	

*NAS is a Department of State organization. **US Special Operations Command is the coordinating agency for all PSYOP activities.

Figure 1. Coordinating Agencies Involved in Information Operations.

problems. For example, two missionaries spent a day–and–a–half waiting in various lines to clear a used electrical generator through customs at the national airport. There are more than six different departments one must visit to clear a simple item through customs. A CA GS team member advised and worked with customs officials to streamline clearing operations.

It was difficult for CA operatives to convince US and UN leaders that education should be a high priority. For the most part, the UN's hierarchy views US CA units only in terms of humanitarian assistance, not as a vital nation assistance force. Despite this, progress was made in the educational arena. CA teams helped reopen several rural schools that were closed. These efforts, however, only "scratched the surface." Outside of Port au Prince, schools generally only provide an elementary education. For levels higher than ninth grade, one must reside in the capital.

HN develop and implement a national information plan. The next phase is to develop, assess and enhance the HN information organization and program. Phase six calls for conducting combined training with any existing HN information organizations. The last phase is program sustainment. It is important to note that changes in government officials often move a program from phase seven back to phase two until the new leader approves the program.

An effective MIST works with many organizations on a complex array of activities, ranging from basic administrative actions to campaign development and product management, as depicted in Figure 1. From identifying appropriate techniques and formats, to establishing a network of contacts, to knowing the eccentricities of protocol and military relations in a particular country, the MIST deals with every aspect of developing an information program. Figure 2 depicts a MIST's capabilities and products.

In preparing a viable strategy, a MIST receives goals and objectives from three sources: the US country team, the supported theater unified commands and the regionally oriented PSYOP battalion. HN goals and objectives are considered with the country team's approval. Understandably, this puts the MIST in the position of finding the common ground between multiple information goals and objectives and subsequently establishing long– and short–range plans. From these sources, the MIST identifies specific opportunities and develops corresponding, prioritized campaigns to develop, advance or accomplish the stated goals and objectives listed in Figure 3.

The MIST must have a detailed understanding of the objectives at each echelon within the US government, as well as the ability to meld multiple objectives into acceptable and workable team objectives as follows:

● Establish a national information management program.

● Support counterdrug efforts.

● Promote understanding of US counterdrug objectives.

● Improve public image of all democratic institutions and individuals supporting US–sponsored programs.

● Conduct research and analysis.

● Promote understanding and use of PSYOP as a force multiplier.

● Train MIST personnel from the METL on all specified and implied PSYOP tasks.

The methodology to analyze, plan for and accomplish MIST objectives becomes a series of campaigns, each with a series of audio and audio–visual products designed to inform, encourage or persuade target audiences.

MISTs are military units that a country team may use to further US policy. The country team may be under a JTF or working directly for the embassy. To support the country team, the MIST coordinates and develops an information management strategy to advance or accomplish each country team objective. While the MIST focuses on and helps develop long–range plans, its relationship to the US country team and HN institutions and its cultural awareness and language proficiency create unique opportunities to advise and work at the tactical or "grass–roots" level. Looking at a representative model will clarify this concept and show how all the parts of an information program fit together.

A MIST in Latin America recently developed an information program to support a country team. The program fully incorporated the prioritized theater, battalion and MIST objectives. Concepts were identified for each objective, which, in turn, provided the foundation for a coordinated information management campaign. Many of these operations were dual–purpose to reduce cost and maximize effectiveness while targeting more than one audience with the same activities, symbols, products and actions.

MIST Capabilities
Social/Intel Research
Target Analysis
Campaign/Program Planning
Product Development
– graphic art and print design
– still photography
– audio–visual products
– linguists
Product Production
Product Dissemination
Information Coordination

MIST Products
Studies/Plans
Radio Spots
Newspapers
TV/Video Spots
Posters
Assessments
Seminars/Exchanges
Pamphlets
Cartoons
Photographs
School Supplies

Figure 2. Military Information Support Team.

Country Team Objectives —
Nurture the democratic process.
Encourage economic stability and growth.
Eliminate the illegal drug industry.

Theater Long–Term Strategy Objectives —
Strengthen HN democratic institutions.
Help HN eliminate threats to regional security.
Support continued economic and social progress.
Help HN defeat drug production and trafficking.
Ensure open and neutral sea lines of communication with the HN government.
Build understanding of the military's role in a democratic society.

Theater Near/Mid–Term Objectives —
Support counterdrug efforts.
Facilitate official peace accords implementation.
Promote liberty among and in regional nations and support for recognized treaties.
Build understanding of and support for civilian control of military forces within regional democracies.

PSYOP Battalion Objectives —
Prepare for war.
Execute peacetime information campaigns.
Integrate RC forces.

MIST Objectives —
Establish a national information management program.
Support counterdrug efforts.
Promote understanding of US counterdrug objectives.
Improve public image of all democratic institutions and individuals supporting US–sponsored programs.
Conduct research and analysis.
Promote understanding and use of PSYOP as a force multiplier.
Train MIST personnel from the METL on all specified and implied PSYOP tasks.

Figure 3. Overall Goals and Objectives.

Destabilizing Influences

False assumptions made about Haiti before the operation began affected the CA mission. A destabilizing assumption was that Haitians were starving to death. Unlike the Somalis, Haitians were not starving—there was no need to dump free or low–cost food into the Haitian marketplace. The result: farmers who provided rice and other staples were slowly driven out of business. This made Haiti dependent on outside sources for food even though the country is agriculturally rich, magnifying urban overcrowding and worsening Haiti's foreign debt. Haiti used to be the biggest supplier of sugar to Europe. Now, sugar must be imported and is very expensive.

The US military mission in Haiti is a perfect example of peacetime engagement as defined by the assistant secretary of defense for Special Operations and Low–Intensity Conflict. "The Army can assign CA units an area of responsibility that allows them to

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The information campaign became the strategic road map with a series of checkpoints—audio and audio–visual products—along the route.

Campaigns became functional when a series of coordinated, related products, such as posters, leaflets and video commercials, were skillfully integrated to optimize campaign effectiveness. Campaigns addressed long– and short–range time lines for the United States and HN. Many of the long–range campaigns were oriented at changing a multigenerational lifestyle, while most of the short–range campaigns were designed to encourage immediate change. Long– and short–range plans to support MIST objectives, military information activities and campaigns were derived from theater and battalion directives, in–country experience, information management techniques and procedures and the *Foreign Internal Defense* (FID) handbook. A five-man MIST conducted these operations to provide a country team with timely, proper and responsive military information support.

The initial tasks of organizing a MIST and presenting a military information support plan to a country team are complex and politically sensitive. A military information support program's essence is commitment to the concept that information is an "instrument of power." Once in motion, a military information support program provides an excellent training opportunity for the military and a low–cost, high–return investment for the country team. Recent successes in Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Guatemala and the Caribbean Basin illustrate how MISTs have made an extraordinarily useful impact in OOTW for US country teams.[9] The MIST is a perfect bridge to support information operations between the United States and HN at a time when diminishing resources and increasing requirements have become the norm. MISTs are a force multiplier for the military, US country team and HN.

While some may argue against the correctness of the terminology of identifying and engaging target audiences from the diplomatic mission point of view, or from a non-lethality perspective, one fact becomes clearer each day— our forces, civilian and military, are increasingly working together to provide national solutions to OOTW's complexities. In the information age, the SOF MIST provides a robust synergy to these operations, as well as a viable alternative to achieve the less–clearly defined political and military objectives often inherent in OOTW.

Capitalizing on the MIST's ability to integrate the human dimension into data and analysis is an inculcation that leaders must make to maximize the efficiency of and minimize the risks to our forces in the future. The MIST creates information synergy, as it encompasses all services and enhances interagency activities critical to OOTW success. It is one system that dispels confusion, calamity and chaos by blanketing target audiences with encouraging, persuasive information. When a country team and HN believe in and support military information activities, a MIST can cover the battlefield with truthful information that will measurably advance both US and HN objectives.■

NOTES

1. PSYOP is also the third element of command and control warfare, which is information warfare's warfighting application. Joint Publication 3–13.1.
2. Although MISTs may work through an embassy and the ambassador has to approve their work, the PSYOP effort must be forwarded from the JTF commander/CINC to the joint staff for coordination and approval. Joint Publication 3–53.
3. Navy units that work with the 4th Psychological Operations (PSYOP) Group (Airborne) include radio station and videography units from the Fleet Information Warfare Command. The Pennsylvania Air National Guard, 193d Special Operations Group, provides airborne radio and video support to the 4th Group.
4. Department of Defense (DOD) Directive 3321.1, *Overt Psychological Operations Conducted by the Military Services in Peacetime and in Contingencies Short of Declared War* (Washington, DC: The Center for Low–Intensity Conflict, 20 July 1984), classified document, establishes policies and procedures and assigns responsibilities for DOD–conducted information operations in peacetime and OOTW.
5. US Atlantic Command (USACOM) and US Southern Command (USSOUTH-COM) have the most mature counterdrug programs. Five countries—Bolivia, Colombia, Guatemala, Ecuador and Venezuela—have full–time MISTs. The following countries received PSYOP support for counterdrug programs in Fiscal Years 1993 or 1994: Antigua, Bahamas, Barbados, Bolivia, Colombia, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Grenada, Guatemala, Guyana, Honduras, Jamaica, Paraguay, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent, Trinidad, Tobago and Venezuela.
6. The 4th PSYOP Group (Airborne) has a significant civilian analyst corps. Within the PSYOP Group, five strategic studies detachments have been organized, each of which is aligned to one of the five unified commands. Over half of the civilians have doctoral degrees; all have significant regional experience and speak one or more languages. They also deploy routinely into the theater in peacetime and OOTW.
7. Security assistance missions are directed to the regional PSYOP battalion through command channels and are controlled by the Security Assistance Training Management Office, Fort Bragg, North Carolina.
8. The sequence of events for a counterdrug MIST deployment starts with the country team. Upon recommendation from the country team's military group commander, the ambassador approves the request for a MIST deployment. This request is sent to the theater command for approval and funding. The theater command staffs the action internally and then executes two simultaneous staff actions. First, the request is forwarded to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, where it is approved and then forwarded to DOD. The SECDEF approves the MIST deployment and routes it back through the chain of command. The theater command must then request a MIST deployment through the US Special Operations Command (USSOCOM). When USSOCOM concurs, the request is tasked down through the chain of command to the regional PSYOP battalion. Once SECDEF approval is received, the counterdrug MIST deployment can be executed.
9. Deployments to these countries have been successful based on one of three criteria: The HN determines mission accomplishment or requests a follow–on deployment; the military command/country team commits to another deployment; or the initial deployment accomplished the assigned, US–directed mission. This information is based on a communique with Bruce Wharton, American Republics Affairs, US Information Agency (Washington, DC: 25 August 1994).

Major Melvin E. Shafer, US Army, is chief, Nuclear, Biological and Chemical Division, Alaskan North American Air Defense Region, Elmendorf Air Force Base, Alaska. He received a B.S. from Brigham Young University and an M.S. from Troy State University and is a graduate of the US Army Command and General Staff College and the Psychological Operations (PSYOP) Officer Course, School of the Americas. He has held a variety of command and staff positions in the United States and Europe, including S3 and detachment commander, 1st PSYOP Battalion (Airborne), Fort Bragg, North Carolina; materiel development officer, US Army Chemical School, Fort McClellan, Alabama; and commander, 92d Chemical Company, 3d Infantry Division, Würzburg, Germany.

concentrate on particular areas and become regional experts within all of their functional areas. In this manner the strategic needs of the United States and the host nation are met. As a crises response agent, CA can fulfill the need to mobilize quickly and deploy swiftly to an area and respond effectively to any situation."[2]

This brief look at CA operations in Haiti indicates that we are not yet applying all the expertise available to the Army. CA, with its functional area expertise, can be used most effectively in analyzing and planning for operations such as *Restore Democracy* if CA planners are involved early in the planning process. Haiti still needs help on all the pressure points of its economic and political body. Haitians are eager to learn and can "bootstrap" themselves to a more stable environment.

The CA units in Haiti did a superlative job, given their limited resources. They attempted to accomplish much, working with Haitian officials to improve public health, sanitation, education, welfare, public administration, justice, transportation and communication systems. This economy-of-force action was well-appreciated by the Haitians, yet so much remains to be done if the country is to realize some sort of stability.

As with all our military forces, we try to apply the latest technology and expertise to every situation. In the area of nation assistance, it is the integration of ci-

> *False assumptions [were] made about Haiti before the operation began.... Unlike the Somalis, Haitians were not starving—there was no need to dump free or low–cost food into the Haitian marketplace. The result: farmers who provided rice and other staples were slowly driven out of business. This made Haiti dependent on outside sources ... magnifying urban overcrowding and worsening Haiti's foreign debt.*

vilian and military expertise resident in CA that constitutes the leading edge. Hopefully, the lessons learned in Haiti will be applied to the ongoing operation in Bosnia. *MR*

NOTES

1. "Support is Waning for Haiti's U.S. Trained Police," the *New York Times* (24 December 1995).
2. LTC Walter E. Wright and MAJ Ronald L. Fiegle, "Civil Affairs Support in Operations Other Than War," *Military Review* (October 1993), 31–32.

Colonel Eric A. Doerrer, US Army Reserve, Retired, is the operations director, Western Marketing Group, Albuquerque, New Mexico. He received a B.S. from Cornell University. He is a graduate of the US Army Command and General Staff College and a distinguished graduate of the Reserve Component National Security Course. He held a variety of command and staff positions in the Continental United States, Europe and Panama, including commander, 6302d Infantry Division Headquarters Reserve Training Unit, Pasadena, California; senior civil affairs (CA) officer, Headquarters, US Army Southern Command, Panama; assistant G5, Headquarters, 351st CA Command, Mountain View, California; and assistant G4, Headquarters, 8th Infantry Division (Mechanized), Bad Kreuznach, Germany.

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contingencies which require military presence. LOGCAP offers the commander a logistic support source he may not have been able to provide previously. The contribution civilian contractors make is immeasurable and critical in today's limited military manpower environment. As we contract for civilian support for airlift and sealift, LOGCAP gives us "supportlift"

and buys the military a mobile base of operations. LOGCAP should be included in CINC planning and training programs and should be used during contingency operations when political and military situations allow. The use of civilian contractors is a proven method of achieving our national security objectives with great potential for the future. *MR*

NOTES

1. Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), *National Military Strategy 1992* (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office [GPO]), 11–13.
2. US Army Regulation 100–137, *Logistics Civil Augmentation Program (LOGCAP)* (Washington, DC: GPO, 16 December 1985), 3.
3. Joe A. Fortner, "Force Structuring for Combat Service Support," *Army Logistician* (January–February 1989), 12.
4. LTG William Pagonis, "Observations on Gulf War Logistics," *Army Logistician* (September–October 1992), 10.
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13. US Department of Defense JCS Publication 3–0, *Doctrine for Joint Operations* (Washington, DC: GPO, 9 September 1993), V2–V4.
14. President Bill Clinton, *A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement* (Washington, DC: the White House, July 1994), 29.
15. US Army Field Manual 100–16, *Army Operational Logistics*, draft (Washington, DC: GPO, 1993), 6.
16. US Army Combined Arms Command, *Operation Restore Hope Lessons Learned Report* (Fort Leavenworth, KS: 1993), XI–19.

Major Camille M. Nichols is a congressional legislative liaison officer with the Office of the Secretary of the Army, Washington, D.C. She received a B.S. from the US Military Academy, an M.S.S.M. from the University of Southern California, an M.A. from the US Naval War College and a Ph.D. from George Washington University. She is a graduate of the US Army Command and General Staff College. She has served in a variety of command and staff positions in the Continental United States and Korea, including liaison officer, Program Executive Office for Armored Systems Modernization, Headquarters, Department of the Army, Washington, D.C.; project engineer and contracting officer, Corps of Engineers, Kuwait Emergency Recovery Organization during Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm; and commander, Headquarters and Headquarters Company, 2d Engineer Group, Yongsan, Korea.

Keeping the Home Fires Burning:
Family Support Issues

D. Bruce Bell, Joel M. Teitelbaum and
Colonel Walter R. Schumm, US Army Reserve

FAMILY SUPPORT, critical during military deployments, has improved in the US Army thanks to lessons learned during Operations *Desert Shield* and *Storm,* according to a field study conducted at Fort Drum, New York, by the Walter Reed Army Institute of Research. Through spouse surveys and interviews during the Operation *Restore Hope* deployment to Somalia, our research team discovered that the Army has successfully institutionalized key elements of its family support structure.

The study was specifically designed to determine:

• The exact stressors spouses encountered during the mission.

• The Army and non–Army psychological and social supports spouses used to reduce stress.

• How well spouses and families coped with deployment and reunion stressors.

• The extent to which family support lessons from the Operation *Desert Shield/Storm* era were incorporated into Fort Drum's support system.

Restore Hope was a joint services task force that deployed about 28,000 personnel from all four armed services to Somalia. President George Bush approved the mission on Thanksgiving Day 1992 and publicly announced his decision on 4 December. According to Secretary of Defense Richard Cheney, the purpose of sending US forces to Somalia was to "restore the situation so that relief supplies can be delivered, and so that once we withdraw, we can turn over responsibility for dealing with the continuing security problem to regular UN forces."[1] Most of the 10,000 Army personnel deployed came from the 10th Mountain Division (Light) [10th MD(L)], Fort Drum.[2]

The field study's first part, conducted in March 1993 at Fort Drum, consisted of interviews with spouses, family support group (FSG) leaders, rear detachment (RD) commanders, housing unit mayors and family support service providers.[3] These interviews helped us develop a questionnaire for spouses

and explore local family support resources and emerging issues.

The questionnaire was given to a representative sample of 10th MD(L) spouses a few months after about 94 percent of the soldiers had returned from Somalia. About 46 percent of the questionnaires were returned, allowing us to statistically compare the views of nearly 700 spouses of soldiers who had deployed to Somalia with the views of more than 300 spouses of soldiers who had not deployed. Wherever possible, *Restore Hope* responses were compared with 1991 survey responses from spouses of soldiers who had deployed to Southwest Asia for *Desert Shield/Storm* from the Continental United States.[4] Also, because of the continued concern within the Department of Defense about junior enlisted marriages, we conducted special analyses within that group.[5]

Lessons Learned

Restore Hope's mission—armed peacekeeping (PK) in a famine–stricken Third World nation—was quite different from Army warfighting operations during the Gulf War. Although *Restore Hope* had at least a temporary positive effect in stopping starvation and reducing the chaotic conditions in Somalia, it received much less public support and news coverage than *Desert Shield/Storm.*[6] Only 61 percent of deployed soldiers' spouses at Fort Drum were satisfied with the level of support the American public gave the mission. In comparison, 92 percent of *Desert Shield/Storm* spouses were happy with the support those operations received. Only 40 percent of *Restore Hope* spouses were satisfied with media coverage. One spouse noted, "Somalia was in the news too much initially and too little lately. Also, the media's grasp of the facts regarding Somalia left a lot to be desired."

Stressors. Most spouses at Fort Drum found the deployment emotionally stressful. The events or

problems spouses had to deal with during the soldiers' absence and the amount of stress the spouses felt are listed in Figure 1. Because of Fort Drum's location, the weather was sometimes a problem, as one spouse noted: "The biggest problem for me and many other spouses was the snow." Another agreed: "I was . . . pregnant. . . . I needed someone to come over and shovel the three feet of snow we were getting every day. I have 4–, 2– and 1–year–olds. I had to leave them in the house while I shoveled snow."

The most stressful events were those linked directly to the deployment. A smaller proportion of spouses experienced stressful familial "life events," such as pregnancy (3 percent) or family violence (2 percent), which were worsened by the deployment. Not surprisingly, some spouses were more stressed than others. *During deployments, Army leaders and program managers must respond to a range of problems and reactions to those problems.*

On average, it took 22 days for the deployed soldier to communicate with a spouse, which was essentially the same time lapse as during the early days of *Desert Shield/Storm.*[7] The communication delay was even longer for soldiers deployed outside Army command headquarters at Mogadishu and Baledogle, Somalia. According to Fort Drum spouses, the situation was worsened by command promises that communications would be rapid and dependable.[8] One spouse wrote, "The mail system worked very poorly. We received each other's letters usually a month after being written, if at all." Another said, "There was a period of four weeks where none of our wives received phone calls. Going this long without contact was very stressful." *The Army recognized this problem and has attempted to solve it for other missions.*

During *Restore Hope*, deployed soldiers' spouses were less likely than their *Desert Shield/Storm* coun-terparts to have financial difficulties, as illustrated in Figure 2. Additionally, they were less likely to report problems with shopping or household tasks, holding a paid job, working as a volunteer, taking care of

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Restore Hope's mission—armed peacekeeping in a famine–stricken Third World nation—was quite different from Army warfighting operations during the Gulf War . . . . [and] received much less public support and news coverage than Desert Shield/Storm. . . . One spouse noted, "Somalia was in the news too much initially and too little lately. Also, the media's grasp of the facts regarding Somalia left a lot to be desired."

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their own or their children's health or dealing with loneliness. This success was due to the outstanding support system Fort Drum put in place. However, it is important to remember that *Restore Hope* was shorter and less dangerous than *Desert Shield/Storm.*

Supports. In most cases, more *Restore Hope* than *Desert Shield/Storm* spouses said Army services were helpful. These services included those provided by the Family Assistance Center, Army Community Services and FSGs. As depicted in Figure 3, Army information sources were used and rated as "helpful" by more *Restore Hope* than *Desert Shield/Storm* spouses. *Desert Shield/Storm* spouses found CNN broadcasts and telephone calls to be more helpful than did *Restore Hope* spouses. Researchers who studied *Restore Hope* soldiers also reported problems with telephone calls and CNN coverage.[9]

Figure 1.   **Spouses' Major Concerns During the Somalia Deployment.**

Problem	Reported Experiencing	Cited Problem as Extremely Stressful
Giving birth while spouse was away.	3%	58%
Going through a pregnancy while spouse was away.	12%	56%
Death of close friend or family member.	11%	47%
Not knowing what was going to happen.	90%	45%
Violence in the family.	2%	45%
Fears about spouse's safety.	93%	42%
Problems corresponding with spouse.	70%	40%
Rumors about return date.	82%	38%
Romors about spouse's physical health.	83%	34%
Snow removal at home.	57%	33%

Source: Fort Drum Survey (Question 47) weighted data

Figure 2. **Deployment-Induced Financial Problems: Enlisted and Officer.**

* The differences between Operation *Desert Shield/Storm* andOperation *Restore Hope* are statistically significant (α = .05) for each rank group.
** The difference between Operation *Restore Hope* officers and enlisted is statisically significate (α = .01).

Source: Operation *Desert Shield/Storm* Data, Army Families II Survey 1991, weighted data
Operation *Restore Hope* Data, Fort Drum Survey (Question 46). weighted data

All *Restore Hope* and *Desert Shield/Storm* spouses made extensive use of informal support sources, such as friends, neighbors and co–workers, and formal support, such as RD commands, FSGs

> The most stressful events were those linked directly to the deployment. A smaller proportion of spouses experienced stressful familial "life events," such as pregnancy (3 percent) or family violence (2 percent), which were worsened by the deployment. . . . During deployments, Army leaders and program managers must respond to a range of problems and reactions to those problems.

and other spouses. One spouse said, ". . . I did keep in close contact with my husband's commander's wife to get important information, and she was extremely helpful to me. With her help and the help of family and friends, the deployment was stressful, but not traumatic." Another said, "The only major support I received was first from my originator of the chain of concern, also the first sergeant's wife and the company commander's wife." *Restore Hope* spouses relied more on personal friends and the unit than installation services and were more likely than their *Desert Shield/Storm* counterparts to report that installation services—command briefings, family services and installation radio and TV—were helpful. *Restore Hope* spouses were also more likely to rate the RD as helpful.

Differences at Fort Drum. The major difference among the spouses at Fort Drum was their reliance on friends and unit supports. Compared to the spouses of nondeployed soldiers, the "deployed" spouses were more likely to say they were "using"

friends, neighbors, co–workers and unit FSGs for support. Their use of installation services was the same or even less than that reported by the spouses of nondeployed soldiers.

There were no differences between "deployed" and "nondeployed" spouses in their reported levels of daily coping, degree of marital satisfaction or willingness to support the soldier's career. There were only minimal differences between the two Fort Drum groups in their feelings about whether the Army should be involved in PK and humanitarian missions. Spouses gave more support to Army participation in humanitarian vice PK missions or the Somalia mission, as depicted in Figure 4.[10] *Restore Hope spouses greatly disliked the lack of support from the Somali people and the harassing gunfire and rock–throwing at US soldiers.*[11]

Reunion. Fort Drum spouses reported easier adjustments to the stresses of reunion than did *Desert Shield/Storm* spouses. During the reunion at Fort Drum, spouses had fewer problems with marital intimacy, adjusting to new routines, sharing family financial management and household decisions and disciplining children. This may be due to the nature and length of *Restore Hope* compared with *Desert Shield/Storm*, the good support system in the 10th MD(L) and at Fort Drum or a combination of both.

Married junior enlisted. During *Restore Hope*, equally high proportions of junior enlisted and career Army spouses used informal and unit social supports. Junior enlisted soldiers' spouses were more likely to view the Somalia deployment and "life events" as extremely stressful. They also were less likely to find Army information support resources helpful, had fewer family strengths and coped less

Figure 3.   **Sources of Deployment Information Helpful to Spouses.**

Sources of Information	Operation Restore Hope	Operation Desert Shield/Storm
Letters from spouse*	76%	70%
CNN*	47%	62%
Family support group members*	45%	33%
Telephone calls from spouse*	44%	71%
RD command*	34%	13%
FSG newsletter*	32%	15%
FSG telephone tree*	30%	21%
Local command briefings*	23%	11%
Installation radio/TV station*	22%	9%
Mohawk Theater brief	19%	(NA)

*The difference in the proportions between Operation *Restore Hope* and Operation *Desert Shield/Storm* is statistically significant (α = .01).

Source: Operation *Desert Shield/Storm* Data, Army Family II Survey 1991, weighted data
Operation *Restore Hope* Data, Fort Drum Survey (Question 41), weighted data

Figure 4.   **Spouses' Approval Ratings for Army Deployments**

Deployed   Not Depolyed

Agree or Strongly Agree with Army Involvement

Humananitarian*   Peacekeeping   Somalia*

57 62   52 58   47 51

* The difference in the proportions is not statistically significant (a = .05).
Attitudes about the three missions are statistically different from each other (a = .01).

Source: Fort Drum Survey (Questions 2 and 15), weighted data

well during reunion.[12] However, substantially more *Restore Hope* than *Desert Shield/Storm* first–term enlisted soldiers' spouses reported using unit support mechanisms. *Fort Drum's success in reaching this group should be explored further and can be incorporated into the new Army family team–building initiative to train family members and soldiers how to better cope with Army life.*[13]

The Fort Drum system. Fort Drum's family support system during *Restore Hope* was a direct outgrowth of the Army's historic commitment to support families.[14] That system was modified during the first US deployment to the Sinai as part of the Multinational Force and Observers (MFO) PK effort in 1982.[15] The system was further developed by the Gulf War.[16] Fort Drum's system included a senior spouse steering committee, RD commands, FSGs, Family Assistance Center, command briefings and Army radio, TV and newspaper use. Support leaders credited some of their success to the very recent experience with the deployment to Hurricane Andrew disaster relief operations in Florida, which gave their staff and volunteers practice running a family support system in a less–demanding contingency separation shortly before the *Restore Hope* mission.[17]

Overall, spouse perceptions of Army support during *Restore Hope* were positive. The survey and interviews, however, did point out the need for further improvements. One spouse said, "Units must have capable, caring rear detachment staffs, not just someone who is undeployable and was tasked [to do] the job." Another said, "The rear detachment was of little help. They wouldn't give out any information as to the location of our husbands or their expected returns. They only sent out newsletters to a few of the spouses of the higher ranks." *One improvement would be to maintain FSGs in garrison between deployments. A related challenge is how to train unit RD command personnel and assign them to deployment support missions.*

A major area of improvement over *Desert Shield/ Storm* was command delivery of relevant information to spouses via briefings, newsletters, phone trees and installation television and radio broadcasts by Fort Drum. Spouses who did not live on or near the post received more useful information than *Desert Shield/Storm* spouses in similar circumstances.[18]

Despite mission differences, *Restore Hope* spouses experienced stresses similar to those documented in military family separation literature since 1984. The main differences reported as stressful for *Restore Hope* spouses were less media attention and public support than for *Desert Shield/ Storm*. However, fewer families suffered serious financial strains during *Restore Hope* partly due to improved system support. Direct communication between soldier and spouse was nearly as difficult as in *Desert Shield/Storm*, particularly for soldiers in remote areas of Somalia. Yet, timely and accurate

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family information reached more *Restore Hope* spouses and helped reduce the adverse effects of rumors and misinformation. As in other deployments, the primary sources of support for "waiting" *Restore Hope* families were friends and relatives. These families were also more positive about the help they received from the Army than were their *Desert Shield/Storm* counterparts. One spouse noted philosophically, "My husband and I have been married for 13 wonderful years and have seen many deployments. But it never gets any easier— maybe harder—when it comes time for the next deployment."

In general, *Restore Hope* families were able to cope. In virtually all stressor areas with comparable data, they were more likely to report that they coped well than were the spouses of the soldiers who deployed to *Desert Shield/Storm*. *Restore Hope* spouses were also more likely to say that their marriages remained intact.

The 10th MD(L) and Fort Drum institutionalized a well–functioning family support system with lessons learned from *Desert Shield/Storm* and "practice" during the 1991 Hurricane Andrew mission. However, continuing support shortfalls included: mechanisms for training and sustaining FSG volunteers in small Army units and assigning and training unit RD command staff. Junior enlisted spouses

showed better coping skills than during previous deployments. However, compared with the senior enlisted soldiers' and officers' spouses, they continued to lack confidence in Army supports and their own capabilities to successfully deal with deployment stress.

The Army is starting a new phase in PK operations: the use of soldiers from the Reserve Components as MFO peacekeepers in the Sinai. That mission presents some unique family support challenges because "waiting" families are widely dispersed and often live a long distance from US military facilities. The Army Research Institute is helping the Army with this experiment, which, hopefully, will result in additional "lessons learned" that can be used in future PK missions. It seems fitting that we are returning to the MFO to refine the family support system it gave to the Army over 12 years ago. *MR*

NOTES

1. Secretary of Defense Richard Cheney and GEN Colin Powell, *News Briefing* (Washington, DC: Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense, Public Affairs, 4 December 1992), 2.

2. MG S.L. Arnold, "Somalia: An Operation Other Than War," *Military Review* (December 1993), 26–35.

3. This article is a joint product of field research by the US Army Research Institute (ARI) and the Walter Reed Army Institute of Research (WRAIR). The US Army Community Family Support Center (USACFSC) sponsored the research, and support center staff helped conduct it. The research was an outgrowth of the US Army vice chief of staff's task force study on spouse support "lessons learned" from Operations *Desert Shield* and *Desert Storm*, which was under way when Operation *Restore Hope* began.

4. R. Fafara and M. Peterson, "Key Findings: 1991 Survey of Army Families II," briefing to USACFSC commander (Alexandria, VA: Army Personnel Survey Office, ARI, 1 February 1993). Also see F.R. Rosenberg, "Survey of Army Families, 1991: A Multivariate Analysis" (Washington, DC: Department of Military Psychiatry, WRAIR, 1993), unpublished manuscript; and J.M. Teitelbaum, "Army Supports to Prevent and Mitigate Family Dysfunction During Military Combat Deployments" (Washington, DC: American Psychological Association and National Institute of Occupational Safety and Health Conference on Workplace Stress, 1992), unpublished paper. The interviews and observations showed us the level of Fort Drum's command awareness of the spouse support lessons learned from *Desert Shield/Storm*. Comparing the *Restore Hope* and *Desert Shield/Storm* surveys showed how well the system was working.

5. This topic received special interest when US Marine Corps Commandant GEN Carl Mundy Jr. announced that the Marine Corps would no longer recruit married junior enlisted personnel. That decision, which was quickly rescinded, led to a Department of Defense–wide review of how well married junior enlisted soldiers cope with the rigors of service life. Some useful references on this issue include: American Forces Information Service, "Marriage and the First–Term Family," *Defense* (January–February 1994), 6–16; K. Jowers, "Study: Do Not Bar Marrieds," *Army Times* (27 December 1993), 16; Personnel and Readiness Division, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense, *Family Status and Initial Term of Service*, 6 vols. (Washington, DC: Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense, 1993).

6. K.B. Richburg, "Banditry, looting predicted in wake of US military withdrawal," *Washington Post* (14 March 1994), 12.

7. *Restore Hope* spouses were less likely than *Desert Shield/Storm* spouses to rate letters and phone calls from the soldier and CNN coverage of the operation as being helpful to them—probably because these forms of communication were less available during *Restore Hope*. However, *Restore Hope* spouses were more positive about Army briefings, RD support and the FSG.

8. This difficulty is not unique to *Restore Hope*. The command also promised rapid and dependable communications during *Desert Shield/Storm*, where the problem seemed to be the great volume of communication traffic. In *Restore Hope*, the problem seemed to be too little infrastructure, including telephones. See R.K. Gifford, J.N. Jackson and K.B. DeShazo, "Observations of a Human Dimensions Research Team in Somalia During Operation *Restore Hope*" (Baltimore, MD: Inter–University Seminar on Armed Forces and Society Biennial Conference, October 1993), unpublished paper.

9. Gifford, Jackson and DeShazo.

10. This finding was for the summer of 1993—well before the shooting of the Pakistani peacekeepers, the killing of 18 US Rangers and the decision to get out of Somalia by the end of March 1994.

11. D.B. Bell and J.M. Teitelbaum, "Operation *Restore Hope*: Preliminary results of a survey of Army spouses at Fort Drum, New York" (Baltimore, MD: Inter–University Seminar on Armed Forces and Society Biennial Conference, October 1993), unpublished paper. Also see Arnold; and Gifford, Jackson and DeShazo. Another source is R. Lacayo, "How the troops see it," *Time* (18 October 1993), 48.

12. P.A. Gade, D.B. Bell and J. Scarville, "Army support for families during Operation *Restore Hope* at Fort Drum, New York" (Alexandria, VA: ARI, 1993), unpublished manuscript.

13. USACFSC, *Army Family Team Building Levels I and II* (Alexandria, VA: USACFSC, 1994).

14. D.B. Bell and R.B. Iadeluca, *The Origins of Volunteer Support for Army Families* (Alexandria, VA: ARI, Research Report 1456, 1987). Also see S. Albano, "Military Recognition of Family Concerns: Revolutionary War to 1993," *Armed Force and Society* (Winter 1994), 283–302.

15. D.R. Segal and M.W. Segal, *Peacekeepers and their Wives: American Participation in the Multinational Force and Observers* (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1993). Also see E.W. Van Vranken, et al., *The impact of deployment separation on Army families* (Washington, DC: Division of Neuropsychiatry, WRAIR, 1984).

16. D.B. Bell, "The impact of Operation *Desert Shield/Desert Storm* on Army families: A summary of findings to date" (Denver, CO: 53d Annual Conference of the National Council on Family Relations, November 1991), unpublished paper. Also see US Army War College Class of 1992 spouses and students, *Who cares? We do!! Experiences in family support* (Carlisle Barracks, PA: US Army War College, 1992); and *The Yellow Ribbon*, edited by M.S. Winneke (Fort Leavenworth, KS: US Army Combined Arms Command, 1991).

17. D.B. Bell and J. Teitelbaum, "Operation *Restore Hope*: Preliminary results of a survey of Army spouses at Fort Drum, New York" (Denver, CO: 53d Annual Conference of the National Council on Family Relations), unpublished paper.

18. Fafara and Peterson. Also see Van Vranken, et al.

D. Bruce Bell is a research psychologist and team leader of the Organizational Change Research Team, US Army Research Institute (ARI) for the Behavioral and Social Sciences, Alexandria, Virginia. He received a B.A. and an M.A. from the University of Texas at Austin and a Ph.D. from Texas Tech University. His previous positions include leader, Family Research Team, and project monitor, Army Family Research Program, ARI; and deputy unit chief, ARI, Fort Benjamin Harrison Field Unit, Fort Benjamin Harrison, Indiana. In 1980, he was elected a fellow in the Military Psychology Division, American Psychological Association. His report on how to support families during overseas deployments is being used to shape family support for the current US Army peacekeeping operation in Bosnia.

Joel M. Teitelbaum is a senior social science analyst and coordinator of Army Family and Community Unit Research, Department of Military Psychiatry, Walter Reed Army Institute of Research (WRAIR), Washington, D.C. He received a B.A. from Brown University, an M.S.P.H. from the University of North Carolina and an M.A. and a Ph.D. from the University of Manchester, England. Since 1986, he has led studies of Army family way–of–life and mission stressors in deploying units and has coordinated family research for WRAIR. He coordinated family stress research at WRAIR for Operation Desert Storm. He currently is researching Active Duty Army family and soldier stress, supports and coping in deploying units.

Colonel Walter R. Schumm, US Army Reserve, is a professor of family studies, Kansas State University, Manhattan, Kansas, and is the Kansas state emergency preparedness liaison officer, Fifth US Army, San Antonio, Texas. He received a B.S. from the College of William and Mary, an M.S. from Kansas State University and a Ph.D. from Purdue University and is a graduate of the US Army War College. His past positions include commander, 530th Military Police (MP) Battalion and commander, 439th MP Detachment, Omaha, Nebraska; and chief, movements cell, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics, Fifth US Army, San Antonio. He also has served as a summer faculty fellow at the ARI, Alexandria, Virginia. He is co–editor of the Sourcebook of Family Theories and Research Methodology, *and his article "Movement Management in Support of Desert Storm: A CONUSA Perspective" appeared in the July 1993 issue of* Military Review.

The Future of the Nation-State

Philip L. Ritcheson

Today's international system of nation–states has survived for centuries through economic, scientific, technological and political change. Unprecedented change will cause further instability and conflict, redefining future national and international security agreements. Many nation–states may not be capable of dealing with these issues as the once clear–cut lines of state sovereignty become blurred. This article examines the nation–state and identifies current trends reinforcing the idea that the nation–state is declining in importance.

SINCE THE COLD WAR's end, the idea that the nation–state is declining and cannot deal with 21st–century problems has become widespread. The idea is reinforced by various global issues such as environmental problems, economic integration, refugee flows, population explosions and resource depletion. The successor to the nation–state seems to be some form of supranationalism as suggested by the signing of the General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs (GATT), which encourages economic interdependence and the removal of trade barriers. The European Union (EU) is another example of supranationalism on a regional scale, and the UN is seen as an international security problem solver.

Despite all this, the nation is still the preferred object of identification and allegiance. After World War II, Asian and African nationalism was awakened. Each new nation claimed independence, sovereignty, the right to pursue its self–interests and the power to make its own decisions. In 1945, 51 nations signed the UN Charter. By the late 1960s, UN membership more than doubled. On 15 December 1994, the UN admitted the Western Pacific island chain of Palau as its 185th member.[1]

Since World War II's end, nationalism has become resolute, surging with the Soviet Union's dissolution. The relatively stable bipolar environment of the past 50 years has given way to a US–dominated unipolar framework, which will eventually yield to a multipolar, competitive international security environment with nation–states as the principal actors.

This article examines the concepts of nation, state and nationalism and describes, in broad terms, post–World War II nationalism in Europe, Africa, the Middle East, Asia, Latin America and the former Soviet Union. It also identifies current trends reinforcing the idea that the nation–state is declining in importance and assesses international relations at the 20th century's end.

Definitions: Nation, State and Nationalism

A *nation* is a community of people bound together by a sense of solidarity, common culture and national consciousness. They consider themselves distinct

National identity—the feeling of dignity, pride and self–respect—precedes the formation of nations and is derived from membership in a people. Historically, the nation has been associated with the political, territorial and ethnic connotations of a population and country— "a sovereign people."

A state is a set of organizations in a society that interact with other formal and informal organizations. A state is distinguished by its ability to require obedience and loyalty and to institute binding rules.

from others as they strive to create or maintain their state.[2] Culture—a system of ideas, signs, associations and ways of behaving and communicating—is important when defining the nation. A nation can include the population of one state, be included with other nations in one state or be divided into several states.

National identity—the feeling of dignity, pride and self–respect—precedes the formation of nations and is derived from membership in a people. Historically, the nation has been associated with the political, territorial and ethnic connotations of a population and country—"a sovereign people." National consciousness, the recognition of others who share your specific culture, is another element of a nation. According to author Hugh Seton–Watson, "A nation exists when a significant number of people in a community consider themselves to form a nation, or behave as if they formed one." Thus, the nation can be viewed as "an imagined community" with territorial limits and national freedom characterized by sovereignty.[3]

A *state* is a set of organizations in a society that interact with other formal and informal organizations. A state is distinguished by its ability to require obedience and loyalty and to institute binding rules.[4] The difference between strong and weak states depends on "the existence of legitimate political institutions which are capable of winning compliance for official policies without resorting to violence against domestic populations." The sovereign state depends on two principles: self–help (no authority exists above the state); and territoriality (authority is exercised over a defined geographic area). Thus, the sovereign state is an independent, geographically based political system that can exist without a nation or with several nations. Not all societies are states. Eric Hobsbawm regards the nation as "a social entity insofar as it relates to a certain kind of modern territorial state, the 'nation–state'. . . ."[5]

Louis Snyder differentiates between the state–nation and nation–state.[6] In the primarily Western *state–nation*, the nation developed within a framework that already included the state. Common sovereignty provided common institutions and a sense of nationhood transcended cultural differences which synthesized to transcend ethnic differences. The national spirit was a sense of community based on a common past and hope for a common future. In the *nation–state*, exemplified by Central and Eastern Europe, the nation developed within a specific culture. Ethnic and political frontiers collided, and nationality reflected ethnic identity. The nation was

identified as a cultural, not a political, entity. National consciousness created the demand for a nation–state. In the final analysis, however, the nation–state is a modern political entity, designed to manage social structures. Its inhabitants "consider themselves a single nation and wish to remain one."[7]

Nationalism is a political ideology which holds that the nation and state—namely, territorial and political loyalty—should be congruent. Nationalism can be interpreted in two ways: as doctrine about the character, interests, rights and duties of nations; and as a description of an organized political movement designed to further the alleged aims and interests of nations seeking independence or national unity. Sometimes, the political movement strives to build a nation within an independent state. Thus, the nation seeks collective freedom from domination by another nation, and the individual seeks freedom to join the nation of his or her choice.[8]

Author Liah Greenfeld lists two types of nationalism: *individualistic–libertarian* and *collectivistic–authoritarian*. In the former, nationalism is also distinguished by membership in the national collectivity, meaning membership can be open and voluntary and is referred to as civic when acquired on an individual basis. Collectivistic–authoritarian nationalism cannot be acquired or changed if one has it. It is predominantly ethnic, with the connotation of genetic inherency. It can, however, be civic too.[9]

At the core of nationalism are the characteristics and nation's symbols which have produced several variations of nationalism. Nationalism has been a force for:

- *Unity*, whereby a politically divided nation, such as Italy or Germany, has used nationalism to achieve union in a single state.
- *Status quo*, whereby multinational states, such as the Austro–Hungarian and Russian empires and the former Yugoslavia, prevent a breakdown into smaller nationalistic parts.
- *Independence*, characterized by national minority peoples achieving autonomy, most recently demonstrated in Eastern Europe, the former Soviet Union and the former Yugoslavia.
- *Fraternity*, in which irredentists strive to gain union with others of the same group.
- *Economic expansion*, accompanying attempts by more powerful nations to obtain economic advantages vis–à–vis underdeveloped nations.
- *Colonial expansion*, used by older established nations to enhance their political and military interests.

In the nation–state, exemplified by Central and Eastern Europe, the nation developed within a specific culture. Ethnic and political frontiers collided, and nationality reflected ethnic identity. The nation was identified as a cultural, not a political, entity. National consciousness created the demand for a nation–state. In the final analysis, however, the nation–state is a modern political entity, designed to manage social structures.

- *Anticolonialism*, which promoted the creation of nation–states in former colonies.
- *Aggression*.[10]

The nation is the "constitutive element" of modernity. It is defined by nationalism predating "every significant component of modernization." Nationalism shapes economic forces and, with other factors, "stamps its cultural temper." Politically, nationalism has made our world what it is. Successful nationalism implies social harmony; acceptance of the culture and its signs, symbols and associations; peaceful change when required; and legitimate state authority.[11]

Nationalism Following World War II

World War I, with its predominantly nationalist flavor, was to be the "war to end all wars" that would "make the world safe for democracy." But 20 short years later, World War II exploded, driven, in part, by nationalism. In 1945, there was strong hope that nationalism's importance would recede. Four factors reinforced this desire:

- The small state had demonstrated its military and economic insecurity.
- The UN held out the promise of superseding nationalism through a collective security mechanism.

Overpopulation, inadequate investment, limited or no research and development, resource depletion and migration threaten to further destabilize poverty–stricken regions. Combined with this trend are the effects of technological power and a knowledge explosion, particularly in developed countries, where there is little or no population growth. . . . The changing structure of international business and investment may exacerbate the "have/have–not" gap because most people will not be able to afford the advances.

● As colonial empires collapsed in the postwar period under their own weight, it seemed that the strong nation–state with overseas commitments was a thing of the past.

● International communism appeared to solve the problem of aggressive and destructive nationalism.[12]

Postwar European nationalism was fragmented. Europe unified to defeat Adolf Hitler, and when that goal was achieved, the European nations went their separate ways. When it became clear that the Soviet ideological and military threats were real, they came together again under the auspices of NATO in 1949. Although talk of European integration and union has persisted for decades, this new type of nationalism still reflects the "old" idea that the nation is the ultimate politico–economic unit. Trends toward integration, economic and cultural factors, and geographic and political fragmentation remained.[13]

African postwar nationalism exploded in anticolonial sentiment. World War II Allied leaders began to hint at self–government, and African troops, who had learned new skills serving overseas, wanted more political power at home. The African "revolution of rising expectations," carried out under an ethnic and racial banner, began in the North African Arab–Muslim states. In 1945, Ethiopia, Liberia, Egypt and South Africa were the only four independent African countries. By 1964, 34 African states were independent and by 1980, the entire continent was independent with the exception of Namibia. But the African continent had limited, and in some areas no, experience with self–rule. Compared with the Philippines or India, African nationalism had a difficult road because both the nation and state had to be built. In parts of Africa today, "public realm" characteristics are difficult to ascertain: State offices have limited or uncertain authority, government organizations are corrupt or ineffective and the political community is segmented ethnically into various "publics."[14]

By World War II's end, nationalists in the Middle East ended colonial domination, only to face the significant problems of hunger, disease and poverty. As elsewhere, Middle Eastern nationalism had many forms and characteristics—religion was the dominant force and common denominator. The nationalist movement was influenced by the region's proximity to Western Europe, the state of Israel's establishment and the emergence of state nationalism in Turkey and Egypt.[15]

Asian nationalism was explosive, unpredictable and multifaceted. Psychological factors, manifested principally by delicate national pride, were more im-

Melanie Stetson Freeman, *Christian Science Monitor*

Militia troops arresting Georgian nationalists at an April 1989 Moscow demonstration before the break-up of the Soviet Union.

portant than economic motivations. Once independence was achieved, Asian nationalism became negative and reactionary. Communal clashes, hostilities and linguistic rivalries permeated Asian nationalism, which relied more on dictatorship than democracy.[16]

Three other interrelated factors, all driven by anti-imperialism, were important:

● General dissatisfaction with the process of Western industrialization and capitalism led Asians to try to modernize their cultures with Western science and technology while they were seeking independence.

● International communism was thought to be a liberating force. Because the Marxist–Leninist connection of imperialism and capitalism made sense to many Asians, moves toward independence based on some form of socialism became prevalent.

● Resentment of European domination spurred rising nationalism. Initially begun as an economic protest, nationalism eventually enveloped a political feature which then gave way to demands for independence and, eventually, guerrilla warfare.

In Latin America, nationalism concerned breaking traditional modes and was characterized by sporadic revolution, though the cycle of revolution was long, uncoordinated and uneven. Latin American nationalism had six general characteristics:

● It was inspired by the small upper classes.

● It was derived from the European experience because of ties to Europe's language, religion, traditions, customs and ethics.

Modern nationalism was an extension of the city–state idea on a great scale. The same bonds of common language, religion, customs and heroes; the same patriotism; the same xenophobia— all these were combined to form the stuff of nationalism. Cultural barriers were broken down; technological and scientific change brought the various parts of the world closer and closer together. But while cultural diversities were disappearing, political nationalism became at the same time more and more intensified.

> *Current globalists consider economics to be the defining issue of international relations. However, prosperity without physical security may be short–lived, and affluence without political liberties may be unenjoyable. Because humans are not solely economic beings, defining economic well–being in isolation is difficult. A country's history, culture and geopolitical situation are better indications of its strategic behavior than economic wealth.*

● It included a potent element of *dignidad,* a sense of dignity that produced a particularly intense form of nationalism.

● It had a volatile quality that inspired the desire for quick change.

● Its predilection to statism hindered the emergence of Latin American democracy. This characteristic was created toward the end of the 19th century when a nationalistic middle class was infused with economic nationalism.

● Anti–Western and specific anti–US feelings were prevalent.[17]

In the Soviet Union, propaganda appealed to proletarian internationalism, but messianic nationalism prevailed until the "petty nationalisms" of 1991 re–emerged. Following World War II, Soviet leader Joseph Stalin continued his drive toward indomitable Soviet nationalism. Stalin pursued nationalist purges, particularly in the Slavic republics of Ukraine and Byelorussia (Belarus). At the same time, Russian nationalism became a shield to protect other socialist countries from the capitalist world. The emergence of separatist national communist regimes, or "domesticism," in Eastern Europe—in countries such as Yugoslavia, Hungary, Poland and China—contradicted Stalin's policy and fervent desire to establish communist satellites around a Moscow/Russian center. It also forced recognition by Moscow that Russia was not the only place where communism could be defined.[18]

Thus, two types of nationalism followed World War II. *Persistent nationalism,* in its early form, continued to exemplify most modern European nation–states, but variations, combining basic old qualities with new characteristics, emerged in other regions. Blatant, *aggressive nationalism* was significantly reduced, but the desire for national sovereignty and other fragmentary trends persisted.

Factors Leading to the Nation–State's Decline

Several trends support the belief that the nation–state is declining. The bipolar standoff is over, major power competition in the Third World seems anachronistic and international relations revolve around economic issues more than anything else. In addition, proponents claim that major power warfare has been eliminated, territorial conquest has lost its value and ideology is outdated. More specifically, these trends are the outcome of—and are sustained by—other global integration trends, including growth of technology, production, information and communications and the circulation of goods, people and ideas.[19]

Paul Kennedy argues that many of these issues are interrelated and confront the world today, and especially tomorrow, with greater force than ever before. On the one hand, overpopulation, inadequate investment, limited or no research and development, resource depletion and migration threaten to further destabilize poverty–stricken regions. Combined with this trend are the effects of technological power and a knowledge explosion, particularly in developed countries, where there is little or no population growth. Productivity is expected to increase, displacing traditional occupations and threatening to undermine the economies of developed countries. Further, the changing structure of international business and investment may exacerbate the "have/have–not" gap because most people will not be able to afford the advances.[20]

The forces of change are expected to cause instability and conflict that will force the redefinition of national interests and national and international security. Traditional guidelines, social organizations and the nation–state's structure and power may not be capable of dealing with these issues. The clear–cut lines of state sovereignty that existed in the 18th century and became the model after World War II are fading. The interchanges of nations are creating well–informed individuals who are, increasingly, "citizens of the world" who must, with the rest of humanity, face global problems.[21] Two issues in particular—economic integration and transnationalism—challenge the nation–state's viability.

Economic integration has increased dramatically over the last 50 years. It is occurring on a global scale and creating a richer system that will not be universally enjoyed. Economic integration is also undermining autonomy and eroding the differences between national economies. Economic distance is shrinking through increased trade, migration and capital movements as reduced transportation and communication costs make cross–border transactions easier. The North American Free Trade Agreement, the EU, the Asian–Pacific Economic Conference and GATT all have led to significant "fence lowering." The world, once dominated by a few powers, now has many countries with political and economic power.[22]

Transnationalism connotes several ideas, but its key defining characteristic is that it excludes or bypasses a national government and involves at least one nongovernmental organization (NGO) or international NGO in interstate relations. The NGO constitutes a transmission of authority beyond the nation–state, and transnationalism involves the re-

Although talk of European integration and union has persisted for decades, this new type of nationalism still reflects the "old" idea that the nation is the ultimate politico–economic unit. Trends toward integration, economic and cultural factors, and geographic and political fragmentation remained.

location of authority away from the nation–state. Transnationalism encompasses increasing identification with ethnicity, international banks, international organizations and agreements and global communications.

The quintessential example is the transnational corporation (TNC), which is emerging as the creator and controller of technology. TNCs can focus on their own interests because they are not tied to any country's values or interests. Transnationalism is also exemplified by economic zones, new trading relationships and cities which establish themselves as free–trade zones to promote investment.[23]

Consequently, as interdependence increases, national and international security become inseparable but increasingly difficult to define. Relocating authority up or down may further degrade the nation–state. In a world characterized by rapid change, the nation–state is viewed, at worst, as an impediment and at best, as an ineffective organization. From this, one can conclude that the nation–state is losing control and new structures are required. In addition, the "forces for peace"—democracy and liberalization, interdependence, the decreasing appeal of war and supranationalism—are "pressuring all states to behave in a cooperative fashion."[24]

There are no practicable strategies for realizing the vision of some larger community. For example, inherent problems exist in determining a national security strategy. One can only imagine the difficulties of trying to determine an international, global strategy. The fact is that definitions of what constitutes security differ. Current difficulties within the EU and the UN are good examples of this.

International Relations at the 20th–Century's End

The idea that some form of supranationalism is more desirable than the existing order is an old one.[25] The Christian Roman Empire sought universality, believing it was mandated by heaven. The effects of technology and communications in medieval and early modern history allowed for "the cultural compatibility of people in a similar estate across political boundaries." In the 19th century, borders perforated by capital encouraged Karl Marx to predict the death of nationalism and the nation due to capitalism's economic integration.

In this century, the destruction wrought by two world wars again raised hopes for nationalism's demise. From the 1950s to 1970s, modernization theory held that migration, urbanization, growing literacy and political and economic integration would break the parochial walls of ethnic identity and prompt loyalty to a larger community. Thus, there have been numerous attempts to take advantage of cultural uniformity, but in each case, it was not powerful enough to overcome political diversity.

"Modern nationalism was an extension of the city–state idea on a great scale. The same bonds of common language, religion, customs and heroes; the same patriotism; the same xenophobia—all these were combined to form the stuff of nationalism. Cultural barriers were broken down; technological and scientific change brought the various parts of the world closer and closer together. But while cultural diversities were disappearing, political nationalism became at the same time more and more intensified. The process continued into the middle of the 20th century. The prophecy that the world would move toward political unification as cultural barriers were eliminated was not realized. The paradox [of nationalism] remains."[26]

For the past 400 years, collectivists have underestimated nationalism's power. One of supranationalism's driving forces is economics and the belief that economic affairs prevail over all others. But economic well–being is culturally bound, time–bound and relative, meaning the expectations and definitions of economic well–being differ from time to time and place to place. Current globalists consider economics to be the defining issue of international relations. However, prosperity without physical security may be short–lived, and affluence without political liberties may be unenjoyable. Because humans are not solely economic beings, defining economic well–being in isolation is difficult. A coun-

UNITA guerrillas preparing to blow up a bridge on the Lobito rail line east of Huambo, Angola. Despite the end of the Cold War, Angola and Afghanistan are still in turmoil and southeastern Europe remains troubled.

Al J. Venter, *Soldier of Fortune*

try's history, culture and geopolitical situation are better indications of its strategic behavior than economic wealth. Economic integration results from and strengthens the national interests of sovereign states. Integration is an inherent characteristic of the state system and is not an alternative to sovereignty within that system.[27]

There are no practicable strategies for realizing the vision of some larger community. For example, inherent problems exist in determining a national security strategy. One can only imagine the difficulties of trying to determine an international, global strategy.[28] The fact is that definitions of what constitutes security differ. Current difficulties within the EU and the UN are good examples of this.

The EU seeks to look beyond the nation–state as the determining unit in European society and affairs. Yet, the EU cannot eliminate the nation–state's character or complexities from its organization. As long as the EU focuses on economics and does not threaten national sovereignty and prestige, plans continue without broad protest. Disjunction exists, however, between the less fragmentary issue of national economies and the divisive issues of diplomacy and defense. Additionally, various EU states have internal problems that only the nation–state can solve. Complicating this, countries in Central and Eastern Europe, with whom Western Europe wishes to strengthen ties, do not have a political history that is conducive to democracy. Western Europe does

The numbers and types of conflicts occurring today and expected in the future will continue to challenge the UN. Broad civilizational, political and economic divisions—themselves the result of shifting power structures and regional impoverishment— are prompting, or reigniting, conflict in general and ethnic conflict in particular.

The international system is still anarchic, meaning it does not have an overarching governing order, although there are certain "rules of the road." Inequality in international power distribution will continue. As competition increases with inequality, the relevance of national sentiment and resentment will increase and differences in international prestige, cultural achievement and political records will become visible. The relevance of ethnic identity may increase, possibly leading to more conflict.

not yet trust nondemocratic civil societies where there is a strong likelihood of continuing socioeconomic failures. The drift toward populism and violent nationalism in the East is still a danger.[29]

Given these divisive issues, Italian authors Fabio Luca Cavazza and Carlo Pelanda suggest that the goal for European states should be to respond to problems with "calm patriotism." "Given the very substantial differences between states, their political force and power cannot be made equal by the stroke of a pen."[30]

The UN has become another test case for supranationalism.[31] Less tension exists today among the major powers, and there is a general desire for the UN to handle international threats. Perceived UN successes from 1987 to 1991 reinforce this. During those years, the Iran–Iraq War was mediated; the UN was involved with the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan; a broad coalition government was established in Cambodia; and the civil war in El Salvador was ended. From 1988 to the present, 20 additional UN peacekeeping operations were initiated, adding to the 13 already under way. At the beginning of 1994, 17 UN operations, involving 70,000 to 90,000 troops, observers and police, were still ongoing.[32] The prospect of UN success is enhanced by the idea that the nation–state is weakening. According to UN Secretary–General Boutros Boutros–Ghali, "It is undeniable that the centuries–old doctrine of absolute and exclusive sovereignty no longer stands. . . . A major intellectual requirement of our time is to rethink the question of sovereignty . . . to recognize that it may take more than one form and perform more than one function."[33] Essentially, opportunities exist for cooperation on many issues. More important, solutions to many problems may come from international organizations, TNOs or NGOs with no state affiliation.

However, in the final analysis, the UN has not been able to prevent or undo aggression, because too many UN members have diluted their efforts to support human rights and political freedom and the UN's contribution to socioeconomic progress has been less than that of specialized agencies. The UN is not an authoritative channel of communication because it has too many voices to act as one. In addition, the UN has little political leverage, resulting in promises and threats that lack credibility or teeth, and it cannot pursue a coherent, flexible or dynamic strategy. No upgrading or modernization of the organization is expected to change this.[34] Even recent UN success was due to unique contexts for the resolution

of those conflicts—either local parties were exhausted with the situation or external powers did not support the conflict. In addition, the UN is still unable to cope with some intractable problems. For example, Afghanistan and Angola are still in turmoil, and the former Yugoslavia is an ignominious failure.

The numbers and types of conflicts occurring today and expected in the future will continue to challenge the UN. Broad civilizational, political and economic divisions—themselves the result of shifting power structures and regional impoverishment—are prompting, or reigniting, conflict in general and ethnic conflict in particular. Conflicting interests are evident within NATO, between developed and developing countries and between the Islamic and Confucian worlds and the liberal democratic West.[35] The addition of the nonstate further stresses the security environment where the UN is expected to succeed. A nonstate actor could be an internal faction, terrorist group or criminal organization that does not act as states do in terms of decision making and weighing interests, costs, benefits and risks.[36]

Disaffected groups now have greater political opportunities to seek autonomy or power. Ted Robert Gurr identifies these orientations toward state power:

● Ethnonationalist. A large, regionally concentrated entity with a history of organized political activity which may seek independent statehood or regional autonomy. This orientation has been increasing since the 1960s and characterizes the conflicts in the former Yugoslavia and former Soviet Union.

● Culturally distinct peoples. Tribes or clans who are contending for power among themselves within a heterogeneous society. This form is the most deadly and disruptive, because it reignites and generates new "ethnopolitical" conflicts. The situations in Afghanistan and Angola characterize this orientation.[37]

It is clear that international relations at the 20th century's end are still shifting and thus unpredictable. It is likely that greater international cooperation on various issues will occur even though power is more diffuse and multidimensional. The balance between statecraft and military force remains important, because the struggle for advantage continues and, hence, national power and relative advantage remain essential. Further, the nation–state remains the principal actor in international relations, despite the existence of failed, failing and transitional states and their forces. It is interesting

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to note that states have the opportunity to fail. Robert Jackson contends that the post–1945 doctrine of nonintervention makes it possible for weak and disunited states to survive, whereas in the past they would have been conquered, partitioned or eliminated. The fact that this has not happened as much as it did in the past suggests that the principles of sovereign statehood and nonintervention will forestall the deaths of sovereign states, such as Chad, Sudan, Uganda, Ethiopia, Lebanon and Somalia, in the near future.[38]

Simultaneously, many states, primarily in the Northern Hemisphere and characterized by either multiparty democracies or one–party autocracies, have greater capacities to mobilize and deploy human and material resources to serve state policies than at any other time in history. The nation–state is still determined to protect its sovereignty and independence and is run by individuals who are accountable to domestic interests. Additionally, without the constraints of the bipolar security system, nations, states and groups now have more latitude to pursue

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their interests. The fact that the state may be more important in relation to societal problems makes control of the state more desirable.[39]

No general solution to the problem of conflict has yet appeared. Over the centuries, various nations have attempted to establish "new world orders." These organizing frameworks were designed to solve the problem of conflict by basing permanent peace on universal religion and language; the elimination of poverty; socialism; world government and a federal world state; global, economic and social pressures that reduce tribalism; or peace education.[40] But the security environment for the foreseeable future will be characterized by two trends: political fragmentation and ethnic and regional conflict; and the unprecedented availability of technologies with military applications, some with mass destruction potential. Taken together, these trends constitute the basis for a broad, potentially intense, conflict spectrum.[41]

Today's society of states remains separated by distinct identities, territories and symbols. National identity and self–determination remain strong, and independent countries continue to receive their citizens' loyalty. Governments organize institutions based on political orientation and ideology and decide and implement their own policies. These states also continue to have their own interests, including territorial and political integrity.

Moreover, there is seldom concern about international problems unless they affect a nation's political, military or economic interests. As the need for international law becomes greater, the greater the trend toward nationalism and "the rock of sovereignty." In addition, resolving global problems depends, fundamentally, on the willingness of nations to enter into and implement international agreements. For now at least, there is no substitute for the nation–state.

The international system is still *anarchic*, meaning it does not have an overarching governing order, although there are certain "rules of the road." Inequality in international power distribution will continue. As competition increases with inequality, the relevance of national sentiment and resentment will increase and differences in international prestige, cultural achievement and political records will become visible. The relevance of ethnic identity may increase, possibly leading to more conflict.[42]

Greenfeld argues that the worth of the nation is "related to the experience of dignity by wide and ever widening sectors of humanity. . . . The remarkable quality of national identity which distinguishes

it from other identities . . . is that it guarantees status with dignity to every member of whatever is defined as a polity or society." This key characteristic—dignity—ensured the spread of nationalism and partly explains its persistence. Therefore, to transcend the nation's worth requires alternative guarantees of dignity through a replacement for nationalism.

The present international system of nations and states has survived for centuries. Throughout, there have been periods of seemingly unprecedented economic, scientific, technological and political change. The capabilities of states have increased drastically too. Sovereign states have demonstrated they can be flexible in responding to different circumstances or events. The nation–state remains both fulcrum and goal. Modernization and integration are done for the benefit of the nation, not for the internationalization of society.[44] *MR*

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Philip L. Ritcheson is working on a Ph.D. in international relations at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University, and is a policy analyst with ANSER, Inc., a public service research institute in Arlington, Virginia. He received a B.A. from the University of Southern California and an M.S. from Southwest Missouri State University. He has published articles in Strategic Review, Armed Forces and Society, Defense News *and the* Boston Globe. *His article "China's Impact on Southeast Asian Security" appeared in the May 1994 issue of* Military Review.

The Occupation of Japan—
Legacy for the Cold War and Beyond

Lieutenant Colonel Joseph G.D. Babb, US Army, Retired

The occupation of Japan began 28 August 1945 with US soldiers landing on the mainland. It officially ended with the April 1952 Treaty of San Francisco signing. However, the occupation's unofficial end came with the June 1950 North Korean attack against South Korea. In response, General Douglas MacArthur began deploying 24th Infantry Division elements (Task Force *Smith*) from Japan to stem further communist aggression. However, the occupation of Japan was more than an interlude between wars in Asia. Military operations conducted there from 1945 to 1950 had far–reaching military and political effects that continue today.

Anthropologist Ruth Benedict was contracted by the Office of War Information in June 1944 to do a study for military staff planners and decision makers "in answering a multitude of questions about our enemy, Japan."[1] Published after the war, her classic work *The Chrysanthemum and the Sword: Patterns of Japanese Culture* began with this observation: "The Japanese were the most alien enemy the United States had ever fought in an all–out struggle. In no other war with a major foe had it been necessary to take into account such exceedingly different habits of acting and thinking."[2] In the transition to peace, the Japanese were expected to become as formidable and difficult an enemy as they had been in war.

In August 1945, the Allies finally attained military victory. Emperor of Japan Hirohito, in an unprecedented radio broadcast, spoke directly to his people and prepared them to accept the surrender terms. On 2 September 1945, on the battleship USS *Missouri* anchored in Tokyo Bay, the unconditional surrender was signed after years of bloody and often desperate combat.

On 15 August 1945, President Harry S. Truman appointed MacArthur as Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers. The first Americans—engineers and signaleers—landed on 28 August at Atsugi, a former kamikaze air base 30 miles from Tokyo. After 4,000 combat troops from the 11th Airborne Division arrived to provide security, MacArthur landed in his unarmed B–54, *Bataan*, on 30 August 1945. Winston Churchill said, "Of all the amazing deeds of bravery in the war, I regard MacArthur's landing at Atsugi as the greatest of them all."[3] This series of events began a predominantly US effort that "set out with aplomb, breathtaking in its audacity, to reform their former enemies, to destroy not only their means but their will to make war."[4]

US forces quickly changed their main effort and focus from defeating this "most alien enemy" we had ever faced on the battlefield, to demobilizing and demilitarizing the Imperial Japanese Army and Navy and fundamentally transforming every aspect of the warrior class, including Japanese society. Truman, amid significant political turmoil and disagreement at home and with the Allies, selected MacArthur to command the occupation of Japan and gave him unprecedented authority and responsibility. "The authority of the Emperor and the Japanese government will be subject to the supreme commander, who will possess all powers necessary to effectuate the surrender terms and to carry out the policies established for the conduct of the occupation and control of Japan."[5] Japan had a new "emperor."

War in Korea, Presidio Press

US military police stand guard as Japanese soldiers carry rifles, machineguns and swords to a collection point in Yokohama, 8 September 1945.

Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers
Douglas MacArthur speaking to reporters at
Atsugi air base, 30 August 1945.

Not only did MacArthur have complete authority over the postwar Japanese leadership, but Truman had dictated to the Allies that, "in the event of differences of opinion among them, the policies of the United States will govern."[6] Finally, in terms of strategic command and control guidance, MacArthur was directed that, "in view of the present character of the Japanese society and the desire of the United States to attain its objectives with the minimum commitment of forces and resources, the supreme commander will exercise his authority through Japanese government machinery and agencies, including the Emperor, to the extent that this satisfactorily furthers US objectives."[7]

Hundreds of thousands of US and other Allied soldiers, sailors, airmen and marines were in the theater and moving to the area to support the planned invasion of Kyushu (Operation *Olympic*) and Honshu (Operation *Coronet*). The forces and resources MacArthur needed to conduct the occupation (Operation *Blacklist*) were being quickly reduced as a war–weary America and its Allies called for the earliest possible return of their sons and daughters now that World War II was officially over. The early surrender precipitated by dropping atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki was certainly welcomed, but the detailed planning and execution of the occupation were necessarily hurried. The occupation force's missions and tasks were immense and extremely complex, fraught with political pitfalls that were significantly different from those required to fight and win the Pacific war. MacArthur, his staff and military units from all the services rapidly moved to carry out the surrender terms and transition to a peacetime occupation.

In *MacArthur: 1941–51*, written by MacArthur's intelligence officer, Major General Charles A. Willoughby, the occupation is divided into two phases. The first–phase missions concentrated on security and demilitarization operations. These activities were followed by second–phase missions calling for massive changes in Japan's governmental, economic and social structures. US Army and Marine Corps units, under US Sixth Army command, moved to occupy the home islands—Hokkaido, Honshu, Kyushu and Shikoku. They confronted a devastated infrastructure—industries, businesses and living quarters—caused by the strategic bombing campaign and massive human tragedy that included dislocation, suffering and looming starvation.

Besides the Japanese people, there were US and Allied prisoners of war and civilian internees by the thousands to be located, identified, cared for and transported. This humanitarian disaster was difficult to ignore as the various military headquarters and units went about the primary task of demobilizing and demilitarizing a still–significant Japanese military capability. The two phases began to blur very early in the occupation.

Japan's population at war's end was more than 70 million. More than 7 million Japanese military and civilian personnel surrendered on the home islands and throughout the Asia and Pacific theaters. In addition, there were more than a million Korean and Chinese workers to be repatriated.[8] While the Japanese military and civilian bureaucracies conducted most of the repatriation and resettlement efforts into the late 1940s, initially the US Navy provided significant support. Army and Marine units concentrated on demilitarization—demobilizing home island units and destroying war machinery and industry. "Under Allied supervision, thousands of aircraft were sprayed with gasoline and burned. Tanks were dynamited, poison gas carefully destroyed, ammunition detonated or burned or taken out to sea and dumped."[9]

One very controversial occupation aspect was that the United States and its Allies ran the International Tribunal of the Far East. Because of the tribunal's war crime trials, hundreds of Japanese officers were found guilty and executed, and thousands were imprisoned. A related occupation policy was identifying more than 200,000 Japanese military officers, businessmen and government officials, who subsequently were denied the right to hold postwar public office in Japan.

For the most part, the political bureaucracy conducting day-to-day routine government business remained intact, was generally exempted from this "purge" and remained a cohesive, capable administrative organization.

On the policy side, MacArthur and the US military took the lead in formulating policy and defining its role in enforcing mandated reparations, demilitarizing, "democratizing" and reforming Japan's military, political, economic and social structures. This included promulgating a new constitution in which Japan's government was restructured and in which Japan also "forever renounced the use of war as an instrument of national sovereignty."[10] The military staff and units undertaking this great rebuilding and reforming enterprise were predominantly from the US Army.

The US military planned to demobilize 9 million American troops between June 1945 and June 1946.[11] Of the more than 40 Army and Marine divisions in-theater or in various stages of deployment for the assault on Japan's home islands, many were involved in the initial occupation. However, only one army (US Eighth Army), two corps (I and IX corps) and four divisions (1st and 7th Cavalry and 24th and 25th Infantry) were left in Japan by June 1946. The 29th Infantry Brigade was on Okinawa.[12]

This drawdown was a sign of how well the occupation was going and how rapidly US military forces demobilized after the war. The US Eighth Army is still in the Korean theater today, and all four occupation force divisions played a role in Korea after June 1950, when North Korean forces crossed the 38th parallel into the Republic of Korea.

Each division was given a geographic sector and set up headquarters and subsectors to oversee local Japanese government and agency administration of the occupation policies. The troops' primary duties were to act as military police and supervise reform and humanitarian assistance activities. Units were spread throughout the islands and began to lose divisional and regimental integrity.

"Late in 1946, the wives and children of the officers and [noncommissioned officers] began to arrive in Japan, and life in the 'colonial army' took on traditional form. The social routine that developed was similar in every way to patterns in the Philip-

pines and China before World War II."[13] While the occupation of Japan was going exceedingly well, the units' combat skills were eroding, training was taking place only at battalion level and below, if that, and unit strengths and equipment levels continued in a downward trend. This would be a major factor in the Korean War's initial stages. T.R. Fehrenbach's book *This Kind of War: A Study in Unpreparedness* and Roy K. Flint's chapter on Task Force *Smith* in *America's First Battles: 1776–1965*, are classic case studies of the military consequences of the occupation policies and failure to maintain the combat readiness of units.

However, focusing only on Korean War problems does a disservice to the great success of the US military occupation effort in Japan. Kenneth Pyle, in *The Making of Modern Japan*, argues there were two fundamental beliefs serving as the basis for planning occupation policy: a faith in the universality of American values and institutions and a belief that democratic societies are not militaristic.[14] With these beliefs as a foundation and a receptive Japanese people, significant and lasting positive changes were made in a very short period. This does not imply that US policies and MacArthur's actions in Japan during this period do not have their critics.

Michael Schaller, in *The American Occupation of Japan: Origins of the Cold War*, argues that while the "legacy of the occupation seems one of progress, prosperity, peace and democracy," it prevented a clear appreciation of and altered America's thinking of what was right and what was possible in the rest of Asia.[15] This led, at least in part, to the loss of China, the stalemate in Korea and defeat in Vietnam. This is obviously much clearer in hindsight and is still much argued and debated. Today, it is widely accepted that an economically vigorous, democratic, friendly Japan contributing significantly to the economic costs of forward basing US forces in the Pacific is a critical element of US security policy in Asia.

Despite the controversy over the legacy of occupation policy and actions, changes in Japan's interpretation and implementation of Article 9 of MacArthur's "Peace Constitution" and the continuing debate over trade issues with the United States, Japan is a stable, democratic nation that has led

Asia's economic boom. For more than 50 years, Japan has not threatened any of its neighbors with military force and has begun to play an important military role in UN peacekeeping activities worldwide. Japan has become a key ally, critical to our national security in this most dynamic world region. The foundation for this important and enduring relationship is firmly rooted in US military efforts during the occupation.

This statement from the *1995 National Military Strategy* captures the military's operational success in Japan after World War II: "In Northeast Asia our bilateral security relationship with Japan remains fundamental to US security. Our forces in Japan are a visible demonstration of our commitment to the peace and stability of the entire region and are available for short notice for deployment throughout the theater."[16] *MR*

NOTES

1. Ruth Benedict, *The Chrysanthemum and the Sword: Patterns of Japanese Culture* (Rutland, VT: Charles Tuttle & Co., 1985), 4.
2. Ibid., 1.
3. Charles A. Willoughby and John Chamberlain, *MacArthur: 1941–51* (New York: McGraw-Hill & Co., 1954), 295.
4. John Curtis Perry, *Beneath the Eagles Wings: Americans in Occupied Japan* (New York: Dodd, Mead & Co., 1980), ix.
5. Edwin A. Martin, *The Allied Occupation of Japan* (New York: Stratford Press, 1948), 3.
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7. Ibid., 4.
8. Walt Seldon, *The Honorable Conquerors: The Occupation of Japan, 1945–1952* (New York: Macmillan Publishing Co., Inc., 1965), 41.
9. Perry, 93.
10. Kenneth B. Pyle, *The Making of Modern Japan*, 2d ed. (Lexington, MA: D.C. Heath & Co., Inc., 1996), 220.
11. James Jones, *WWII* (New York: Ballantine Books, Inc., 1975), 255.
12. Charles E. Heller and William A. Stofft, *America's First Battles, 1776–1965* (Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 1986), 269.
13. Ibid., 271.
14. Pyle, 214.
15. Michael Schaller, *The American Occupation of Japan: Origins of the Cold War in Asia* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1985), viii.
16. *A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement* (Washington, DC: The White House, February 1995).

Lieutenant Colonel Joseph G.D. Babb, US Army, Retired, is an instructor and author in the Military Operations Other Than War Division, Department of Joint and Combined Operations (DJCO), US Army Command and General Staff College (USACGSC), Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. He received a B.A. from Bowdoin College and an M.P.A. from Clark University and is a USACGSC graduate. He has served in a variety of staff positions in the Continental United States and Hawaii, to include China ground forces analyst, Defense Investigative Agency (DIA), Washington, D.C.; DIA liaison officer, National Military Command Center, and senior China analyst, Pacific Command; deputy director, Current Intelligence, Camp H.M. Smith, Hawaii; Northeast Asia desk officer, Office of Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations, Fort Shafter, Hawaii; and chief, Strategic Studies Division, DJCO.

MRInsights

Operational Doctrine and the Environment
Charles E. Notar

During the Gulf War, US Central Command (CENTCOM) was alerted on 2 February 1991 that the oil wells and storage tanks at the Al Wafra field in southern Kuwait were burning. On 3 February 1991, CENTCOM received news that the spigots on Kuwait's main supertanker loading pier at Sea Island terminal had been opened, resulting in a 16–kilometer band of crude oil headed for the Saudi Arabian desalination plants.

Another significant impact on the environment during Gulf War mobilization, deployment and combat operations was the 11,000 depleted uranium (DU) rounds fired by US forces. Because of the armor–piercing capability of the rounds, US forces had used these more lethal DU kinetic energy penetrators. As a result, traceable radioactive, heavy metal residue was introduced to an already heavily cluttered battlefield. These Gulf War incidents led then Brigadier General Morris J. Boyd, deputy chief of staff for Doctrine, US Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC), to staff a White Paper on environmental considerations.[1]

A year after the Gulf War, after a tour with the Environmental Protection Agency, Captain Mark Peterson came to the US Army Chemical School (USACMLS) to integrate environmental considerations into USACMLS training. As the instructional systems designer for developing USACMLS training, I was writing policies for instituting environmental awareness training, hazardous communication and safety risk assessment. Peterson and I were then assigned as representatives to the TRADOC environmental working group, an extension of the TRADOC Environmental Steering Committee responsible for training the Army on environmental considerations.

In USACMLS discussions on how to integrate environmental considerations into operational planning, it was felt that blowing up oil wells and opening pipelines during the Gulf War was using the "environment as a weapon." USACMLS saw the environment as a weapon concept as an issue worth exploring. Further analysis changed the original idea into one of how to deal with the environment within the Army planning process. The environmental considerations are hazardous materials and waste; wetland protection; archaeological and historic site protection; threatened and endangered species protection; and water, air and noise pollution prevention. The USACMLS command group determined that the intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB) process was the best place to start.

The USACMLS asked the TRADOC environmental working group to explore the issue from a "doctrinal integration" standpoint. The TRADOC agency tasked with providing environmental operational mission doctrine and training for Army soldiers and units is the US Army Engineer School (USAES). USAES was asked to present the idea to the TRADOC Environmental Steering Committee.

The committee, in turn, contracted retired Army Colonel Joseph C. Conrad to develop a White Paper. Conrad, who is an environmental science and engineering expert, began working with Major Dave Neeley, chief of the Leadership and Environmental Division, USAES, and me to provide the concepts and developmental guidance.

Titled "Environmental Considerations in Army Operational Doctrine," the White Paper was presented to the Army on 10 May 1995. It presents a strong, cogent case for the inclusion and integration of environmental considerations into doctrinal manuals. The paper focuses on "US Army Environmental Strategy into the 21st Century" and how the Army should integrate this strategy into its warfighting doctrine.

The White Paper had two objectives. The first was to convince the Army to decide whether environmental considerations, as presently taught in training and addressed in 21st–century environmental strategy statements, should apply during Army operations in war and operations other than war (OOTW). The second objective was to decide in which CAPSTONE doctrinal manuals the Army should integrate environmental considerations and to what extent. The second objective required guidance for each environmental collateral damage consideration across the operational spectrum with a focus on mission accomplishment and force projection.

With its extensive background on strategic, legal, operational and moral issues, the White Paper provides insight on the increased importance of environmental considerations in military operations. Strategic issues address the shift from a bipolar to multipolar war; the explosive population growth; and how these factors have altered the basic assumptions of strategic analyses serving us for the last 50 years. Conrad reviews the law of land warfare, internationally and domestically, through the acquisition of new environmental conventions and customs. OOTW has required operational commanders to pay attention to postconflict environmental outcomes. Conrad discusses the need to develop additional intelligence and operational capabilities and specific environmental procedures to match mission categories. He explains that our concept of morality in relationship to future generations, with the recognition that the earth's natural resources are exhaustible, has become an ethical issue.

TRADOC Pamphlet 525–5, *Force XXI Operations*, provides the concept for Army operations in the 21st century.[2] It uses terms such as *environmental risk* and *environmental operations*. Since this pamphlet serves as a precursor of new doctrine, the Army inevitably will include environmental considerations in its other CAPSTONE manuals: US Army Field Manual (FM) 100–5, *Operations*; FM 100–1, *The Army*; FM 22–100, *Military*

Leadership; FM 25–11, *Training the Force*; FM 25–101, *Battle Focused Training*; FM 100–10, *Combat Service Support*; and FM 101–5, *Staff Organization and Operations*.

If the Army incorporates environmental considerations into these manuals, there will be a domino effect as the proponent schools integrate environmental considerations into their manuals as well. Furthermore, environmental considerations must also be integrated into tactics, techniques and procedures manuals.

FM 100–5 does address the environment. However, it relates environment to mission, enemy, troops, terrain and weather and time available in a "combat environment." Conversely, environment as used in the White Paper broadens the definition to "the human ecosystem on earth and encompasses the physical and biological systems providing the resources necessary to sustain productive human life: clean air and water, healthy surroundings and sufficient food." The White Paper's incorporation of the environmental considerations into operational doctrine would require the US Armed Forces to protect our global environment and commanders to consider those mitigating factors for the sake of future generations.

Conrad associates these issues with the Gulf War to show where environmental doctrinal inclusion would have been appropriate. In reading the White Paper, one can see where events in Somalia, Sub–Saharan Africa and Haiti strengthen the argument that the Gulf War environmental lessons learned are not isolated instances.

The Army presently accepts environmental protection in peacetime and training. The present regulations and publications include:

● US Army Regulation (AR) 200–1, *Environmental Protection and Enhancement*.

● AR 220–2, *Environmental Awareness*.

● *Army's Environmental Strategy into the 21st Century*.

● *Commander's Guide to Environmental Management*.

● Training Circular 5–400, *Unit Leader's Handbook for Environmental Stewardship*.

These publications exhibit peacetime applications. However, the environmental pieces already in place must move from a peacetime sensibility to an operational consciousness

through doctrine, and Army leaders must provide environmental guidance and direction to help this movement.

"The Army has effectively isolated environmental issues, expertise and programs in the 'installation' stovepipe. The new physical realities—all these exponential curves—now provide imperative reasons for the Army to incorporate environmental values and expertise into its core doctrine."[3] These incorporated environmental issues should address the following:

● *Where to plan*—in the IPB or the operations plan annex.

● *How to plan*—with decision-making assistance on environmental considerations. This must include how to plan for hazardous waste generation and how to use assigned matrix organization personnel.

● *Weight of factor*—the relative weight of environmental collateral damage allowable in each consideration across the operational spectrum with a focus on mission accomplishment and force protection.

Our 21st–century force–projection Army will have additional impact on environmental planning that our past static, pre–positioned forces have already facilitated. When environmental considerations are incorporated into the commander's intent, rules of engagement (ROE) or as part of the expected end state, commanders must weigh environmental considerations within the operational mission context. New missions, similar to Operation *Uphold Democracy* in Haiti, will probably include an operations order paragraph or addendum, based on the end state or ROE, placing environmental requirements on the executing forces.

Integrating environmental strategy into current and future doctrine will affect strategic, operational and tactical thinking. The Army must provide environmental decision–making guidance as it moves into and through joint, combined, multinational, interagency and UN operations. Senior leadership must have an international perspective, not just a North American perspective. It must provide specific guidance for commanders to consider during the operational planning process to best fulfill Army requirements.

Army Focus 1992 states, "Training is not a cost, but an investment in readiness and our national security."[4] If we use the same logic, environmen-

tal protection is also an investment in readiness and our national security. The White Paper shows that incorporating environmental considerations into Army doctrine will make Army operations less costly in the future. In fact, environmental law violations might result in criminal penalties for the violators. Additionally, federal, state and local agencies could fine Army units for violations, with payment coming from their operational budgets. The bottom line is that environmental considerations could become a readiness issue.

If the Army proclaims itself the environmental steward for future environmental strategy, it cannot view the environment as a training constraint. Instead, the Army must view the environment as a condition to be met. Once the Army incorporates environmental considerations into doctrine, leaders will gradually accept this condition.

The White Paper attempts to show and translate 21st–century strategy into doctrine, providing examples of where the Army should go in doctrinal publications. It includes several decision models that provide perspective on how to use the decision–making process for environmental considerations in planning operations. Figure 1 depicts the potential integration of environmental considerations into operations. FM 100–5 and other doctrinal manuals must plan for the environment and give guidance on its weight.

The Army has already developed and integrated risk management into everything it does—most recently in the realm of safety—to decrease risk and mitigating circumstances. Risk management is a thought process. Figure 1 also shows the need for a risk management concept to help leaders implement and develop planning weights for Army training and opera-


Figure 1. Relative Levels of Concern.

Peacetime ◄ **Military Operations Continuum** ► **War**

▨	Hazardous materials and waste
▨	Water pollution
▨	Air pollution
▨	Archaeological and historic sites
▨	Threatened endangered species
▨	Wetland protection
▨	Noise pollution

High Probability

Area of Responsibility Lethality

Low Probability

Figure 2. Environmental Considerations.

tions. The White Paper explains the need for the concept and recommends that the requisite research be conducted.

Field, tactical and operational commanders and those at major commands who have reviewed the White Paper agree a need exists for environmental doctrinal guidance. A follow-on White Paper is being prepared to provide this guidance and should be released soon. Figure 2 builds on Figure 1 and serves as a starting point for developing this guidance. It also simplifies the decision matrix type the Army needs. Environmental considerations do not necessarily depend on a type of action or operation being conducted on the continuum. However, relationships do exist, and the Army must consider them when planning operations and developing end state and ROE.

Figure 2 shows the environmental considerations in priority of importance as missions move across the operations continuum. For example, in nation assistance, all considerations are important. In war, noise pollution receives little or no consideration. However, hazardous materials and hazardous waste are still considered in planning and execution. The Army should "flesh out" the concept, in the same way it developed the risk management program, to assist in planning to reduce the risks assigned the various environmental considerations.

The only way to communicate that the environment is a consideration in operational planning is through doctrine. The impact of environmental concerns on current national and in-

ternational structures and relations is profound.

Retired Rear Admiral James A. Winnefeld and Mary E. Morris state that "The environment in conflict-prone regions needs as much (we would argue more) attention as human rights. The two are joined, but environmental degradation can be irreversible. . . . Environmental preservation needs also to be seen as a security issue in policy and strategy formulation."[5]

Using the word *irreversible* makes the point for why environmental considerations are important. The environment as a *security issue* demands its inclusion into the CAPSTONE manuals mentioned earlier. Incorporating environmental considerations into these CAPSTONE manuals will result in proponent doctrinal development and integration into planning and strategy.

The Army has done environmental protection activities for years. If the Army holds warfighters accountable for the environment, then the Army must provide the common basis for communicating, organizing, setting priorities and synchronizing opera-

tions while considering the environment. The Army must write these activities with environmental considerations into its doctrine. **MR**

NOTES

1. White Paper, "Environmental Considerations in Army Operational Doctrine" (Fort Leonard Wood, MO: US Army Engineer School, January 1995).
2. US Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) Pamphlet 525–5, *Force XXI Operations* (Fort Monroe, VA: TRADOC, 1 August 1994).
3. White Paper, 18. This quote is from footnote 36, Department of the Army, *US Army Environmental Strategy into the 21st Century* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1992).
4. Department of the Army, *Army Focus 1992: The Army in Transformation* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office).
5. Retired RADM James A. Winnefeld and Mary E. Morris, "Where Environmental Concerns and Security Strategies Meet: Green Conflict in the Middle East" (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1994), 28, B–11, footnote 46.

Charles E. Notar is chief, Staff and Faculty Development Division, Office of the Secretary, US Army Military Police School (USAMPS), Fort McClellan, Alabama. He received a B.S. from Pennsylvania State University, an M.A. from Memphis State University and an Ed.D. from Memphis State University. His past positions include chief, Design Division, Directorate of Integrated Training, and deputy director, Directorate of Training and Doctrine, USAMPS; and chief of design, Directorate of Training and Doctrine, and chief, Staff and Faculty Division, Directorate of Training and Doctrine, US Army Chemical School, Fort McClellan, Alabama.

From My Bookshelf

Russell W. Ramsey
Latin American Military Affairs

"During the Cold War, military professionals had difficulty finding accurate geostrategic Latin America reference works. Since the late 1830s, diplomats and military analysts have often relied on the British *Statesman's Yearbook*, a unique but sometimes inaccurate reference tool for Latin Americanists. Now, with democratization and privatization occupying national security and military analysts' attention, there is a fine new crop of reference literature available."

South America, Central America and the Caribbean: 1995. This 5th edition of Europa Publications' *Regional Surveys of the World* series is the most comprehensive work of its kind ever done because it relates public and private data from all sectors to national security issues. The directory includes specific information on companies, government agencies and security forces for immediate use by professionals.

"The Caribbean and Latin America" by John Chipman in *The Military Balance, 1994–1995.* The International Institute of Strategic Studies produces this famous series known colloquially as "Brassey's Annuals." The annual *Military Balance* provides analysis on Latin America's greatly reduced and rapidly changing military institutions. For descriptive information on Latin America's military forces, Chipman's article in the 1995 edition is the best. Developed at the London International Institute of Strategic Studies, it contains both threat descriptions and force analysis.

***Latin America 1995* by Pierre Etienne Dostert.** This is the best one–volume regional description in the English language because of its balance, scope and inclusion of strategic issues. The earlier annual issues still read with authenticity since their 1967 origin. Part of Stryker–Post's unique *The World Today* series on the world's regions, this Latin America volume integrates economic, political and military trends and gives a menu for deeper reading.

"The Caribbean," "Central America" and "South America" by Claude C. Sturgill in *The Military History of the Third World Since 1945: A Reference Guide.* Sturgill's three Latin America chapters in this book are the best work available on US security assistance linkage with the region's military institutions. This is especially true because US security assistance programs to Latin America averaged 2 percent across the Cold War era, yet these programs are regularly villainized by leftist writers as the cause of regional lapses in military professionalism. Sturgill's book restores the balance and objectivity.

The Jaguar Series, Scholarly Resources Press. This series, edited by William H. Beezley and Colin M. MacLachlan, offers a strong entry to Latin American studies. Two excellent series entries are:

- ***Rank and Privilege: The Military and Society in Latin America.* Edited by Linda Alexander Rodriguez.** These essays fill the vacuum on the answers to such questions as how the great *caudillos* (strongmen) gave way to professional military officers in the 20th century and where the Latin American military officer's cultural ethos came from. The annotated bibliography is the best short piece of its kind in print. The book's introduction should be standard reading for Latin America regional students.
- ***Money Doctors, Foreign Debts and Economic Reforms in Latin America from the 1890s***

Letters

does not want to be bothered, can Nash explain why? I believe I can. Sajer is probably enjoying his book's massive reprintings as a "true" account. Novels do not normally get this type of attention. Why then would he want to come forward and declare it a fictional account? He would not, if he wanted to keep the royalties coming. Sajer is being pragmatic. I would do the same. Besides, what harm can it do?

I prefer to think educated, professional officers do not use fiction as fact. This problem is encountered occasionally at the US Army Command and General Staff College when students cite fictional works such as Michael Shaara's *Killer Angels* to support nonfiction assertions. *Killer Angels* does not pretend to be true, but some officers must not read the cover—"unique, sweeping, unforgettable—a dramatic re–creation of the battleground for America's destiny."

Yes, I agree with Nash that *The Forgotten Soldier* is still one of the "finest and most realistic" accounts of Eastern Front combat. Like *All Quiet On the Western Front*, it is good enough to belong on my bookshelf, but I do not use either book as a nonfiction research reference.

I would encourage Nash to contact and present his case to Spaeter and the *Grossdeutschland Verband*. Spaeter, a Knight's Cross awardee and *Grossdeutschland* wartime veteran, served from company to corps level. His service, unlike Sajer's, can be verified, and he has written five books about it under his, not an assumed, name.

The *Grossdeutschland* veterans would probably love having the famous author–veteran Sajer as a member of their association, especially one who has written about their unit. However, Sajer may want to consider having the book first printed in German, unless, of course, he does not want the real *Grossdeutschland* veterans to write him as well.

LTC Edwin L. Kennedy, *USA, Combat Studies Institute, USACGSC*

to the Present. **Edited by Paul W. Drake.** This Jaguar Series offering is a strong volume on the economic dimensions of emerging regional security. It shows how economic investment in the recent past often produced runaway deficit, destabilization and few new jobs. The mistakes are carefully analyzed.

● **Democracy in Latin America: Patterns and Cycles. Edited by Roderic A. Camp.** Here is the Jaguar Series 1996 offering on emerging democratic systems. While the military chapter is somewhat dated, the cultural–economic linkage is blue chip. Professor Camp is an expert on Mexican military forces.

The North–South Center Series, University of Miami, under the leadership of Ambler H. Moss Jr. The center has no single name for its recent books on security and economic issues in Latin America, but several of its recently edited titles form a topical series of great merit:

● **Security, Democracy and Development in U.S.–Latin American Relations. Edited by Lars Schoultz, William C. Smith and Augusto Varas.** This book, the outcome of a 1993 North–South Center symposium, opens the door to a discussion long blocked by competing ideology among scholars. It examines Western Hemisphere defense in an era of booming democracy, developing neoliberal economics and urgent social needs.

● **Latin American Political Economy in the Age of Neoliberal Reform: Theoretical and Comparative Perspectives for the 1900s. Edited by William C. Smith, Carlos Acuna and Eduardo Gamarra.** This is an excellent North–South Center entry in the economics of national security field. Unlike the Drake volume, it concentrates on current processes and offers thoughtful policy recommendations.

● **Drug Trafficking in the Americas. Edited by Bruce M. Bagley and William O. Walker III.** This 1994 volume on a persistent and melancholy topic is comprehensive. However, constant criticism of "US policy that militarizes the drug war" is unbalanced and partially dated in 1996.

"Hopeful Neo–liberals, Derailed Collectivists: Emerging Paradigms on Latin America" by Russell W. Ramsey in *Comparative Strategy, an International Journal.* This is my January 1996 effort to organize the emerging literature ideologically. Military professionals can do better work on Latin America now than in the past because the reference literature and the interpretations about military–related events are less polemical, more variegated and more factual.

Cuba and the Latin American Radical Left

"Any discussion of US–Latin American relations and the Cold War must revolve heavily around Cuba and Fidel Castro. Thanks to a spate of excellent new books, military readers at the operational level can now address this topic factually and objectively. Latin America produced only one solid and enduring Marxist–Leninist regime during the Cold War—Cuba. The books reviewed here suggest strongly that Castro's personal leadership, coupled with anti–US emotions arising from the conspicuous abuse of Cuban moral sensibilities, had more influence during the Cold War in Latin America than Karl Marx."

Contesting Castro: The United States and the Triumph of the Cuban Revolution by Thomas G. Paterson. This exciting plunge into stormy Caribbean waters is Paterson's 1994 masterpiece. He believes the United States liberated Cuba from Spain, only to reconquer it as the offshore haven for the vices that North American cities would not allow before the 1960s. He describes US national security response to this backyard challenge, one that national leaders could not fit into the paradigm of deterrence and containment against Soviet Communism, evoking memories of a Three Stooges film. Paterson also provokes thought on how Castro's small organization seized control of a large, pluralistic revolution.

Eyeball to Eyeball: The Inside Story of the Cuban Missile Crisis by Dino A. Brugioni. In early 1960, Castro steered his way into the Soviet Union's military orbit. The bungled Bay of Pigs 1961 landing strengthened his claim that a future US attack was likely. In early 1962, Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev authorized the clandestine placement of strategic nuclear armed missiles in Cuba. Brugioni, a senior technical analyst with the Central Intelligence Agency, reveals the process. His account of the US national security apparatus at work throughout the crisis is mandatory reading.

Operation ANADYR: U.S. and Soviet Generals Recount the Cuban Missile Crisis by General Anatoli I. Gribkov and General William Y. Smith. The Soviet clandestine operation is revealed in great detail by its military commander, Gribkov. He tells how he and his colleagues thought Castro to be truly an idealistic champion of the oppressed. Smith, then a Joint Chiefs of Staff desk officer, gives the Pentagon's side of the Cuban Missile Crisis. Seldom will military readers find such a pair of windows into an event so critical.

Castro: A Biography by Robert E. Quirk. How did the son of a multimillionaire, immigrant Spaniard to Cuba emerge as a global Don Quixote for the poor? Jules Dubois (1959), Manuel Urrutia Lleo (1964), Herbert L. Matthews (1969), Ernest Halperin (1972), Carlos Franqui (1984) and Tad Sculz (1986) are some better known Castro biographers. In the apparent twilight of Castro's reign comes Quirk's 1993 book, which eclipses all others in coverage, objectivity and insights.

Soviet–Cuban Alliance: 1959–1991, by Yuri Pavlov. A Soviet view of Castro's Cold War role now surfaces in this 1994 book. Ambassador Pavlov served the former Soviet Union as a senior diplomat in Cuba, Costa Rica and Chile. He played a key role within the Soviet Foreign Ministry during the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis. Like Gribkov, he genuinely believed Castro was implementing a new and authentic form of socialism in Cuba and abroad. However, he also believed Castro became a "communist of convenience" in 1960 to bolster his regime against a possible US invasion.

Cuba and the Future. Edited by Donald E. Schulz. As the Cuban Revolution ages on the vine, sincere questions arise. Is Castro a Cold War dinosaur? Is the Cuban Revolution a

model of some validity, at least for other countries? The papers published in 1994 in Schulz's slim book are the outcome of a January 1992 symposium at the Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College. "The Cuban Armed Forces in Transition," an essay by Phyllis Greene Walker, is a gem in military force analysis. The book also includes Schulz's own essay on recommended US policy toward Cuba.

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Chronicle of Higher Education: An Essay by Robert B. Toplin. Much of Castro's support has always come from the US academic community. Professor Stanley J. Stein

of Princeton University challenged the Conference on Latin American History in his December 1960 speech to recognize that "evolutionary methods" and "parliamentary government" would not work for Latin America (*Hispanic–American Historical Review*, August 1961). This reality finally made academic print when Professor Toplin lamented it in his 30 March 1994 essay "Many Latin Americanists Continue to Wear Ideological Blinders."

Modern Latin American Revolutions by Eric Selbin. The trend of the radical left is to be a part of the newly democratizing and privatizing political and economic mainstream that is the 1990s' Latin America. However, not all agree. In Selbin's 1993 book, socialist revolutions in Latin America are valid and necessary. Selbin concludes that the Nicaraguan Sandinistas won their struggle, despite their loss in the 1990 election, and that the Peru and El Salvador leftists may yet prevail in some form as well.

Guerrillas and Revolution in Latin America by Timothy P. Wickham–Crowley. In his 1992 book, Wickham–Crowley concludes that only the 1959 Cuban and the 1979 Sandinista revolutions in Nica-

ragua ever achieved legitimacy. He meticulously examines the armed leftist struggles within Latin America during the Cold War. He also shows how erroneous US support for *mafioso* regimes was the real cause of communist victory in Cuba and Nicaragua. He argues convincingly that such leftist efforts as Che Guevara's 1967 operation in Bolivia were idiosyncratic, not comprehensive, in public support. *MR*

Russell W. Ramsey is the distinguished resident professor, US Army School of the Americas, Fort Benning, Georgia, and lectures in Spanish on strategy at the Inter–American Defense College, Fort McNair, Washington, D.C. He received a B.S. from the US Military Academy, an M.A. from the University of Southern Mississippi and a Ph.D. from the University of Florida. He has served in a variety of military positions in Southeast Asia, Panama and the Continental United States, to include commander, parachute infantry company, 1st Air Cavalry Division, Vietnam; counterinsurgency instructor, School of the Americas, Panama; mobilization designation Reservist desk officer, Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, J5, Strategy–Western Hemisphere. He is the author of Soldiers and Guerrillas, *a history of modern rural violence in Colombia, and wrote the first counterinsurgency course curriculum for the School of the Americas when it was located in Panama.*

^M_R Book Reviews

SAVAGE PEACE: Americans at War in the 1990s by Daniel Bolger. 368 pages. Presidio Press, Novato, CA. 1995. $24.95.

Military professionals and policy makers should read this book. As the title implies, Bolger examines the dilemma resulting when military forces are used in peace–related operations in an existing hostile environment. Bolger focuses on US operations occurring under either UN auspices or international agreement.

Within a discussion that examines the core question of what constitutes war, Bolger makes the case that Americans are going to become targets of the world's "have nots." As the sole remaining superpower, the United States will be involved worldwide for reasons of national interest and humanitarian character in places where ethnic, religious, economic and political conflicts are raging. Despite the best US intentions, Americans will eventu-

ally become targets. This reality, Bolger asserts, means military force deployment in "peace operations" is inherently fraught with danger.

Despite military operational labels such as police action, low–intensity conflict, peacekeeping, peace enforce-

ment or operations other than war, Bolger's central premise is that these operations are war. He asserts that the rules and considerations which must be adhered to in war can be ignored in so–called nonwar situations only at great risk. However, his argument is more than the cliché that "if you are killed in a peace operation, you are just as dead."

Bolger contends that commanders and policy makers must understand that military force deployment, especially of US force, even for something as altruistic as keeping peace, inherently contains the seeds of combat. Not being prepared to fight weakens the military's short–term effectiveness and dooms the policy it supports to eventual failure.

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The author supports his thesis with detailed explanations of US involvement in everything from the demilitarized zone in Korea to the initial

policy forays and troop deployments into Bosnia. He shows what works and what fails in this netherworld of military operations that are not exactly war, but not exactly peace either. His accounts of the Lebanon and Somalia tragedies are particularly sobering.

Bolger describes how the Marine mission in Lebanon became untenable, leading to failure and tragedy because the Marine commander sought to make policy rather than act as an instrument of policy. The commander allowed the mission title to obscure his understanding of the changing environment and the need to focus on security and maintain a warfighting posture. By contrast, Operation *Provide Comfort* was a success because it was a feasible mission executed with a combat orientation within a cooperative joint and combined command climate. Bolger stresses that much of *Provide Comfort*'s success stemmed from the years of combined NATO exercises. The combined command structure in Lebanon and Somalia was either nonexistent or so superficial as to be ineffective.

This book is an excellent contemporary history on the subject of military operations supporting policy objectives in a nonwar environment. Bolger creates a primer of what happens when there is a policy and execution disconnect and the military is improperly used to fill the void. *Savage Peace* should be required reading in our service schools and, hopefully, at the National Security Council.

LTC Douglas D. Brisson, *USA, Department of Defense On–Site Inspection Agency, Washington, D.C.*

TRANSPORTATION AND LOGISTICS: One Man's Story by Jack C. Fuson. 227 pages. Center of Military History, Washington, DC. (Available from the Superintendent of Documents, US Government Printing Office, Washington, DC.) 1994. $18.00.

Ten years ago, there were few choices to read about military logistics. This is changing, partially because of the Center of Military History series started a few years back with Carter B. Magruder's *Recurring Logistical Problems As I Have Observed Them* and Joseph M. Heiser's *A Soldier Supporting Soldiers.* Lieutenant General Jack C. Fuson's *Transportation and Logistics* is the third series book and clearly the best.

Fuson retired in 1977 after a distinguished logistician military career,

which included three wars and serving as the US Army's deputy chief of staff for Logistics. He played a major role in this century's Army logistics evolution. His purpose in *Transportation and Logistics* is not self-glorification but, as he says, "to highlight several logistic problems which kept recurring during my thirty–five years of service in the United States Army."

These problems are: no one is in charge of the total logistic system for the Army; a lack of in–transit visibility continues to persist; many fail to understand concepts such as transportation management, traffic management and movement control; amphibious operation organization and doctrine remain insufficient; a continuing lack of emphasis on retrograde operations; and too few support personnel deploy during the initial stages of operations. Fuson discusses each with even more personal experience detail in his last chapter. He also appends a 1918 article by Major C.A. Bach, whose thoughts remain timeless and warrant careful reading by commanders.

There are interesting discussions of General Frank S. Besson's ideas and "experiments," specifically Besson's 1950s efforts to develop an aerial tramway for ship–to–shore logistic operations and to promote cargo containerization. Besson's tramway idea never developed a following, partially because bad weather ruined its demonstration. However, his containerization ideas contributed to a worldwide cargo handling revolution.

Senior leaders redesigning the Army to meet 21st–century requirements must read the portions discussing *Project 80*, the *Brown Board* and *Project Steadfast.* These studies, each coming to a different conclusion, focus on how best to organize the Army's logistic mission and training requirements. Fuson says the *Brown Study* is "the most thorough, comprehensive and detailed examination of the Army's logistic system ever made." The board "pointed out that the Army does not learn by reviewing history and the lessons it teaches, but continues to repeat the same mistakes," particularly when it comes to logistics. It proposed giving the Army's deputy chief of staff for Logistics authority to manage the logistic system and recommended how to do

it. Fuson encourages today's leaders to re–examine the *Brown Board* findings and recommendations, which are now 30 years old.

There is much to ponder in this small book, and those reading *Transportation and Logistics* will find the time well spent. While it is "one man's story," it is a very important one in some ways for finding the right future azimuth.

COL Kenneth L. Privratsky, *USA, Strategic Mobility Division, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics, Washington, D.C.*

MOBILIZING THE AIR NATIONAL GUARD FOR THE PERSIAN GULF WAR: Lessons and New Directions by James E. Lightfoot. 154 pages. Air University Press, Maxwell Air Force Base, AL. 1994. No charge.

James E. Lightfoot's book details the Air National Guard mobilization process for Operations *Desert Shield* and *Desert Storm.* While noting the Air National Guard's successful mission integration into the US Air Force structure, Lightfoot describes executive, managerial and unit–level mobilization shortcomings. He identifies Gulf War lessons learned and offers new direction to those involved in the mobilization process.

Important beginning background information is given on Air National Guard development and mobilization problems encountered during the Berlin Airlift and the Korean and Vietnam wars. This historical perspective is key to understanding *how* problems developed and *why.* Despite improvements over the years, major problems persist today. Lightfoot also explains how congressional and military regulation language legalities on

mobilization call–up were major Gulf War mobilization stumbling blocks.

Next, Lightfoot provides three unit case studies of successful war mobilization despite continuing mobilization process problems. The problems include a lack of system interoperability between Active and National Guard assets; communication equipment shortage; outdated equipment; and conflicting command and control authority, reference terms, regulations and reporting requirements. The case studies reflect significant improvement over the years to integrate Active and Reserve force packages.

Lightfoot says the struggle is only half over, and he identifies the leadership path to travel the rest of the way. His alternative direction is very important to the Active and Reserve planners at state and Department of Defense levels, specifically those involved in mobilization planning and execution. Current and future operations demand successful Active and Reserve force integration. This book will help leaders smoothly transition through the mobilization process.

LTC Becky H. Caprano, *USA,*
Strategic Mobility Division, Office of
the Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics,
Washington, D.C.

A FORGOTTEN OFFENSIVE:
Royal Air Force Coastal Command's
Anti–Shipping Campaign, 1940–1945,
by Christina J.M. Goulter. 366 pages. Frank Cass Publishers, London. 1995. $47.50.

The preponderance of World War II Royal Air Force (RAF) material deals with either the determination of Bomber Command's strategic offensive against Germany or Fighter Command's desperate defense during the Battle of Britain. Until recently, the RAF's only other home–based optional command—Coastal Command—has remained practically unnoticed by the world's historical community. Remedying this apparent lack of scholarship is Christina J.M. Goulter's *A Forgotten Offensive.*

Goulter's work focuses on only one of Coastal Command's many roles: its attempts to destroy enemy merchant and naval shipping in the North Sea. Competing against other RAF commands and the Fleet Air Arm for resources, Coastal Command provided aircraft for antisubmarine patrols and fleet reconnaissance, besides its antishipping campaign. Between 1940 and 1945, Coastal Command aircraft sank 366 vessels and damaged 134, accounting for more than 1 million tons of shipping. However, Goulter asserts, "The diversion of manpower and material to defend and maintain the German merchant fleet was, in fact, the most valuable contribution made by the antishipping campaign to the Allied war effort."

With excruciating detail and flawless research, Goulter examines practically every campaign aspect in this chronological study. She begins with a brief naval aviation history during World War I and the interwar periods, highlighting the difficult conditions and technological achievements of the early British maritime aviators. Goulter accounts for the Coastal Command's dismal first World War II antishipping strikes, describing many insurmountable challenges facing Britain's maritime aviators. These include a reliance on obsolete aircraft, inadequate doctrine and training, poor weather conditions, over–water navigational difficulties and faulty coordination with escort fighter units. A recurring theme is British aviation resources' concentration on the strategic bombing campaign to the maritime air operations' detriment. Goulter superbly covers the effects of intelligence, inter–RAF squabbles and morale on the campaign.

A Forgotten Offensive is the first detailed examination of this antishipping campaign. Highlighting the impact of intelligence, training, tactics and weapon systems on operations, Goulter describes Coastal Command's struggle against the Germans, the weather and the RAF's other operational commands. The study's value lies in its superior coverage of an institution competing for limited resources and its emphasis on the importance of economic warfare in World War II.

CPT John J. Abbatiello, *USAF,*
US Air Force Academy, Colorado

A CRISIS OF EXPECTATIONS:
UN Peacekeeping in the 1990s. Edited by Ramesh Thakur and Carlyle Thayer. 317 pages. Westview Press, Boulder, CO. 1995. $56.00.

In 1990, the UN managed 10,000 "blue helmet" forces in eight observation or traditional peacekeeping (PK) missions at a cost of $700 million. By 1993, the "explosion in peacekeeping" was fully realized in 18 UN PK operations that included 90,000 forces and cost $3.6 billion. Beyond the increasing numbers, UN peacekeeping also changed dramatically in breadth, depth and volume of operations. This was most clearly seen in the large, complex, dangerous and ambitious military undertakings in the former Yugoslavia and Somalia. These operations scarcely resembled the innocuous military or political traits of traditional UN peacekeeping.

Because of the operation failures apparent by 1995, UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros–Ghali recently retreated from his ambitious 1992 collective security plans. He gave an implicit disapproval of an expansive UN role in managing large, ambitious military operations. *A Crisis of Expectations* examines the issues during this critical period. It seeks to explain the traditional UN PK role, the UN experience in such operations' management, the post–Cold War plans to expand traditional PK concepts and the general failure of UN–managed operations that tried to mix enforcement provisions with traditional PK tenets.

The book is an edited volume and the principal contributors are from so–called middle nations traditionally concerned with UN PK practice. As such, there are some scary moments for US strategists who quite rightly see UN PK as a peripheral instrument to US national security strategy. For instance, one editor writes, "Progress toward a world order based on justice and law requires that US power be harnessed to UN authority." Thus, the book's intellectual direction is firmly grounded in an internationalism quite out of vogue in the United States.

Despite excellent contributions from PK scholars such as Mats Ber-

dal, Susan Lamb and Paul Diehl, the book's total impact is "much less than the sum of its parts." This is, in part, because of loose editing and a cobbled–together manuscript. For instance, the reader must endure at least a dozen introductions describing the "explosion in peacekeeping" dynamics. The 17 short chapters on different missions or PK facets should have gone straight to their subjects.

For the reader seeking a lightweight guide to the 1990s' UN peace operation dynamics, this book is handy to have. However, if one seeks a serious contribution to the debate, keep looking. Curiously enough, this "too–expensive" book is intellectually unchallenging and does not clearly address the fundamental questions of whether the UN as an institution is suited for today's military tasks.

John Hillen, *Heritage Foundation, Washington, D.C.*

HITLER'S GREATEST DEFEAT: The Collapse of Army Group Centre, June 1944, by Paul Adair. 192 pages. Sterling Publishing Co., Inc., New York. 1994. $25.00.

The summer 1944 destruction of Army Group Center is a little–known World War II Eastern Front battle. The destruction of the 25 to 30 German divisions that attended Army Group Center's collapse makes it a very significant battle. For obvious reasons, Operation *Bagration* is a model for military historians and art–of–war students studying the Soviet army. This catastrophe, combined with the heavy losses sustained by the *Wehrmacht* in Normandy, marked the beginning of the *Wehrmacht*'s end as an effective fighting force.

In *Hitler's Greatest Defeat*, the late Paul Adair gives a succinct description of the events leading up to this battle, the actual battle and its aftermath. Keep a good atlas nearby when reading though, since maps are conspicuously absent. However, Adair's use of eyewitness accounts and vivid prose more than compensate for this lack. Of particular note are the ways in which the Red Army pinned fleeing Army Group Center remnants against river obstacles and used the partisans to harry the fleeing Germans and secure operationally important objectives. *Hitler's Greatest Defeat* is a worthwhile addition to any military student's library.

COL S. Wayne Kohlwes, *USAR, Signal Mountain, Tennessee*

THE STRUCTURE OF STRATEGIC REVOLUTION: Total War and the Roots of the Soviet Warfare State by James J. Schneider. 334 pages. Presidio Press, Novato, CA. 1994. $35.00.

The US Army moved from a tactical–strategic to a tactical–operational–strategic orientation beginning in the mid–1980s. The US Army Command and General Staff College (USACGSC) and the School of Advanced Military Studies (SAMS) at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, were in the forefront of this effort as Generals Gordon R. Sullivan, Frederick M. Franks Jr., Huba Wass de Czege and John R. Landry and Colonel David M. Glantz studied, directed and pointed the way to operational–level warfighting.

Many operational lessons the US Army adapted were taken directly from Soviet operational art. Army officers began studying the Soviet operational experience at USACGSC, and selected officers continued this study at SAMS. Many SAMS graduates were key planners in the stellar operational success— Operation *Desert Storm*.

James J. Schneider has held the SAMS chair of military theory since 1984 and has directly influenced the current generation of US Army operational planners. In this book, he uses a series of essays to describe his view of operational art development from its American Civil War roots through its development in Russia and the Soviet Union before World War II. He expands this operational view to the strategic view that drove the Soviet "war state." His main emphasis is on the historical links between grand strategy and campaign planning and their assimilation into

the Soviet strategic concept. He presents the challenge of adjusting to continual warfare change and the chameleon nature of warfighting. His work is well researched, objective and fairly comprehensive.

As with any book encompassing so large a field, there are some areas that are omitted or given short shrift. The reader must cover 63 pages before coming to the first definition of strategy and tactics—and these definitions immediately change and continue changing along with warfare changes. The result—they are never fully defined. An initial definition of terms would help. Other areas given short shrift include the Franco–Prussian War's impact on the General Staff system; and the impact of N.P. Mikhnevich's 1911 *Strategy* and A.A. Svechin's 1926 *Strategy* on war planning.

The fact that the A.A. Svechin–M.N. Tukachevsky debate occurred is acknowledged, yet Svechin's position in this pivotal debate is never discussed, although Svechin's strategic concepts could have prevented the Soviet army's disastrous performance during Operation *Barbarossa*. Finally, Joseph Stalin is credited with holding a minimalist position that would keep the Soviet Union on the strategic defensive during the initial period of war. This was true during the early 1930s but had clearly changed by June 1941.

Overall, this is an excellent book that provides the military professional with insight into the Soviet strategic war model. Although the Soviet Union has dissolved, the body of knowledge and ideas that supported its strategic concepts remain and are still relevant as the professional ponders the strategy and nature of future war.

LTC Lester W. Grau, *USA, Retired, Foreign Military Studies Office, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas*

THE ART OF WAR IN WORLD HISTORY: From Antiquity to the Nuclear Age. Edited by Gerard Chaliand. 1,115 pages. University of California Press, Berkeley, CA. 1994. $75.00 clothbound. $30.00 paperback.

If you want a convenient, single-volume compilation of the seminal works on the art of war, this hefty tome, edited by Gerald Chaliand, is just what you seek. Covering all eras, it ranges from an ancient Egyptian

inscription describing Ramses II's triumph at Kadesh, circa 1295 B.C., to nuclear–age gurus Bernard Brodie, Albert Wohlstetter and Henry Kissinger.

Chaliand's other books have concentrated on the Third World, oppressed minority groups and unconventional warfare, but here he makes a concerted effort to include as many cultures as practical, reproducing the works of ancient Egyptians, Babylonians, Greeks, Romans, Persians, Indians, Chinese, Ottomans and Arabs, with an occasional Mongol, Aztec and Byzantine thrown in for good measure. Traditionalists may criticize Chaliand for choosing so many selections from irregular warfare, but taken all together, the pieces are comprehensive, well selected, sometimes enlightening and always interesting.

Chaliand's introductory essay, "Warfare and Strategic Cultures," is an excellent overview of war and strategy from a global perspective. He captures succinctly the reason why the study of war in its many forms remains important for today's strategists and decision makers, even in the post–Cold War world. He says, "Strategies today need to be more refined than ever, since conflict situations are increasingly complex and multifaceted and more than ever call for clear–sighted perception of threats and determination in tackling them, while military force and capacity to respond remain the indispensable guarantors of security."

The book's 165 pieces are organized by geographical region, such as Ancient Near East, China, Mongolia and Central Asia; or era, such as Age of Limited War in the West, Age of Total Wars and Nuclear Age. This organization works very well for the military history student requiring a handy reference or brief survey of the world's important military thought. While some writers may not be familiar to Western readers, Chaliand includes almost all the superstars of military thought. He even includes the most famous advocate of nonviolence in history: Mohatma Ghandhi. Few will argue with either Chaliand's choice of individuals or the specific selections of their works.

Nitpickers may question the large number of French writers and thinkers included. Considering the book was first published in France, this is not surprising or especially damaging to the overall work. Taken individually, it is hard to argue for deleting any.

As most selections were not originally written in English, another criticism might be the choice of translations used. For example, it is generally agreed today that the definitive translation of Carl von Clausewitz's most important work, *On War,* is the one by Peter Paret and Michael Howard. It is clearly the superior work, capturing Clausewitz's original meanings and intentions, and therefore, a much better vehicle for the uninitiated. Chaliand, however, chose J.J. Graham's translation, which fails to adequately express the subtle nuances.

Despite these minor flaws, *The Art of War in World History* is a fine collection of the many works on warfare over the centuries and truly represents a global collection. As a single-volume sourcebook on the theory of war, no more comprehensive work exists. Along with Paret's *Makers of Modern Strategy,* which provides a more detailed, thoughtful analysis of the importance and impact of the major Western warfare theorists, Chaliand's book stands as a useful, comprehensive sample survey of the art of war's entire body of works.

COL Jerry D. Morelock, USA,
Combat Studies Institute, USACGSC

TRUMAN AND THE HIROSHIMA CULT by Robert P. Newman. 261 pages. Michigan State University Press, East Lansing, MI. 1995. $34.95.

In 1995, the 50th anniversary of the atomic bombing of Japan, there were at least a dozen new books and countless articles published on the topic. As the author of a 50–page study on the issue for the Combat Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, I have become well aware that this topic's au-thors tend to repeat themselves. If you have read one, you likely have read them all. Robert P. Newman's book is the exception. It is the most cogent reply to the thesis usually proposed by so–called antiwar or antinuclear weapon advocates. They posit that Japan was ready to surrender before the bomb was dropped and that the US government knew this but dropped the bomb to scare the Soviet Union into evacuating territory it conquered (or was about to conquer) in Europe and East Asia, particularly Poland and Manchuria.

Newman's book is not a narrative history of events. For this, I suggest reading Robert Maddox's *Weapons for Victory.* Newman's book reads a lot like Gerald Posner's *Case Closed: Lee Harvey Oswald and the Assassination of JFK.* In his book, Posner put all the flimsy claims of a conspiracy to kill President John F. Kennedy, and that Oswald did not do it, under an analytical microscope, proving that alleged exculpatory evidence is evidence of nothing at all. Newman does the same thing on the atomic bombing of Japan issue.

I cannot do justice to the depth and intricacies of most of Newman's arguments, but let me explain one briefly. The antibomb school frequently cites the postwar studies of the Strategic Bombing Survey that Japan would have surrendered without a US invasion, even without using the atomic bomb. Newman, who has read the National Archives' survey files, points out that survey director Paul Nitze had been a critic of strategic bombing (as opposed to battlefield air interdiction) in Europe; came to Japan after the surrender to get more data against strategic bombing; and conducted, in a foreign language and a foreign culture, one of the fastest studies on record. Newman further points out that most raw data did not support the study's conclusion. Most Japanese government leaders and almost all Japanese armed forces testified to US interrogators that the atomic bomb was very important in causing them to sue for peace.

If you are looking for hyperbole and unsubstantiated claims, read the other books about Hiroshima. If you are looking for an in–depth examination of claims, you should read *Truman and the Hiroshima Cult.*

Michael D. Pearlman,
Combat Studies Institute, USACGSC

WARRIORS IN PEACETIME:
The Military and Democracy in Latin America, New Directions for US Policy.
Edited by Gabriel Marcella. 163 pages. Frank Cass Publishers, Ilford, England. 1994. $35.00 clothbound. $19.50 paperback.

This slim volume is the most important book on civil–military relations specifically related to Latin America to appear in recent years. Edited by Gabriel Marcella, a Third World studies professor at the US Army War College, *Warriors in Peacetime* grew out of the December 1992 Inter–American Defense College Conference. Within the Americas' democratic revival context, it links related notions of what soldiers, suddenly at peace, do within US policy toward the region. The collection's strength lies in raising the right questions, which more than justifies the book's purchase.

Warriors in Peacetime does suffer from an inability to weave tightly its two central themes: the Latin American armed forces' role in the democratic societies marking the region in this post–Cold War era; and the ways US Armed Forces should interact with their Latin American comrades–in–arms to strengthen democratic civil–military relations. Both are pronounced North American policy goals.

Despite this, both themes stand out. The articles by Marcella, Juan Rial and Richard Millett clearly address the first theme and not entirely optimistically. Marcella points out some difficulties developing appropriate armed forces roles during declining budgets and low–threat perceptions. Rial notes civil–military relations have not moved nearly as far as the democratic transition suggests. Finally, Millett points to the "backsliding" on democracy represented by the successful 1991 Haitian coup, the Venezuelan and Argentine 1992 coup attempts and Peruvian President Alberto K. Fujimori's 1992 *autogolpe*.

US policy issues range from Kenneth Sharpe's North American drug policy critique; through Howard Wiarda's guided tour of human rights and democracy policy development; to Jack LeCuyer's discussion of military policy tools, with emphasis on military engineers and nation assistance; and Ambassador Cresencio Arcos' articulate analysis of Latin American democracy problems and defense of current US policy.

Sharpe's piece argues that North American drug policy is counterproductive to its Latin American democracy goals. Although he may be right, it is for the wrong reasons. As Ambassador Edwin Corr stated in his commentary on Sharpe's presentation, the US government never did devote the funds needed to support its drug war on the supply side. Although Wiarda discusses developing and consolidating a policy, he does not suggest how that policy might and should evolve to focus the question of "warriors in peacetime."

LeCuyer addresses the relationship between the US Armed Forces and their Latin American counterparts, but he implies that tactically employing military engineers on "good works" will have a positive operational and strategic effect on civil–military relations. This article of faith is, however, not logically supported by effectively linking the three operational levels.

Arcos' brilliant analysis of the impunity of tying civilian politicians to what has been perceived as a purely military problem is not matched in his US policy discussion. Neo–liberal economic restructuring, contrary to Arcos' implicit position, will not solve the impunity problem. For more than the purely venal reasons he articulates, it will provoke real and legitimate opposition among both the leaders and the led.

The final chapter by Marcella and Don Schulz summarizes the book and the conference. It captures the flavor of some discussions and picks up the comments of other participants whose papers were not included.

Retired General Fred Woerner best captures the diversity of this initial exploration of an immense and immensely important topic in his foreword: "US policymakers need to sustain a strategy of constructive engagement with the Latin American military institution for the purpose of strengthening the foundations of democracy. Such a strategy will, however, not succeed unless civilian professional competence in all the interrelated issues raised in this volume . . . is strengthened. Therefore, engaging and educating Latin American civilians in these areas is the new and compelling challenge for [US] policy and the democratic community of nations."

Although *Warriors in Peacetime* does not provide the recipe for successful democratic civil–military relations in Latin America and the other new and fragile world democracies, it does pose the right questions. This should be required reading for the military professional as this century closes.

John T. Fishel, *Department of Joint and Combined Operations, USACGSC*

SECURITY, DEMOCRACY, AND DEVELOPMENT IN U.S.–LATIN AMERICAN RELATIONS. Edited by Lars Schoultz, William C. Smith and Augusto Varas. 284 pages. Transaction Publishers, New Brunswick, NJ. 1995. $22.95.

US–Latin American specialists team up with several Latin American academics to present essays on emerging national security topics within the region. This volume is one in an excellent series produced by the University of Miami's North–South Center. It is valuable reading for Western Hemispheric national security and strategic issues specialists. The essays' four topical areas are the changing national security environment, military–to–military relations,

arms and arms control and future security regimes for the region.

The Latin American scholars' entries are strong for two reasons. They show an emerging presence of Latin American scholars who can write on admittedly sensitive defense issues via the accepted international language of national security policy studies. They also show an encouraging awareness that real security challenges exist, with a need for Latin American civilian leadership to engage frontally in the debate with regional military and police commanders. Professor Francisco Rojas Aravena of Costa Rica has a particularly strong entry on this topic.

The US contributors, especially lead author Lars Schoultz, appear to have discovered partially that there is more to Western Hemisphere security analysis than bashing US efforts to defend its backyard during the Cold War. Nina M. Serafino's essay on US–Latin America military activities is an excellent inventory of possibilities and caveats.

This book is far from being the *magnum opus* on its subject. Professors J. Samuel Fitch and Schoultz are still smitten with the notion that national security planners in Washington, D.C., remain eager to fund and operate hegemonic programs south of the Rio Grande—a politicized idea not sustainable by evidence, even at the Cold War's peak. Only one essay by Rojas Aravena deals strongly with the economic, political and defense linkage, which the book's title purports to address.

The book of choice to date on emerging US–Latin American relationships is *Latin America in a New World,* edited by Abraham F. Lowenthal and Gregory F. Treverton. The two books best addressing the region's national security policy are *Evolving U.S. Strategy for Latin America and the Caribbean*, edited by L. Erik Kjonnerod, and *Warriors in Peacetime: The Military and Democracy in Latin America*, edited by Gabriel Marcella. A book on Latin America national security policy with full political, military and economic articulation still awaits authorship.

Russell W. Ramsey, *US Army School of the Americas, Fort Benning, Georgia*

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ATORL anticipates significant increases in paper, digital and multimedia materials on the tactical and operational levels of war. CARL constantly acquires new resources and access to new resources located elsewhere, making its users less dependent on just CARL holdings.

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